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Abstract: Although the child support enforcement and criminal justice systems have 
divergent purposes, they are connected when courts jail parents who owe child support 
debt. Jailing for child support nonpayment is one of many possible mechanisms of child 
support enforcement, but little is known about how frequently this tactic is used, against 
whom, and what the consequences are. Using a mixed methods design, this project 
explores the frequency, process, and consequences of jail for child support nonpayment. 
This dissertation is divided into four substantive chapters. In Chapter 1, I use data from 
the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study (FFCW) to explore the prevalence of jail 
for child support debt in a national context, finding that about 14% of debtors go to jail 
for this debt by the time their child is nine years old. I propose two conceptual pathways 
into jail, and find that debt load and family complexity are major predictors of 
incarceration. In Chapter 2, I map the legal process of finding a parent in contempt and 
committing the parent to jail, focusing on the role of judicial discretion at three crucial 
decision points in the life of a case. Focusing on my field work in Riley County, Chapter 
 ix 
3 argues that child support officials police the work and family choices of nonresident 
parents in ways conceptually similar to how welfare policy controls recipients’ behavior. 
Chapter 4 identifies how interpersonal gendered disputes translate into legal action in the 
child support enforcement process. This project has the potential to contribute to the 
national conversation about legal debt, family change, and criminal justice reform, as 
well as to inform laws and policies concerning child support, criminal justice, and the 
family. This project also has implications for the study of inequality. Through 
triangulating a range of novel data sources, this dissertation investigates how one legal 
process—punitive child support enforcement—affects people’s lives and life chances.   
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Methodological Forward 
 The combination of data that I use in this dissertation is somewhat unconventional. 
Because I am investigating a topic about which little is known, I follow Harris (2016) in using 
what she calls a “kitchen sink” approach—incorporating “everything but the kitchen sink” into 
my analysis (p. 180). I am combining as many sources of data as I can, because each data source 
is imperfect. When these data sources are combined, however, they tell a much more complete 
story about the phenomenon under investigation. 
Data sources 
 There are five data sources that I use in this dissertation. The introduction draws on 
administrative data collected at two levels: first, national administrative data collected by the 
Association for Children and Families (ACF) and the Office of Child Support Enforcement 
(OCSE), and second, local administrative data that I obtained from two counties in Texas. The 
major strength of the ACF and OCSE data is that they provide information on the entire 
population of child support and public assistance cases over a period of about twenty years, 
allowing me to map trends in the number of people impacted and the amount of money spent. 
However, questions of magnitude and trends over time are about the only questions that they can 
answer. These data are not individual-level, and do not contain information on most the 
characteristics that I find to be important (e.g., income, relationship status, etc.). Nor can they 
answer any questions about the behavior or attitudes of the effected population. 
 The local administrative data come from two counties that I call Riley County and Verde 
County Texas. The strength of each data source is that it provides information on the entire 
population of child support cases (Riley County data) or jail inmates (Verde County data) during 
one full year of study. Like the OCSE and ACF data, these data allow me to answer questions of 
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magnitude—how many people went to jail for contempt of child support in 2015? How many 
orders for child support enforcement were filed in 2015? The limitations of these data are similar 
to the OCSE and ACF data as well. These local administrative data sources provide little 
information on the characteristics that I’m interested in, and they cannot answer any questions 
about behavior or attitudes. Moreover, I only observe each population for only one year—I 
cannot comment on how representative 2015 is compared with any other year before or since. 
Finally, these data sources come from two different counties, so they cannot be combined. I have 
to make a lot of assumptions while using these data (which I detail in the Introduction), and the 
estimates that I derive from them are not very precise. 
 The third data source that I use in this dissertation is the Fragile Families and Child 
Wellbeing dataset (FFCW). This is a national stratified sample of births occurring in large U.S. 
cities. (More detail about this study can be found in Chapter One, or at 
https://fragilefamilies.princeton.edu/). Unlike the administrative data sources described above, 
the FFCW provides a host of relevant variables that are important for understanding this 
phenomenon. This is a relatively large dataset with enough statistical power to do complex 
statistical models and find correlations between key variables. These quantitative data allow me 
to document statistical associations between variables, but cannot provide explanations as to why 
these associations occur. Another drawback of the FFCW is that selection is operating within the 
subsamples that I analyze, which I discuss in more detail in Chapter One. The findings from this 
chapter are not representative of the U.S. population as a whole. However, the individuals who 
make it into my subsamples appear to be representative of the at-risk population.  
 The fourth data source in this dissertation comes from ethnographic observation that I 
conducted in two Texas counties, described in Chapter Two. In 2016, I observed 250 child 
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support hearings in Riley County and Masters County. The strength of this observational data is 
that it provided rich detailed information about exactly what happens during child support 
hearings. I observed the behavior of judges, litigants, and attorneys, taking note of the arguments 
that they made, how they presented themselves, and the emotional tenor of their testimony. A 
sample size of 250 is also relatively large for a qualitative study. However, I only observed in 
two counties so I cannot speak to the generalizability of these findings to other Texas counties, 
or to courts in other states. I also only observed people who ended up in court—there may have 
been other litigants who owed child support but were able to avoid a court appearance. I cannot 
speak to their experiences.  
 The final source of data comes from in-depth interviews that I conducted with parents I 
recruited from Riley County court. More detail on the recruitment and sample can be found in 
Chapter Four. The strength of the interview data is that it provided rich, detailed information on 
people’s narratives, perceptions, beliefs, and understandings of their experiences. My sampling 
methods were relatively systematic, as I recruited on the same day each week until I reached the 
desired sample size. One limitation is that I only spoke with 31 people, which is a relatively 
small sample size. Because I sampled out of child support court, I didn’t hear the stories of 
anyone who did not show up to court. I also only sampled out of one county. These experiences 
are not necessarily generalizable to child support litigants in any other jurisdiction. 
 In the dissertation that follows, I generally move from large, national data to small, local 
data—and from a quantitative overview of how much something happens to a qualitative 
exploration of how it happens and how people feel about it. It isn’t perfect, but we can think of 
the Riley County interviewees as sampled from the Riley County observations, which should be 
accounted for in the Riley County administrative data, which are aggregated up into the OCSE 
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and ACF data. These data sources are related, but not necessarily overlapping. Through 
combining the best available data together, I provide as comprehensive of an understanding of 
this phenomenon as possible. 
Generalizability, reliability, and reflexivity 
 The data sources that I use are imperfect, as described above, and therefore of limited 
generalizability. The most generalizable data source is the ACF and OCSE data, which are 
representative of all welfare and child support cases in the United States over the past 30 years. 
The Fragile Families data is less generalizable, because of the sample selection mechanisms that 
I detail in Chapter One. The local administrative data sources are generalizable only to the 
counties that they come from—the child support case data is generalizable to Riley County and 
the jail data to Verde County. The observational data is only generalizable to the courts of the 
judges I observed in the counties in which it was conducted. As mentioned above, it is not 
generalizable to the experiences of parents who never ended up in the court room. I believe that 
the interview data is reasonably generalizable to the experience of most litigants in Riley County, 
although those who agreed to be interviewed and showed up to the interview may be more 
advantaged than those who could not be interviewed because, for example, they were in jail 
awaiting their hearings. 
 With the proper data access, the quantitative data analysis that I’ve done should be 
replicable. I had to do a lot of work on the front end to get the data into an analyzable format, but 
someone doing the same analyses as me with the data coded the same way should get the same 
results. The issue of reliability is somewhat more complex for the qualitative data. In regards to 
the observational data, I was more of an observer than a participant in the courtroom. Most of the 
time, I quietly took notes on the proceedings. However, I interacted with the judges, attorneys, 
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and court personnel a fair amount. It’s possible that my presence and my relationships with them 
could have impacted their behavior. The interview encounters, too, are determined by exactly 
who is conducting them. In-depth interviewing “focuses on the constructions narrators put on 
[their lived events], in conversation with [the interviewer]” (Lewin 2009:39, emphasis in 
original). 
 My particular embodiment—as a pre-professional white PhD student in her late 
twenties—likely shaped the qualitative data that I gathered. Because of the generous access that I 
was given in both field sites, I was frequently mistaken for an attorney or court official. I 
certainly looked like the court officials, dressed in business casual clothing and sitting close to 
the bench. Sometimes, during recesses, litigants would approach me to ask me questions, before 
I told them that I didn’t actually work in the court. It’s likely that the officials themselves 
perceived me as a peer—sometimes Judge Salinas would affectionately announce that the court’s 
“resident doctor” was here today. I did nothing to dispute this during the observational phase, 
largely keeping my critiques of the system to myself. 
 As I shifted gears from observing in Riley County to thinking about how to recruit 
interview participants, my association with the court system became an object of worry for the 
judge. This concern almost stopped her from allowing me to recruit in the court. The disaster was 
averted after I worked with someone in the Office of Court Administrators to write a “letter of 
independence” to the judge and the Attorney General’s Office that made it clear that I am not 
affiliated with the state in any way. Whenever I solicited recruits, I made it clear that I was an 
independent researcher from the University of Texas. Despite this speech, it’s possible that some 
litigants remembered me from the earlier observational phase and associated me with the 
government anyway. This could have deterred some folks from agreeing to an interview.  
  6 
My gender, too, shaped the recruiting and interviewing experience. Women were much 
more likely to agree to be interviewed by me than men were. After a few weeks of this, I began 
targeting my recruiting efforts towards men only, to better gender balance my sample. I was 
similar in age to many of the interviewees, in their twenties and thirties, and found easy rapport 
especially with women around my age. One of the interviews with a man who was about my age 
became awkward, when someone (presumably a girlfriend) called him during the interview and 
he had to assure her he wasn’t on a date with me. Other interviewees asked me whether I had any 
children, and whether I wanted them someday. 
Unlike the observational phase, when I kept my critiques of the system to myself, I 
sometimes disclosed my real feelings about the system to my respondents to help with rapport. 
This strategy seemed to work best with men who started out reticent, but opened up more once 
they realized that I was critical of the system too.  
Like all face-to-face interactions, my embodiment impacted what I was able to learn from 
my research sites and respondents. Together with the other data sources that I collected—and 
with the caveats that I describe here and elsewhere—these data together present what I see as a 
relatively complete picture of jailing for child support nonpayment. 
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Introduction 
Although the child support enforcement and criminal justice systems have divergent 
purposes, they are connected when courts jail parents who owe child support debt. Jailing for 
child support nonpayment is one of many possible mechanisms of child support enforcement, but 
little is known about how frequently this tactic is used, against whom, and what the 
consequences are. Using a mixed methods design, this dissertation explores the frequency, 
process, and consequences of jail for child support nonpayment. 
   Contempt for child support nonpayment is ostensibly non-punitive—meant to coerce 
compliance with a court order, not to punish those who disobey (Cook & Noyes 2011). Courts 
maintain that, in cases of civil incarceration, prisoners “carry the [jail] keys in their own pockets” 
because they will be released once they pay (Mnookin 1981: 362). Most child support policy is 
based on the idea of the deadbeat dad: one who is able to pay his support, but unwilling. If the 
majority of noncustodial parents in child support court are “deadbeats,” jailing could be a 
rational response to this problem, forcing parents to pay their support in exchange for their 
freedom. If, instead, parents do not pay because they cannot afford to, the purpose of 
incarcerating them for nonpayment demands more investigation.  
   As part of this dissertation, I interviewed two defense attorneys—one private attorney 
and one public defender. I asked each of them whether they had ever represented parents who 
were “deadbeat dads”—able but unwilling to pay. Each said that this situation was rare. Lydia,1 a 
white private attorney, could think of a handful:  
Every blue moon, there’s usually a man who can pay. He’s not being able to see the child, so 
he says ‘Eff you.’… Rarely, I must say, I’ve come across three or four deadbeats, real 
deadbeats. People I almost don’t wanna represent, but that happens. 
                                                 
1 All respondents and jurisdictions in this dissertation have been given pseudonyms to preserve anonymity. 
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Anne, a white public defender, could think of only two:  
Of all the cases that I have represented, any type of enforcement of child support, I can think 
of two that I represented [who actually could have paid.]… I think the law was put in place 
on the assumption that you could pay your child support if you wanted to. Many of the 
people I represent couldn’t pay it unless they won the lottery. 
 
   If Lydia and Anne are right, and most of the nonresident parents who go to jail for their 
child support are unable to pay, this brings about a whole host of questions. How did the system 
come to incarcerate poor parents for debts they cannot pay? Who goes to jail for this, and what 
sorts of factors increase one’s risk of jail? What happens in the courtroom? How does gendered 
relationship conflict factor in? What are the consequences of this policy? 
   This dissertation aims to answer these questions. The outline of this chapter proceeds as 
follows. First, I review the child support system’s raison d’etre. What does the child support 
system aim to do? I divide the goals of the child support system into two categories: fiscal and 
social. First, I evaluate the system’s fiscal goal of welfare cost recovery and provide an estimate 
of the cost of incarcerating parents for nonpayment. Turning to child support’s social goals, I end 
the chapter with an outline of the dissertation that follows.  
What is the child support system trying to do? 
Implemented in 1975 as part IV-D of the Social Security Act, the child support 
enforcement program was established “primarily as a method of reducing public expenditures on 
welfare” (Farrel et al., 2003, p. 1), in addition to “strengthen[ing] families by securing financial 
support for children from their noncustodial parent … and helping … families to remain self-
sufficient and off public assistance” (Solomon-Fears 2013a, p.1). These goals can be divided into 
two broad categories: fiscal goals, and social goals. The fiscal goal of the child support system is 
welfare cost recovery and avoidance. The social goal of the child support system is “parental 
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responsibility”–making noncustodial parents contribute financially to their children. Of course, 
there is some overlap between these goals insofar as noncustodial parents’ child support 
contributions are seen as a driver of welfare avoidance, but nonetheless, there is conceptual 
usefulness in differentiating between these goals. Below, I focus on the fiscal goal of welfare 
cost recovery and avoidance. 
In regards to child support’s fiscal goal, it is important to understand the two key ways 
that the child support and cash welfare systems are connected. First, receiving welfare leads to 
the automatic opening of a child support case, and requires cooperation with enforcement efforts 
(Josephson 1997). Unlike custodial parents without welfare involvement—who decide for 
themselves when and why to file for child support—welfare recipients have no choice but to 
cooperate with child support efforts. Any child support that the nonresident parent pays while the 
resident parent is receiving cash welfare2 is kept by the government, and child support debt that 
accrues during the time a family is receiving welfare is owed to the government, not the 
custodial parent (Bartfeld 2003). This recovered child support is used to reimburse the state and 
federal government for welfare expenditures.  
Because this money is assigned to the state, the state has the ability to seek enforcement 
of the child support order by any mechanism, including wage garnishment, tax intercept, and 
even contempt of court. The state can pursue these actions even if the custodial parent disagrees 
(Bartfeld 2003). Like with child support establishment, the welfare recipient has no choice but to 
comply with state enforcement efforts. In contrast, in child support orders without welfare 
                                                 
2 Aside from a small pass through in some states (but cf. Meyer, Cancian, & Nam 2007). 
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involvement, the custodial parent can choose how hard she3 wants to enforce the child support 
order, and can close the case or forgive debt as she sees fit (Bartfeld 2003).   
The second way child support and welfare are connected is that child support is 
considered a means of welfare-avoidance to the state—providing families with child support is 
thought to help them reach economic self-sufficiency so that they do not need welfare, 
transferring costs from public assistance to private cash transfers from the other parent 
(Josephson 1997; Pirog & Ziol-Guest 2006; Turetsky 1998; 2005). Thus, the government 
considers child support a type of welfare cost avoidance, and up to $2.6 billion in indirect 
savings has been attributed to child support (Solomon-Fears 2012; Turetsky 2005).  
Therefore, the main fiscal rationale behind child support enforcement is to reduce the cost 
of welfare through a) recovering the cost of welfare services from nonresident parents; and b) 
deterring welfare participation through the provision of child support. Yet, major demographic and 
policy changes have called into question how well the system meets this goal. 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 
1996, commonly known as “welfare reform,” made major changes to the welfare system, 
transforming it from an open-ended entitlement to which all low-income custodial parents were 
eligible to a block grant program run by the states, with multiple eligibility requirements. To be 
eligible to receive assistance after welfare reform, mothers were required to seek employment 
and comply with child support enforcement (Collins & Mayer 2010; Hays 2004; Lens 2009). 
Failure to comply with work and child support requirements could make women lose their 
benefits. Even mothers who fully comply find their benefits expired after five years, since 
                                                 
3 About 4 of every 5 non-custodial parents are dads (Census 2012), so I use “he/his” for non-custodial parents and 
“she/hers” for custodial parents throughout the dissertation for ease of understanding for the reader, unless otherwise 
specified. I discuss more about what happens when gender and custodial status do not align in this way at the end of 
Chapter Four.  
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welfare reform also instigated a lifetime assistance limit. These changes to welfare policy 
resulted in a drastic reduction in caseload, from about 5 million families in 1993 to 2 million 
families in 2011 (Loprest 2012).  
At the same time, the child support caseload was undergoing significant demographic 
change. When the child support enforcement system was first implemented, most child support 
clients were divorced. Today, an increasing share have never been married (Case, Lin, & 
McLanahan 2003). Economic transformation, demographic changes, and increases in family 
complexity result in a child support caseload that may be less able to afford to pay child support 
than ever before (Sinkewicz & Garfinkel 2009). Indeed, Sorenson and Zibman (2001) estimate 
that about a third of nonresident parents who owe child support cannot afford to pay. Of these 
fathers, about two-thirds are Black or Latino (Mincy & Sorenson 1998). When child support is 
unpaid, it becomes a debt owed to either the custodial parent or the government. Ten years ago, 
half of all child support debt was owed to the government (OCSE 2004); today, the government 
share of child support debt has dwindled to 25% (OCSE 2014). An overwhelming majority of 
child support debt is owed by those with very low reported income. Only 17% of child support 
debt is owed by parents with reported annual incomes above $20,000 (Sorenson et al. 2007). Of 
the remaining debt, about half (42%) is owed by parents with no reported income (Sorenson et 
al. 2007).  
Given these changes in welfare policy and the demographic composition of the child 
support caseload, how well does child support enforcement recover the cost of providing cash 
welfare? Here, I reexamine the cost-recovery function of child support policy.4  
                                                 
4 To answer these questions, I draw on publicly available government data collected by the Administration for 
Children and Families (ACF), a division of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. First, I aggregate 
historical data compiled by the Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement for their annual reports to Congress 
from 1992-2014. These data are available through the search function of the OCSE’s website 
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Evaluating the cost-recovery function of child support 
 Recall that PRWORA sought to reduce welfare spending in two ways: reducing welfare 
caseload and recovering the cost of welfare with child support payments. PRWORA did indeed 
shrink the welfare caseload greatly. Figure 1 graphs the AFDC/TANF caseload from 1975-2015. 
In 1975, there were almost 12 million individuals receiving AFDC. The number of recipients 
peaked in 1995, at slightly under 14 million, right before welfare reform. Following PRWORA, 
the welfare caseload fell by half in just five years, and has continued a slow descent ever since. 
In 2015, there were only about 3 million individual recipients of TANF. 
 
Figure 1. Total individual recipients of AFDC and TANF, before and after welfare reform. 
Source: OFA. 
                                                 
(https://www.acf.hhs.gov/css). By hand, I downloaded and aggregated data on child support caseload, collections, 
and arrears from the OCSE’s Annual Reports to Congress, with earliest available data beginning in 1992 
(https://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/data-reports/caseload/caseload_archive.html; 
https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/167036/4spending.pdf) . In addition, I also compiled data from the Office of 
Family Assistance (OFA) on AFDC and TANF expenditures and caseload through the ACF-OFA archive 
(https://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofs/data/archives.html; 
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2005/9g.html). I also draw on data from the Congressional 
Research Service (Solomon-Fears 2012) to focus on cost/savings of the child support enforcement system to state 
and federal governments. 
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  This vast reduction in welfare caseload had significant implications for the child support 
caseload. Figure 2 graphs changes in the composition of the child support caseload over time. 
Before welfare reform, 45% of the child support caseload had a custodial parent who was 
receiving welfare (OCSE 1992). Three years after welfare reform, the share of child support 
cases currently receiving welfare had fallen to 20%. Today, only about 10% of the child support 
caseload has a parent who is currently receiving welfare although 40% of cases have a parent 
who is a former recipient.5  Slightly more than half of the child support caseload has never 
received public assistance. 
 
Figure 2. Child support caseload by assistance status. 
Source: OCSE 
                                                 
5 Figure 2 starts in 1999 instead of 1992 because of a change in OCSE documentation. Before 1999, cases were 
classified as welfare or non-welfare (with former assistance and never assistance cases grouped together in the non-
welfare category); after 1999, cases were specified as current, former, or never assistance (Solomon Fears 2012). 
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Because the state keeps child support paid to families currently receiving welfare, 
changes in the composition of the child support caseload led to a decline in the amount of child 
support retained by the state. Figure 3 graphs the share of child support collections retained by 
the government over time, showing that it has fallen from almost 30% in 1992 to only about 5% 
today. Although welfare cases made up 45% of the child support caseload in 1992, they 
accounted for less than 30% of the collections; today, these numbers are 10% and 3%, 
respectively. This demonstrates that welfare-involved child support collections are 
disproportionately low compared to their prevalence in the caseload. Partners of welfare 
recipients pay less child support and owe high debts.  
 
Figure 3. Percent of total child support collections retained by the state. 
 Source: OCSE. 
Taken together, Figures 1, 2, and 3 demonstrate how the changing child support caseload 
has altered the state’s ability to recover welfare expenditures through child support. In other 
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words, the first strategy for reducing welfare expenses (cutting caseload) undermined the second 
(child support collections recovering the cost of welfare).   
Finally, I use data from the Congressional Research Service to examine the state and 
federal cost of the child support enforcement system. Until 1999, welfare cost recovery 
generated revenue for states because the cost of recovering child support was less than the 
amount of assigned child support that states retained (Solomon-Fears 2012). Since then, 
however, assigned child support payments have not drawn a profit. Figure 4 graphs the cost and 
savings to state and federal governments of the child support enforcement program over time. 
This shows that child support no longer recovers the cost of cash welfare for either the federal or 
state governments, even as welfare caseload (Pirog & Ziol-Guest 2006), and subsequent costs, 
have declined.6 
.  
                                                 
6 This is probably an underestimate of the economic irrationality of the cost-recovery mechanism. In 2015, only 
25% of TANF expenditures were made on direct cash assistance to poor families (Schott et al. 2015).  
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Figure 4. Cost/savings of the child support enforcement system to state and federal governments. 
Source: Solomon Fears 2012. 
The cost of jailing for child support nonpayment 
Above, I have demonstrated that the child support enforcement system no longer meets 
its goal of recovering the cost of welfare provision. Yet, incarcerating parents for unpaid child 
support could be economically irrational in its own way. To my knowledge, there are no existing 
estimates of how much it costs to incarcerate parents for their child support nonpayment. Using 
the best available county-level data, here I provide a back-of-the-envelope calculation of this 
cost.   
 The process of incarcerating someone for child support nonpayment requires a number of 
legal actions and motions. These result in court costs that are not typically accounted for in the 
cost-effectiveness measures that the state child support agency reports to the federal OCSE. In 
Texas, the child support agency that prosecutes noncustodial parents is a division of the state 
Attorney General’s Office. But, Child Support Courts are funded separately from the Attorney 
General’s Office, and therefore are not counted as an administrative expense of the child support 
agency (OCA 2015).  
 To estimate the cost of the legal process of jailing someone for child support debt, I use 
two sources of government data. The first comes from the Riley County District Clerk’s office. I 
obtained individual-level records for the three most critical legal motions filed in child support 
enforcement cases for the calendar year 2015. The first motion of interest is the number of capias 
arrest warrants ordered against child support debtors. These are issued when a parent is ordered 
to appear in court on a child support action and fails to appear. During the calendar year of 2015, 
there were 2,195 capias arrest warrants issued by the Attorney General’s Office against child 
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support debtors. The second legal action of interest is the motion for enforcement, the first legal 
motion filed in the process of incarcerating someone for child support nonpayment. During 
calendar year 2015, there were 698 motions for enforcement filed by the Attorney General’s 
Office against child support debtors. The third motion of interest is the motion to revoke child 
support probation. These motions most closely approximate the number of people who are 
sentenced to jail for child support nonpayment. In the calendar year of 2015, there were 301 
revocation motions filed by the Attorney General’s Office against child support debtors. This is 
43% of the total enforcement actions filed during the same time period.7 Of the 301 individuals 
against whom revocation motions were filed in 2015, 242 (80% of the total) have either had a 
warrant out against them or had bonded out of jail at some point during the life of their case.8 
 One way to approximate the cost of these legal motions is to examine the legal fees that 
are associated with these legal actions. Some legal fees are passed on to the litigants, meaning 
that those against whom these motions are filed must repay the state some portion of the cost of 
executing each legal action (Katzenstein & Waller 2015). Examining these fee schedules can 
shed light on how much these legal motions cost. Yet, government officials may not be able to 
pass the full cost of these motions onto litigants, so these estimates provide a low-bound of the 
cost of the legal process of jailing someone for child support debt. A motion for contempt is 
associated with a fee of $65, as is a motion for enforcement (OCA 2014). In family law cases, 
the contempt fee drops to $15 (OCA 2014), as limited by statute (Texas Family Code §110.002). 
                                                 
7 This doesn’t necessarily mean that these are the same people, however—the legal process of enforcing child 
support payment through jail time is lengthy, and could take longer than a year. However, since every motion for 
probation revocation is preceded by a motion for enforcement, this provides a snapshot approximation of how many 
enforcement actions are followed by probation revocations. 
8 These individuals have either bonded out of jail or have had an arrest or capias warrant out against them sometime 
in the history of their case. These data come from online searches of District Court Records for each individual 
cause number of those against whom a 2015 revocation action was filed. I thank Natalie Lewis for her research 
assistance on this. 
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However, it is reasonable to believe that filing this motion still costs the state at least $65, even if 
they are only able to pass $15 of this cost on to the litigants. Since both the motion for contempt 
and the motion for enforcement are each associated with a $65 fee that can be passed to the 
litigant, I therefore assume that each of these legal actions each cost the state $65. Combined, 
therefore, the legal prerequisites of jailing for child support nonpayment amounted to an expense 
of more than $200,000 for Riley County in 2015. Table 1 provides a summary of these legal 
actions. 
  N Cost Sum 
Capias 2195  $     65.00   $  142,675.00  
Motion for 
Enforcement 698  $     65.00   $    45,370.00  
Motion to Revoke 301  $     65.00   $    19,565.00  
Sum  3194   $  207,610.00  
Table 1. Key legal actions against child support debtors in Riley County. 
These court costs do not include the cost of holding someone in jail for child support. To 
estimate this value, I use a second source of data. These data come from reports of individuals 
entering and leaving Verde County jail. I acquired these data from an open records request to the 
Verde County Information Technology Department, for one calendar year from June 12, 2015 to 
June 12, 2016.  Since child support nonpayment results in a charge of contempt, I am pulling all 
of the contempt citations during that year period. In all, 586 individuals were jailed for contempt 
of court in Verde County during the period of study.  
Yet, not all of these contempt of court findings were necessarily for child support 
nonpayment. Some of these individuals could have been held in contempt of court for other 
reasons, such as being disrespectful to a Judge or the nonpayment of another fine or fee. Verde 
County has two Associate Judges who are tasked with hearing child support enforcement cases. 
Thus, it is a fair assumption that anyone charged with contempt who was released on the court 
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order of one of these two Associate Judges were held for child support. Of the 586 individuals 
held in contempt of court, 270 of them were released on the order of a child support judge, about 
46% of the overall contempt sample. However, more than 270 might be held for child support, 
we just cannot know for sure. Therefore, the number who are released on a IV-D Associate 
Judge’s court order provides the lower bound estimate of how many people are held for child 
support nonpayment. Table 2 provides details on the Verde County data. 
 
 All contempt Child support indicator 
Total days in jail 27262 16311 
Average cost per person per stay (low 
bound)  $       1,442.12   $                   1,872.71  
Average cost per person per stay (high 
bound)  $       2,744.68   $                   3,564.19  
Total cost (low bound)  $    845,122.00   $                505,641.00  
Total cost (high bound)  $ 1,608,458.00   $                962,349.00  
N 586 270 
Table 2. Individuals serving time for contempt in Verde County Jail. 
To calculate the cost of jailing for contempt, I used various estimates of the cost of a 
night in jail in Verde County. The lowest estimate is $31/night and the highest estimate is 
$59/night.9 I report both the high and low bounds for both the full contempt sample and the child 
support indicator contempt sample. Taken together, the minimum cost of jailing for child support 
nonpayment in Verde County from June 2015 to June 2016 ranged from $505,641 to $962,349 
for the sample that was released on the order of a child support Associate Judge. More broadly, 
the total cost of jailing for contempt in Verde County from June 2015 to June 2016 ranged from 
$845,122 to $1,608,458.  
                                                 
9 The first estimate comes from a 2014 news story and the second comes from a 2008 government report. For 
confidentiality reasons, I don’t cite these, but I will make these citations available upon request. 
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Because these data sources come from two different counties, we can’t exactly combine 
them to estimate the total cost of jailing someone for child support nonpayment. But, if we 
assume constant rates of legal motions and incarceration for single parent families across the 
state of Texas, we can derive cost-per-capita and extrapolate to estimate the cost of these legal 
motions to the state as a whole.10 These estimates are displayed in Table 3. In sum, I estimate the 
cost of legal and carceral child support enforcement in Texas in 2015 to be somewhere between 
$12.1 and $27.7 million.11 
                                                 
10 The assumption that rates of legal motions and incarceration are constant across the state may not be empirically 
true. However, in the absence of publicly available state wide data, this is the closest possible estimate. 
11 Again, this estimate omits other costs to the child support system that I could not obtain data on, such as service 
process for orders to appear in court, the cost of booking and processing child support debtors once they’ve been 
arrested, the overhead of running child support specialty court, including Associate Judge’s salaries, among other 
possible expenses. 
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 Verde Riley Texas 
 All contempt 
Child support 
indicator All contempt 
Child support 
indicator All contempt 
Child support 
indicator 
Number of single 
parent families12 
80,000 50,000 1,151,578 
Total cost of legal 
process  $      332,176.00   $   332,176.00   $ 207,610.00   $ 207,610.00   $   4,781,582.17   $   4,781,582.17  
Cost of legal process 
per capita  $                4.15   $             4.15   $            4.15   $             4.15   $               4.15   $               4.15  
Total cost of jailing 
(low bound)  $    845,122.00   $ 505,641.00   $   528,201.25   $   316,025.63   $ 12,165,298.78   $   7,278,563.14  
Cost of jailing per 
capita (low bound)  $             10.56   $            6.32   $           10.56   $             6.32   $             10.56   $               6.32  
Total cost of jailing 
(high bound)  $ 1,608,458.00   $ 962,349.00   $ 1,005,286.25   $   601,468.13   $ 23,153,310.58   $ 13,852,749.21  
Cost of jailing per 
capita (high bound)  $             20.11   $          12.03   $           20.11   $           12.03   $             20.11   $             12.03  
Sum (low bound)  $    1,177,298.00   $   837,817.00   $   735,811.25   $   523,635.63   $ 16,946,880.95   $ 12,060,145.32  
Sum (high bound)  $    1,940,634.00   $ 1,294,525.00   $ 1,212,896.25   $   809,078.13   $ 27,934,892.76   $ 18,634,331.38  
Table 3. Extrapolation of county-level costs to estimate the cost of legal and carceral child support across the state of Texas.13
                                                 
12 The population of single parent families for each county and for Texas as a whole comes from the 2010 American Communities Survey (ACS). Accessed via: 
http://www.socialexplorer.com/. To retain anonymity, Verde and Riley County single parent family values are rounded to the nearest 10,000. 
 
13 Note: Bold values come from the Verde and Riley County data shown in Tables 1 and 2, or are per-capita costs derived from these original values in Tables 1 
and 2. Per capita cost values are derived as the total cost divided by the number of single-parent families in each county. Total cost values not displayed in bold 
are estimates derived from multiplying the per-capita cost by the number of single parent families. 
 22 
 
 
Together, the costs of the legal process of jailing for child support—and the cost of 
housing a child support debtor in jail—represent a substantial amount of money. Jail time also 
increases child support debt through continuing child support orders even while an individual is 
incapacitated and cannot earn money (Reynolds et al. 2009). 
Finally, existing evidence suggests that jail is not an effective way to recover child 
support debt. Less than 2% of child support collections are associated with incarceration or the 
threat of incarceration for child support nonpayment (Solomon-Fears, Smith, & Berry 2012).14  
This has led government entities to discourage the use of jailing for child support nonpayment 
(Solomon-Fears, Smith, & Berry 2012). However, my data demonstrate that this practice 
continues in many jurisdictions, including the Texas counties that I observe.   
The dissertation that follows 
If, as we have seen above, jailing for child support debt is not an effective method of cost 
recovery—and, indeed, raises the price of debt recovery—why do officials continue to pursue 
this tactic? In the dissertation that follows, I explore the meaning of incarceration for child 
support nonpayment, its prevalence, its process, and its consequences. 
 In this introduction, I have explored the fiscal motivations behind child support policy, 
finding it to be economically ineffective at recovering the cost of welfare. But what of child 
support’s social goal—promoting “parental responsibility” for children? The rest of this 
                                                 
14 In 2014, Texas collected more than $3.8 billion in child support. 1.9% of this amount is equal to about $73 
million, while my highest cost estimate is only about $28 million. One could argue that this means jailing—though 
expensive—is still cost-effective. However, there are problems with this line of reasoning. First, we don’t know how 
much of the $73 million in collections is associated with jailing as opposed to the threat of jail—something that 
Solomon-Fears, Smith, and Berry (2012) combine in their analysis. Second, it’s unclear that those who pay when 
threatened with jail time are similar in characteristics to those who serve jail time. Third, my cost estimate omits a 
number of other significant costs, including the cost of serving someone with a court order, the cost of arresting and 
booking someone, and the overhead costs associated with child support enforcement court. In order to assess  
whether this is truly cost-effective, we need more publicly available data on child support enforcement. 
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dissertation looks at the complexity of this issue, including what parents, prosecutors, and judges 
expect from nonresident parents.  
The dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 provides a quantitative overview of 
jailing for child support nonpayment. In this chapter, I use data from the Fragile Families and 
Child Wellbeing Study (FFCW) to explore the prevalence of jail for child support debt in a 
national context, finding that about 14% of debtors go to jail for this debt by the time their child 
is nine years old. I propose two conceptual pathways into jail, and find that debt load and family 
complexity are major predictors of incarceration. 
 Chapter 2 moves into the courtroom, where I draw upon court observation of 250 child 
support hearings across two Texas jurisdictions. Here, I focus on the role of judicial discretion at 
three key moments in a child support enforcement case: whether or not a parent is found indigent 
and provided with a court-appointed attorney, whether or not a parent is granted lower bond so 
he can be released while he awaits trial, and whether or not a parent is given another chance to 
pay his debt before being ordered to serve out his sentence.  I find that whose courtroom a parent 
ends up in has significant consequences. 
 Chapter 3 focuses on one of my two field sites to look at how one judge polices the 
earning, spending, and family decisions of the nonresident parents in her court, enforcing her 
normative parenting standards through punishing parents who don’t comply. Unlike those 
outside the child support system—who make the same personal decisions every day—the parents 
who end up in child support court are subject to state sanction about these choices. 
Chapter 4 draws on twenty-nine in-depth interviews that I conducted with parents that I 
met in court. This chapter demonstrates that parents perceive child support court as an arena in 
which to play out gendered relationship conflict. Within a racially diverse group of mostly poor 
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and working-class mothers and fathers, a range of sometimes contradictory power dynamics can 
land parents who don’t pay in jail. 
Finally, the Conclusion presents some consequences of this policy on the lives of those 
entangled in this system. In this section, I summarize the major arguments of this dissertation, 
point to the major dysfunctions that exist in the system today, and offer policy recommendations.  
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Chapter One. Public Assistance, Relationship Context, and Jail for Child 
Support Debt15 
Introduction 
 Previous studies of poverty governance (Beckett & Western 2001; Sugie 2012) have 
focused on how the service provision and punishment functions of the state—conceptualized, 
respectively, as the state’s “left” and “right” hands—work together in simultaneous welfare state 
retrenchment and criminal justice expansion (Wacquant 2009). Yet, less attention has been paid 
to a third institution that bridges the gap between the welfare and criminal justice systems, 
shading into both at each end – child support enforcement. Child support enforcement is 
connected to the welfare system through the assignment of child support payments to the state 
when parents receive public assistance (Coven 1997). Child support enforcement also feeds into 
the criminal justice system, as noncustodial parents (NCPs) who fail to pay their court-ordered 
child support payments can be found in contempt of court and incarcerated for their failure to 
pay (HHS 2002). Researchers have likened jailing for child support nonpayment to a modern 
form of debtor’s prison, as many who go to jail for this reason may be unable to afford to pay 
their child support (Patterson 2008).  Jailing for child support nonpayment is just one of many 
mechanisms of child support enforcement, but little is known about how frequently this tactic is 
used, or against whom. 
In this spirit, this study investigates who goes to jail for child support nonpayment. Using 
longitudinal data from four waves of the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study (FFCW), 
this chapter examines how noncustodial parents find themselves at risk of being sent to jail for 
their child support debt. Child support debt exceeded $114 billion in 2014 (OCSE 2014a). About 
                                                 
15 This chapter has been published as a journal article, as Cozzolino (2018).  
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a quarter of all child support debt is owed to the state to reimburse welfare payments while the 
remaining 75% is owed to the child’s custodial parent (OCSE 2014b). With this in mind, I 
identify two conceptual pathways into jail for child support nonpayment—one instigated by the 
state against NCPs whose children have received public assistance, and the other instigated by 
the child’s custodial parent. I examine how each pathway—public assistance involvement and 
relationship context—influences a nonresident parent’s risk of being jailed for child support 
nonpayment. 
 This study has theoretical, empirical, and policy implications. Theoretically, this 
investigation of jailing for child support nonpayment bridges the gap between studies of welfare 
state retrenchment and the criminal justice system, illustrating how this third institution 
contributes to the governance of social marginality for an increasing portion of the population. 
The child support enforcement system also constitutes part of the “shadow carceral state,” as 
parents jailed for the civil offense of child support nonpayment do not receive the same due 
process protections afforded to those accused of criminal offenses (Beckett & Murakawa 2012; 
Patterson 2008). Empirically, I provide national estimates of how many people are incarcerated 
for their child support debt, and what factors shape the risk of jail. To my knowledge, the only 
existing estimates of jailing for child support nonpayment are on the state or county-level 
(Chambers 1979; Cook 2015; May & Roulet 2005). In regards to policy, this study has 
ramifications for child wellbeing. Parental criminal justice involvement is associated with 
negative outcomes for children (Turney 2014; Wakefiled & Wildeman 2014; Wildeman 2010). 
One of the aims of the child support enforcement system is to improve child wellbeing by 
increasing the support of nonresident parents (Josephson 1997), something that could be 
compromised when jailing is the chosen tactic for child support enforcement. 
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Literature Review 
Founded with the intention of welfare cost recovery and carrying a sanction of 
incarceration for those that do not pay, the child support enforcement system exercises both the 
left and the right hands of the state (Wacquant 2009) at different moments. This study 
contributes to larger discussions of poverty governance by investigating the child support 
enforcement system’s connection to both the welfare and criminal justice systems.  
Poverty Governance: Incarceration, Welfare and Child Support Enforcement 
 Studies of prisoners and welfare recipients have noted the similarities between these two 
populations, which are disproportionately low-income, less educated, and nonwhite (Western & 
Wildeman 2009; Soss 1999). Theorists have identified an increasingly punitive and paternalist 
approach to poverty governance (Beckett & Western 2001; Soss, Fording, & Shram 2008), 
which explains the simultaneous decline of welfare rolls and expansion of the criminal justice 
system. Moreover, research suggests that a disproportionate share of public assistance recipients 
have incarcerated partners (Ovwigho et al. 2005), and that parental incarceration is associated 
with the receipt of some, but not all, public assistance programs (Sugie 2012).  
In addition to the overlap between the welfare and criminal justice systems, there is also 
substantial overlap between the institutions of child support enforcement and the criminal justice 
system. This overlap occurs at two points – first, many inmates who have committed criminal 
offenses accrue child support debt during their incarceration, and second, incarceration is one 
possible sanction for failure to pay child support. Parents with incarceration history make up a 
disproportionate share of those owing child support debt (Ovwigho et al. 2005). While recent 
research has examined the legal debt that accompanies incarceration and its ramifications for 
social inequality (Harris 2016; Harris, Evans & Beckett 2010), less attention has been paid to the 
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role of child support debt for former inmates. Yet, child support debt is estimated to be the 
highest debt that former inmates owe upon release (Reynolds et. al 2009). 
 Parents who fail to make their court-ordered child support payments can end up in jail 
through three possible mechanisms: criminal nonsupport, willful interstate evasion of child 
support,16 and civil contempt of court for failure to pay court-ordered child support. Research 
suggests that civil contempt of court is the most common mechanism (Cook 2015). Contempt of 
court is a charge that ostensibly aims to coerce compliance rather than punish behavior, as 
parents can be released upon payment (Patterson 2008; Cook & Noyes 2011). This offense is 
classified as civil, requiring fewer safeguards than criminal offenses (HHS 2002). Jailing for 
contempt of court constitutes part of the “shadow carceral state,” an extension of state power to 
detain beyond the traditional criminal context (Beckett & Murakawa 2012). Under the shadow 
carceral state, institutions that have not been considered part of the traditional criminal justice 
system —such as child support enforcement courts—acquire the capacity to detain. Few prior 
studies have empirically sought to figure out how many people are sent to jail for child support 
nonpayment, and most have estimated this phenomenon on a state or local level (Chambers 
1979; Cook 2015; May & Roulet 2005). Therefore, the first aim of this chapter is to show how 
many child support debtors spend time in jail for their failure to pay. 
The child support enforcement system is also intertwined with public assistance 
provision. Eligibility for welfare can be revoked if recipients do not conform their work and 
family behavior to welfare policy prescriptions (Hays 2004; Collins & Mayer 2010). Among 
these is the requirement that welfare recipients comply with child support enforcement efforts 
(Josephson 1997). When a parent applies for TANF or Medicaid, the state automatically opens a 
                                                 
16 See 18 U.S. Code § 228 (DOJ 2012). 
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child support order on her behalf so that child support collections can reimburse the state for the 
cost of its welfare provision (Coven 1997; Roberts 2001). This policy is an example of welfare 
state retrenchment, a transference of costs from the public in terms of government-provided 
assistance, to private cash transfers from the parent who lives apart from the child (Alexander 
2005; Josephson 1997). When parents fall behind on their child support payments and 
accumulate debt, those with family public assistance history find that the state owns some 
portion of their child support debt (Solomon Fears 2012).  
 Family public assistance history, therefore, shapes the child support enforcement process. 
When child support debt is owed to the state, the state can proceed in efforts to collect on this 
debt even if the custodial parent does not agree (HHS 2002). About half of the child support 
caseload consists of families with a history of current (10%) or prior (40%) welfare receipt 
(OCSE 2014a).17 Child support debt is huge in magnitude, totaling more than $114 billion in 
2014, and about 70% of the 15 million open child support cases owe debt (OCSE 2014a). About 
a quarter of all child support debt is owed to the state, the other 75% is owed to the child’s 
custodial parent—usually the mother (OCSE 2014b). Many custodial parents are owed child 
support debt, but they may not all pursue this debt. A mother might seek to enforce child support 
against a noncustodial parent when relationship quality is low, or when either parent has moved 
on with a new partner or new children.  With this in mind, I identify two conceptual pathways 
into jail for child support nonpayment—one instigated by the state against NCPs whose children 
have received public assistance, and the other instigated by the child’s custodial parent.  
                                                 
17 Since Medicaid is a much bigger programs in terms of receipt than TANF (Sugie 2012), the number of child 
support cases with Medicaid involvement is likely much higher – however, caseload by Medicaid status is not 
reported by the OCSE (OCSE 2014a). 
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Going to jail for child support nonpayment is a multistep process (See Figure 5). For a 
nonresident parent to be at risk of going to jail for child support nonpayment, he18 must live apart 
from the child’s mother, have a formal child support order and owe child support debt. The 
second aim of this chapter is to see how these different pathways shape the risk of jail for child 
support nonpayment. I analyze how the public assistance and relationship context pathways 
operate to move a noncustodial parent through each progressive step of the process—having a 
formal order, accumulating child support debt, and finally going to jail for this debt. 
 
Figure 5. Jail for child support nonpayment as a multi-step process. 
Pathways: Public Assistance and Relationship Context 
 I argue that public assistance history and relationship context will shape a parent’s 
progress into becoming at risk of jail for child support nonpayment. Below, I review the 
literature on how each pathway should operate at each step of the process. 
                                                 
18 About 4 of every 5 non-custodial parents are dads (Census 2012), so I use “he/his” in this chapter for ease of 
understanding for the reader. Furthermore, the pool of female NCPs in FFCW is too small for analysis. However, 
female NCPs are likewise at risk of incarceration for child support nonpayment, and may face unique vulnerabilities. 
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Formal Child Support  
As described above, the state automatically opens a child support order against the 
nonresident parent when a custodial parent applies for TANF or Medicaid (Roberts 2001). In 
regards to relationship quality, establishment of a child support order may signal a breakdown in 
the parental relationship, and an associated decline in informal and in-kind support 
(Nepomnyaschy & Garfinkel 2010; Waller & Plotnick 2001; Meyer & Cancian 2012; Kane, 
Nelson & Edin 2015). Evidence from qualitative studies suggests that lower relationship quality 
and the loss of informal support can lead custodial parents to pursue formal support as a “last 
resort” (Edin 2000; Waller 2002; Waller & Plotnick 2001).19 Beginning a new relationship and 
having children with a new partner could also lead to a loss of support to the first family, 
compelling the first mother to open a formal child support order against the father (Edin & 
Nelson 2013). Thus, public assistance history and relationship quality may shape the likelihood 
that a family becomes involved with the formal child support enforcement system. 
Child Support Debt 
A parent must be in the formal child support system in order for him to accrue child 
support debt. Child support debt consists of any child support or medical support that has been 
ordered but has not been paid. In Texas, for instance, unpaid child support becomes classified as 
a debt if it is at least one month past due (Texas Family Code § 157.266). Some states have 
policies for ordering retroactive child support, where child support orders that are established 
several years after parents break up can be retroactively determined to start at the date that the 
parents broke up, or even the date of the child’s birth, rather than the date that the order was 
                                                 
19 Other analyses of the FFCW show that initial levels of informal support are higher than formal support, and that 
over time, formal support provided does not reach the initial levels of informal support (Nepomnyaschy & Garfinkel 
2010). Thus, the breakdown of the parental relationship that goes along with the establishment of a formal support 
order may also signal a decline in the value of support provided to children. 
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established (Office of Inspector General 2000). This can lead to parents owing a debt balance 
right from the moment of establishment. Furthermore, states vary as to the value of interest that 
they charge on child support debts. Some states, like New Jersey, don’t charge any interest, 
while other states like Illinois and Ohio charge up to 10% annually (Sorenson et al. 2007). 
Retroactive debts, unpaid child support, and interest all make up child support debt. 
Public assistance involvement could increase the likelihood of child support debt by 
affecting a nonresident dad’s willingness and ability to pay. While a custodial parent is receiving 
TANF, she doesn’t get to keep any of her child support payments, aside from a small pass 
through in some states. Seeing that she doesn’t receive his child support payments could make a 
dad less willing to pay his child support (Waller & Plotnick 2001), perhaps because he sees the 
situation as unfair (Lin 2000). Similarly, mothers with public assistance involvement may have 
children with fathers who have low earnings potential. Studies of assortative mating using the 
FFCW have shown that most mothers have more or equal educational attainment compared to 
fathers (Goldstein & Harknett 2006). When mothers have low educational attainment and 
earnings potential and turn to public assistance to make ends meet, this could signify that the 
fathers of their children are similarly low income. Ability to pay is a strong negative predictor of 
child support debt (Huang, Mincy, & Garfinkel 2005). Furthermore, a mother’s Medicaid receipt 
increases the total sum of monthly support that a noncustodial father must pay, by adding some 
amount of medical reimbursement to the existing monthly child support order (Solomon Fears 
2013). In some states, when mothers are on Medicaid, hospital birthing costs are billed to the 
noncustodial parent, creating a medical support debt from the first moments of his child’s life 
(Bartfeld & Meyer 2003). Having a larger order may increase the likelihood of debt, especially 
for low-income parents. 
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 Similarly, relationship factors may also shape a noncustodial parent’s willingness and 
ability to pay child support and—by extension—drive the likelihood of child support debt 
accumulation. Relationship conflict is associated with child support debt (Turner & Waller 
2017), and conflict and mistrust between parents is one reason that fathers give for their 
hesitation to pay child support (Cozzolino & Williams 2017). Family complexity also increases 
the likelihood of child support debt (Meyer, Cancian & Cook 2005) and could plausibly affect 
both a nonresident parent’s willingness and his ability to pay.  When dad has a new partner and 
children, he often “starts over” with this new family, which results in a lower investment in the 
first partner and children (Edin & Nelson 2013). Dad’s family complexity may also affect his 
ability to pay, as new residential children must compete for resources with his other 
nonresidential children. Furthermore, the magnitude of a child support order generally increases 
as it is spread across multiple households. For instance, a father with three children making 
$20,000 a year in Wisconsin will pay an annual child support order of $5800 if all three children 
are in one household, but $8564 if these three children are spread across three households 
(Meyer, Cancian & Cook 2005). Mom’s family complexity may also affect dad’s willingness to 
stay current on his child support payments, as he becomes unable to monitor how she spends her 
child support payments (Craigie 2015), and can’t be certain that these payments aren’t being 
spent on another man’s child. Thus, public assistance history and relationship quality may drive 
whether or not a custodial parent accumulates child support debt. 
Jail for Child Support Nonpayment 
A parent must owe child support debt in order to be jailed for child support nonpayment. 
Failing to pay child support is a necessary prerequisite to any of the three routes into jail 
(interstate evasion, criminal nonsupport, and civil contempt). In addition to their contribution to 
 34 
 
the likelihood of a nonresident parent a) entering the formal child support system, and b) 
accumulating child support debt,  public assistance history and relationship quality may also 
directly affect the likelihood of a nonresident parent being sent to jail for his child support debt. 
For families with public assistance history, the state has a financial incentive to pursue child 
support debt, because they get to keep some portion of what is recovered (Solomon Fears 2012). 
In cases where debt recovery through more routine enforcement mechanisms is difficult 
(Bartfeld & Meyer 2003), the state may be more willing to turn to punitive actions such as 
contempt of court. Some research suggests that fathers whose families have public assistance 
history are more likely to be jailed than fathers without this involvement (Chambers 1979). 
 Relationship factors may also drive the likelihood of a parent being jailed for child 
support nonpayment, when this debt is owed mostly to the child’s mother. Just as parents with 
better relationships are more likely to avoid the formal child support system (Edin 2000; Waller 
& Plotnick 2001), mothers with good relationships are less likely to cooperate with child support 
enforcement efforts (Rich, Garfinkel & Gao 2007; Waller 2002; Hamer 2001). Thus, mothers 
with worse relationships may be more willing to see their children’s fathers go to jail if they 
believe this will help them to recover the debt they are owed. Previous research about men on the 
run from the law has shown that romantic partners are sometimes willing to use the threat of jail 
in their relationship negotiations (Goffman 2014). Indeed, the judicial child support enforcement 
process can become a source of power in gendered conflicts between parents (Elmore 2010). 
Finally, family complexity may also affect the risk of going to jail for child support nonpayment. 
If a father has children with more than one mother, this could increase his exposure to the child 
support enforcement system. The more women that a noncustodial father has had children with, 
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the greater his likelihood that at least one of them will become disenchanted with him and pursue 
child support debt aggressively (Meyer, Cancian & Cook 2005). 
 Based on the preceding discussion, I hypothesize that public assistance history and 
relationship context will each increase the odds of a nonresident parent a) having a formal child 
support order, b) accumulating child support debt, and c) being jailed for child support 
noncompliance. 
Data and Method 
Data Source 
 Data come from four waves of the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study (FFCW), 
when focal children are ages 1, 3, 5, and 9. FFCW is a longitudinal birth cohort sample of nearly 
5,000 families from 20 U.S. cities, of which three quarters of parents were unmarried at birth. 
When weighted with national sampling weights, the FFCW is representative of births occurring 
in cities with populations larger than 200,000 between 1998 and 2000. Because of the 
oversample of unmarried parents, these data are ideal for studying topics related to child support. 
This survey also collects data on involvement with the criminal justice system. To my 
knowledge, FFCW is the only national dataset that measures whether a non-custodial parent has 
gone to jail for child support nonpayment.  
Analytic Strategy 
 Based on the multistep process of jail for child support nonpayment outlined above, this 
analysis follows a similar logic. Within a discrete-time event history framework, I conduct a 
series of three logistic regressions: 
1. Of families with nonresident fathers, what predicts having a formal child support order? 
2. Of fathers with a formal child support order, what predicts having child support debt? 
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3. Of fathers with child support debt, what predicts jail for child support nonpayment? 
 I combine all waves of data and reshape the dataset so that each observation represents one 
person-wave. Each regression is clustered by respondent ID to control for including repeated 
measures of the same individuals over time.  
 This series of regressions allows me to parse out what factors affect progression through each 
step of the process of becoming at risk of jail for child support nonpayment. To adjust for time 
ordering, I conduct these regressions within a discrete-time event history framework. Results 
represent how each variable affects the likelihood of becoming eligible for the next stage of 
analysis by the next wave. At each stage, data were set for discrete-time event history analysis by 
identifying the dependent variable as a marker of failure and nesting repeated observations 
within a respondent’s ID, using the st set suite of commands in Stata 14. For each regression, I 
measure the impact of public assistance and relationship context. The last logistic regression is 
the key outcome of interest, who out of the eligible population of child support debtors is sent to 
jail for nonpayment.  
 For fathers to be eligible to be sent to jail for child support nonpayment they must: a) live 
apart from the mother, b) have a formal child support order, and c) owe child support debt. (See 
Figure 5). Because of this, the sample for each equation is limited to those who are eligible. The 
first logistic regression predicting who has a formal child support order is limited to nonresident 
fathers, the second regression predicting child support debt is limited to those with a formal child 
support order, and the third regression predicting jail for child support nonpayment is limited to 
those with child support debt. Because my analyses focus on particular subsamples of the full 
 37 
 
FFCW, no appropriate weights exist for my samples (Turney 2011).20  The tables that I present 
are unweighted (Sugie 2012; Turney 2014a; Turney 2014b; Wildeman 2010). 
 Because the odds of proceeding through to the next regression depends on a respondent 
making it through the previous step, I control for the predicted probability of having made it 
through the prior step.21 The regression predicting child support debt controls for the predicted 
probability of having a formal child support order, and the regression predicting jail controls for 
the predicted probability of owing child support debt.22  
 There is a large amount of missing in the father’s reports. To minimize this, I combine father 
and mother reports for most measures, coding outcomes as true if either mom or dad reported it. 
Missing data are accounted for using multiple imputation in Stata 14 with fifty imputed datasets 
(Allison 2009). 
  Finally, because child support policies vary widely by state (in terms of order amounts, 
interest on debt, and ability to collect on debt [Roberts 2001]), I make use of the geocoded 
FFCW data to include dummies to control for the state where the respondent resides.23 
                                                 
20 I find significant differences on all key variables of interest based on whether or not a respondent is part of the 
national FFCW sample. Appendix 1 presents results of t-tests demonstrating the differences on key variables 
between respondents who are and are not missing on a FFCW national probability weight, and presents weighted 
means for the descriptive statistics (Haskins 2016; Bzotek, McLanahan, & Carlson 2012).  Because of these 
systematic differences, I present unweighted estimates. 
21 Because my outcome variables are related, it’s possible that the error terms of these three regressions might be 
correlated. To address any disturbances across the three regressions, I redid the models as seemingly unrelated 
regressions (using the Stata suest command for binary outcomes) as an additional sensitivity check. This allowed me 
to estimate all three of the dependent variables simultaneously, to allow for the error terms to be correlated across 
the three outcomes. The results were largely the same (see Appendix 2.)  
22 To further account for the selection of parents into my sample, I also employed coarsened exact matching to 
account for the selection of parents into these groups. Parents were matched on age, race, education, and whether 
they made it through the prior step (e.g., for the debt regression, parents were matched on having a formal child 
support order). Results of these models are substantively the same, so I do not show them (available upon request). 
23 The FFCW is based on a sample of large cities. As a sensitivity analysis, I ran the models with city instead of 
state fixed effects. Results are largely the same (See Appendix 3). Because child support policy is made at the state 
level, I report results from the state fixed effects models in this chapter. 
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Measures 
  There are three dependent variables of interest used in this analysis, describing whether a 
father has a formal order, owes debt, or goes to jail for child support nonpayment during any of 
the survey waves. First is whether or not a given nonresident father has a formal child support 
order. This is a binary variable coded with 1 = formal child support order and 0 = no formal child 
support order. Fathers who live with their children at the current wave are excluded from the first 
logistic regression.  
 The second outcome of interest is whether or not a father owes child support debt. This is a 
binary variable coded as 1 = owes child support debt and 0 = no child support debt. To minimize 
missing values, fathers who are reported as having been to jail for child support nonpayment, 
having faced other child support enforcement, or owing child support debt for children other than 
the focal child are also coded as 1. Fathers without formal child support orders are excluded from 
the second logistic regression. 
 The third outcome of interest is whether or not a father has gone to jail for child support 
nonpayment. This is a binary variable coded as 1 = has gone to jail for child support nonpayment 
and 0 = has never gone to jail for child support nonpayment. Jail for child support nonpayment is 
measured in two questions. The first is measured during the series of questions about the charges 
of dads with criminal justice histories. The second is measured during the series of questions 
asking about child support enforcement. A positive response to either question is coded as a 1.  
Fathers without child support debt are excluded from the third logistic regression. 
 These variables are based on a combination of mother and father reports for each of the four 
survey waves. If either a mother or a father reports that the father has a formal order, owes debt, 
or has been to jail for child support nonpayment, this is coded as true for this survey wave.  
 39 
 
 Key independent variables measure the two pathways into jail for child support nonpayment:  
public assistance involvement and relationship context. 
 Public assistance. I measure public assistance receipt as whether or not the focal child’s 
mother has received TANF or Medicaid.  TANF history is measured as a binary variable 
indicating whether mom has ever received TANF by the current wave, with 1 = has received 
TANF and 0 = has never received TANF. This measure combines two questions on TANF 
receipt. Mothers are asked if they have a) ever received TANF as of that year, or b) have 
received TANF at any time during the interview year. A positive response to either question is 
coded as 1 for that wave. Medicaid history is coded as a binary variable measuring whether mom 
has ever received Medicaid by the current wave. Because the nine year follow up does not 
differentiate between Medicaid and other forms of health insurance, Medicaid receipt is only 
measured up until the time the child is age five. 
 Finally, the third logistic regression includes a measure of the amount of child support debt 
that each father owes at each wave. This is an ordered categorical variable ranging from 1 to 8, 
with values of 1 = owes debt between $1 and $499, 2 = owes debt between $500 and $1,000, 3 = 
owes debt between $1,001 to $2,000, 4 = owes debt between $2,001 and $3,000, 5 = owes debt 
between $3,001 and $4,000, 6 = owes debt between $4,001 and $5,000, 7 = owes debt between 
$5,001 and $10,000, and 8 = owes debt above $10,000. Owing less than $500 in debt is the 
reference category. 
 Relational variables. There are four variables that measure the relationship between parents. 
First is mom’s report of the quality of the parental relationship at each wave. This is a scale with 
values of 0 = I never see him, 1 = Poor quality, 2 = Fair quality, 3 = Good quality, 4 = Very good 
quality, and 5 = Excellent quality. Next is whether either mom or dad is in a relationship with 
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someone new at each wave, based on a combination of mom and dad’s reports with each parent 
reporting on themselves. This is a binary variable with 1 = either parent is in a new relationship 
and 0 = neither parent is in a new relationship. The final two variables measure multi-partner 
fertility (MPF)—whether either parent has children by more than one partner at each wave. The 
measure of mom’s MPF is coded as a binary variable based on mom’s report with 1 = multi-
partner fertility and 0 = no multi-partner fertility. Dad’s MPF is coded the same way, but 
combines mom’s and dad’s reports to minimize missing.  
 The first control is the parent’s relationship at baseline. This is a categorical variable with 
values of 0 = not married or cohabiting, 1 = married at birth, 2 = cohabiting at birth. Next is 
whether dad was incarcerated at baseline. This is based on mom’s report of whether dad was in 
jail or prison at either of their baseline interviews, with a value of 1 = dad is incarcerated. Dad’s 
educational attainment at baseline is measured as a categorical variable with values of 1 = less 
than high school, 2 = high school degree, 3 = some college, and 4 = college degree or higher, 
with less than high school as the reference category. Next is dad’s age at the baseline survey, 
which is coded as a continuous variable. Dad’s race is included as a series of dummy variables 
for Black, Hispanic, and other (race that is not white, Black or Hispanic.) White is the reference 
category. This measure was constructed by the survey developers and measured at the baseline 
survey. 
 In addition to these baseline control variables, I account for several time-varying controls. 
First is a measure of dad’s household income, which is measured as a continuous variable at each 
survey wave. This measure is constructed by the survey developers. I include dad’s employment 
status at each wave as a binary variable reporting whether or not dad was working last week, 
with values of 1 = working and 0 = not working. Both mom and dad reports are combined. Next 
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is whether mom reports any domestic violence from dad. This combines two measures of 
domestic violence that are reported at years 1, 3, 5, and 9 (see Boynton-Jarrett et al. 2010).  
Respondents were coded as 1 if mom reports that dad ever slapped or kicked her, or if dad ever 
seriously injured her. 
 Finally, state of residence is measured as where dad resides at each survey wave. This 
measure is included as a set of fixed effects (not shown, but available on request) measuring 
whether or not each individual dad lived in each state at each wave, with Texas as the reference 
category. Dad’s report of state is prioritized, but to minimize missing, I fill in with mom’s report 
of state if dad’s is missing. 
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  Full FFCW Nonresident Dad=1 
Formal CS 
Order=1 CS Debt=1 
Jail for CS 
Debt=1 
Nonresident dad 0.529  (0.499) 1.000  (0.000) 1.000  (0.000) 1.000  (0.000) 1.000  (0.000) 
Formal child support order 0.265  (0.441) 0.515  (0.500) 1.000  (0.000) 1.000  (0.000) 1.000  (0.000) 
Child support debt 0.149  (0.356) 0.297  (0.457) 0.604  (0.489) 1.000  (0.000) 1.000  (0.000) 
Jail for child support 
nonpayment 0.019  (0.138) 0.039  (0.194) 0.082  (0.274) 0.140  (0.347) 1.000  (0.000) 
Amount of child support 
debt (Categorical) 4.896  (2.394) 4.979  (2.385) 4.979  (2.385) 4.979  (2.385) 5.974  (2.246) 
           
Public Assistance History           
Mom has ever received 
TANF 0.475  (0.499) 0.627  (0.484) 0.641  (0.480) 0.693  (0.461) 0.855  (0.353) 
Mom has received 
Medicaid by wave 3 0.579  (0.494) 0.719  (0.450) 0.730  (0.444) 0.768  (0.422) 0.699  (0.459) 
           
Relational Variables           
Relationship quality  3.074  (1.523) 2.151  (1.420) 2.051  (1.363) 1.752  (1.249) 1.700  (1.284) 
Either parent is in a new 
relationship 0.266  (0.442) 0.500  (0.500) 0.551  (0.497) 0.598  (0.490) 0.592  (0.492) 
Mom has MPF 0.421  (0.494) 0.554  (0.497) 0.580  (0.494) 0.597  (0.491) 0.636  (0.482) 
Dad has MPF 0.533  (0.499) 0.627  (0.484) 0.719  (0.450) 0.726  (0.446) 0.819  (0.386) 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics by subsample. 
 (continued on next page) 
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 Mean (SD) 
  Full FFCW Nonresident Dad=1 Formal CS Order=1 CS Debt=1 Jail for CS Debt=1 
Controls           
Dad worked last week 0.725  (0.446) 0.577  (0.494) 0.628  (0.483) 0.537  (0.499) 0.508  (0.501) 
Relationship at Baseline 
(Categorical) 0.968  (0.870) 0.722  (0.922) 0.706  (0.920) 0.685  (0.921) 0.618  (0.908) 
Dad in jail at baseline 0.039  (0.193) 0.061  (0.239) 0.058  (0.233) 0.065  (0.246) 0.044  (0.206) 
Any domestic violence 0.089  (0.284) 0.155  (0.362) 0.163  (0.369) 0.198  (0.399) 0.187  (0.391) 
Dad's education 
(Categorical) 2.288  (1.060) 2.173  (1.017) 2.168  (0.979) 2.108  (0.977) 2.145  (1.089) 
Dad age at baseline 32.127  (7.718) 31.235  (7.719) 31.719  (7.274) 31.457  (6.928) 31.536  (6.412) 
Dad's household income 
 $ 
47,436.18  (54,954.52) 
 $               
35,179.63  (41,537.10) 
 $              
35,842.95  (39,781.27) 
 $ 
32,321.37  (39,934.43) 
 $            
28,443.12  (27,285.89) 
Dad is White 0.188  (0.391) 0.107  (0.310) 0.110  (0.313) 0.111  (0.314) 0.122  (0.327) 
Dad is Black 0.504  (0.500) 0.631  (0.483) 0.654  (0.476) 0.661  (0.473) 0.678  (0.468) 
Dad is Hispanic 0.264  (0.441) 0.219  (0.414) 0.199  (0.399) 0.191  (0.393) 0.155  (0.362) 
Dad is other race 0.040  (0.196) 0.034  (0.182) 0.032  (0.177) 0.032  (0.177) 0.046  (0.210) 
State of residence 
(Categorical) 32.897  (15.841) 33.523  (15.457) 35.277  (15.210) 35.979  (15.154) 38.363  (13.628) 
Baseline state of residence 
(Categorical) 33.144  (15.770) 33.742  (15.435) 35.512  (15.145) 36.154  (15.123) 38.678  (13.731) 
N  (person-waves) 16,665   8,814   4,284   2,359   304   
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Results 
Descriptive Results 
 Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the full FFCW sample and each limited sample. A 
little more than half of FFCW observations report a nonresident father at any survey wave. Of 
families with nonresident fathers, about half have a formal child support order. Of families with 
a formal child support order, 60% owe debt on this order. And of these child support debtors, 
about 14% go to jail for child support debt. Figure 6 graphs selected characteristics of these 
subsamples to demonstrate differences in public assistance and relationship context among these 
different subsamples. Compared to the analytic subsamples, a smaller share of those in the full 
FFCW have received public assistance or have relationship complexity (a new partner or new 
children). As the sample is refined, generally higher percentages of respondents have public 
assistance history and relationship complexity. For interested readers, Appendix 4 presents the 
percent of FFCW debtors who go to jail from each city (and aggregated by state).24 Figures 1-3 
and Appendix 5 present the results of two-tailed t-tests differentiating between those in and out 
of each subsample. These additional tables and figures can help contextualize how my samples 
compare to one another, and to the full FFCW.  
                                                 
24 In their description of the FFCW sampling procedure, Reichman et al. (2001) describe how cities were sampled 
based on the stringency of their welfare and child support regimes. Comparing Appendix 4 to the original 
classification shows that most of the cities identified by survey designers as punitive or lenient are also punitive or 
lenient when it comes to jailing, with a few exceptions (Austin incarcerates more debtors, and Boston, and Detroit 
each incarcerate fewer debtors than would be expected based on their 2001 child support stringency ratings). 
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Figure 6. Selected characteristics of FFCW subsamples. 
 I now turn to the results from the multivariate models. For Tables 5-7, Model 1 includes 
public assistance measures, Model 2 includes relationship context, and Model 3 includes both. 
For Table 7, Model 4 incorporates information on the amount of child support debt. All models 
include controls for state of residence as well as the sociodemographic controls described above. 
Formal Child Support Order 
 Table 5 displays the multivariate results from a logistic regression predicting a formal child 
support order among nonresident fathers. In the first model, fathers whose children’s mothers 
have ever received TANF by the focal survey wave have 15% higher odds of a formal child 
support order, all else held constant. Model 2 incorporates relational variables. In Model 2, 
relationship quality is negatively associated with the having a formal child support order, as 
every one-point increase in the relationship quality scale is associated with a 5% decline in the 
odds of having a formal order. Either parent having been in a new relationship is associated with 
an 18% increase in the odds of obtaining a formal child support order. Dad’s MPF—but not 
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mom’s MPF—is associated with 2.16 times higher odds of obtaining a formal child support 
order. In the full model, the effect of TANF drops to marginal significance, and relationship 
quality becomes significant, but the rest of the associations are the same. 
 
  Odds Ratio (Standard Error) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Wave 1.131*** 1.098*** 1.114*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Public Assistance History    
Mom has ever received TANF 1.153*  1.127+ 
 (0.075)  (0.075) 
Mom has received Medicaid by wave 3 1.075   1.040  
 (0.071)  (0.070) 
Relational Variables    
Relationship quality   1.008  0.947* 
  (0.021) (0.020) 
Either parent has ever been in a new 
relationship  1.226*** 1.186** 
  (0.065) (0.063) 
Mom has MPF  0.973  0.973  
  (0.063) (0.063) 
Dad has MPF  2.089*** 2.159*** 
  (0.140) (0.145) 
Constant 0.296*** 0.408*** 0.293*** 
 (0.059) (0.083) (0.062) 
    
Observations 8,164  8,164  8,164  
Table 5. Results from logistic regressions predicting formal child support order among families 
with nonresident dads. 
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Robust seeform in parentheses. All models 
control for state of residence, relationship at baseline, whether dad was in jail at baseline, dad’s 
baseline age and education, whether dad worked last week, dad’s household income, and dad’s 
race. 
Child Support Debt 
  Table 6 displays the multivariate results from a logistic regression predicting child support 
debt among fathers with formal child support orders. Compared to the previous model, this 
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model has fewer significant associations, possibly because much of the difference between those 
with and without child support debt are absorbed by the differences between those with and 
without a formal child support order. This model controls for the predicted probability of having 
a formal child support order.  
 In Model 1, neither TANF nor Medicaid is significantly associated with the accrual of child 
support debt.25 In Model 2, relationship quality is negatively associated with the accrual of child 
support debt, as every one-point increase in the relationship quality scale is associated with a 
24% decline in dad’s odds of acquiring child support debt. In Model 3, the effect of TANF 
becomes significant, with fathers whose children’s mothers have ever received TANF by the 
current wave having 38% higher odds of accruing child support debt, compared to those families 
without public assistance involvement. In this model, relationship quality remains significantly 
negatively associated with accruing child support debt, at a similar magnitude as in Model 2.  
  
                                                 
25 A quick note on causality. It is plausible that dad’s child support debt (or, his child support nonpayment that leads 
to this debt) could impel mom to apply for public assistance, instead of mom’s public assistance receipt increasing 
the likelihood of dad’s child support debt (Roberts 2001). As a sensitivity analysis, therefore, I also ran models 
which lagged mom’s TANF receipt by one wave (available on request). The results were robust, so I have 
confidence that causality is operating in the hypothesized direction. 
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  Odds Ratio (Standard Error) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Wave 0.912  1.109+ 1.027  
 (0.069) (0.061) (0.053) 
Public Assistance History    
Mom has ever received TANF 1.167   1.384** 
 (0.142)  (0.147) 
Mom has received Medicaid by wave 3 1.103   1.172+ 
 (0.111)  (0.113) 
Relational Variables    
Relationship quality   0.742*** 0.786*** 
  (0.023) (0.031) 
Either parent has ever been in a new 
relationship  1.276+ 1.163  
  (0.177) (0.128) 
Mom has MPF  1.099  1.021  
  (0.094) (0.088) 
Dad has MPF  1.288  0.731  
  (0.562) (0.273) 
Constant 0.294+ 3.244  1.292  
 (0) (2.640) (0.738) 
    
Observations 3,849  3,849  3,849  
Table 6. Results from logistic regressions predicting child support debt among families with 
formal child support orders. 
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Robust seeform in parentheses. All models 
control for the predicted probability of having a formal child support order, state of residence, 
relationship at baseline, whether dad was in jail at baseline, dad’s baseline age and education, 
whether dad worked last week, dad’s household income, and dad’s race. 
Jail for Child Support Nonpayment 
 Table 7 displays the multivariate results from a logistic regression predicting a jail for child 
support nonpayment among fathers with child support debt.  Again, this model has few 
significant associations, suggesting that much of the difference between those who do and do not 
go to jail for child support debt is absorbed through differences between those with and without 
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debt, and those with and without a formal order. This model controls for the predicted 
probability of having child support debt. 
 In Model 1, neither TANF nor Medicaid is significantly associated with jail for child support 
nonpayment among child support debtors. In Model 2, Dad’s MPF emerges as a significant 
predictor of jail for child support nonpayment among child support debtors, increasing the odds 
of jail by 65%. In Model 3, Dad’s MPF remains the only significant predictor of jail for child 
support debt, with a similar magnitude. Finally, Model 4 incorporates information on the amount 
of child support debt. Compared to parents owing less than $500 in child support debt, parents 
who owe more than $10,000 are almost four times as likely to go to jail for this debt. In Model 4, 
dad’s MPF remains a significant positive predictor of jail, even after controlling for the amount 
of debt. 
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  Odds Ratio (Standard Error) 
  
Model 
1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Wave 1.087+ 1.038  1.051  1.003  
 (0.055) (0.057) (0.050) (0.050) 
Public Assistance History     
Mom has ever received TANF 0.932   0.758  0.733  
 (0.232)  (0.206) (0.198) 
Mom has received Medicaid by wave 3 1.406   1.312  1.305  
 (0.300)  (0.282) (0.285) 
Relationship Factors     
Relationship quality   1.326  1.278  1.356+ 
  (0.265) (0.211) (0.226) 
Either parent has ever been in a new relationship  0.764  0.759  0.741+ 
  (0.131) (0.132) (0.129) 
Mom has MPF  0.991  1.035  1.045  
  (0.165) (0.165) (0.169) 
Dad has MPF  1.649* 1.658** 1.619* 
  (0.324) (0.319) (0.315) 
Amount of CS Debt (Ref: Between $1 and $499)     
$500 to $1,000    1.462  
    (0.734) 
$1,001 to $2,000    1.677  
    (0.808) 
$2,001 to $3,000    1.536  
    (0.787) 
$3,001 to $4,000    1.600  
    (0.906) 
$4,001 to $5,000    1.728  
    (0.931) 
$5,001 to $10,000    2.256+ 
    (1.084) 
More than $10,000    3.849** 
    (1.838) 
Constant 0.054* 0.011* 0.008* 0.004** 
 (0.076) (0.023) (0.016) (0.008) 
     
Observations 2,046  2,046  2,046  2,046  
Table 7. Results from logistic regressions predicting jail for child support nonpayment among 
families with child support debt. 
Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Robust seeform in parentheses. All models control for the 
predicted probability of owing child support debt, state of residence, relationship at baseline, whether dad was in jail 
at baseline, dad’s baseline age and education, whether dad worked last week, dad’s household income, and dad’s 
race. 
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Discussion 
 Taken together, these models provide moderate support for the hypothesized effects of public 
assistance involvement and relationship context on pathways into jail for child support 
nonpayment. Medicaid receipt is never significantly associated with jail for child support debt. 
TANF receipt, on the other hand, is marginally positively associated with the acquisition of a 
child support order (OR= 1.127, p < 0.10) and significantly positively associated with the accrual 
of child support debt (OR= 1.384, p < 0.01). These results are as hypothesized. However, public 
assistance involvement is not significantly associated with jail for child support nonpayment 
among debtors. This could be because public assistance increases the odds of a father making it 
into the risk pool of child support debtors—by (marginally) increasing the odds of obtaining a 
formal order, and by increasing the odds of accruing child support debt—but, once he makes it 
into this risk pool, TANF does not significantly increase his odds of going to jail for this debt.  
 Yet, the amount of child support debt is an extremely strong predictor of jail for child support 
nonpayment, with fathers who owe above $10,000 almost four times as likely to go to jail as 
fathers who owe less than $500. Since TANF is associated with the accrual of debt, it’s possible 
that TANF is operating indirectly through the amount of child support debt to affect the risk of 
jail. However, more analyses are necessary to determine whether this is the case. 
 These results provide consistent support for the relationship context pathway into jail for 
child support nonpayment. At the first stage, relationship quality, either parent having a new 
relationship, and dad’s MPF—but not mom’s—are all associated with obtaining a formal child 
support order. In line with prior qualitative research (e.g., Edin & Nelson 2013; Waller & 
Plotnick 2001), parents with lower relationship quality and parents with new partners and 
children are more likely to have a formal child support order. To my knowledge, this is one of 
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the first studies to find this same effect in quantitative data. At the second stage, relationship 
quality is significantly negatively associated with child support debt accrual, as a one point 
increase in the relationship quality scale is associated with about a 20% decline in the odds of 
accruing child support debt, in line with the hypotheses. Finally, in the third stage, dad’s MPF 
(but not mom’s MPF [cf. Craigie 2015]) is positively associated with jail for child support 
nonpayment among child support debtors, as hypothesized. 
 There are several limitations to these findings. First, I want to hedge the findings about which 
of these pathways is stronger. Because the public assistance pathway is measured by only two 
binary variables and the relationship context pathway is measured through four variables (three 
binary and one categorical), the measures of public assistance receipt have less variance than the 
measures of relationship context. Because of this, the generally stronger support for the 
relationship context pathway could be a statistical artifact. Although both the public assistance 
and relationship context pathways affect the process of becoming at risk of jail for child support, 
these differences in variation make it hard to say whether either pathway is stronger. 
 Second, my sample comes from a particularly low-income and nonwhite subsample of the 
FFCW (See Appendix 5 and Figures 1-3 in Appendix for more on how my samples differ from 
the full FFCW). Because I am analyzing a subsample, these estimates are not weighted with 
national sampling weights. Therefore, the estimates from this article should not be generalized to 
the entire U.S. population. However, we know that incarceration is not equally distributed across 
the population (Alexander 2012; Wakefield & Wildeman 2014). Due to the structure of the child 
support enforcement system, as well as demographic predictors of single parenthood and child 
support debt (Bogenschneider 2000; Sorenson et. al 2007), my analytic sample is likely 
representative of those most at risk of being jailed for child support debt, and my results can still 
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be instructive for those involved in studying the child support, welfare, and criminal justice 
systems.  
 It is perhaps because of this sample refinement that I do not find significant effects for race 
(see full models in Appendices 6-8). Compared to those in the full FFCW, the fathers in my 
formal, debt, and jail samples are all significantly less likely to be white and significantly more 
likely to be Black. Perhaps the effect of differential selection by race is absorbed through the 
predicted probabilities that I include that move from each prior regression to the next.26 Research 
in criminal contexts shows that race matters for judicial discretion (e.g., Demuth 2003; Demuth 
& Steffensmeier 2004; Steffensmeier & Demuth 2001). Future studies should look more closely 
at the effect of race on jailing for child support debt.  
 Further, since child support policy operates on a state level, I control for state of residence 
but do not analyze the effects of any particular state on the risk of jail for child support 
nonpayment. Future research should leverage state-level variation to examine how different child 
support policy levers affect the likelihood of jail for child support debt.27  
 Overall, I find that 14% of child support debtors spend time in jail by the time their children 
are 9 years old. This may seem perplexing, given that 60% of those in the formal sample owe 
                                                 
26 I do not find any main effects for race (See Appendices 6-8). To further investigate this question, I conducted a 
series of interaction tests to see if the effect of relationship context or public assistance varied by race. I interacted 
each of the focal public assistance and relationship context variables by the dummy variables for Hispanic, Black, 
and white. None of the Hispanic interactions were significant. Turning to the Black interactions, relationship quality 
* Black was significant and negative for both the debt and formal regressions. This suggests that an increase in 
relationship quality for Blacks is especially protective against entrance into the formal system or debt accumulation, 
compared to dads who aren’t Black. For the white interactions, being in a new relationship * white was significant 
and positive for the jail regression. Yet, only 3% of the sample fit into this category, suggesting that this significant 
effect could be because of small cell sizes. 
27 Although there is variation in the percentage of debtors incarcerated for child support by city and state (see 
Appendix 4), the role of judicial discretion makes it unlikely that state or city completely determines outcomes. 
Because the FFCW is a sample of large cities, many of the IV-D courts in these cities are likely presided over by 
more than one Judge. One foundational study of child support establishment found great disparities in outcomes 
across individual judges who presided over the same jurisdiction in Denver (Yee 1979). Because contempt of court 
is so dependent on judicial discretion—and because the FFCW cities are so large—I am confident that there remains 
room for judicial discretion within cities and within states, even if we see some variation across cities and states. 
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debt. There are a few reasons why this number may be so low. First, contempt of court can be a 
lengthy process, necessitating a number of legal motions that can be time-consuming. Little is 
known about how this process works across the country, but research from select jurisdictions 
has shown that sheriffs see contempt of court as a low priority, service process can take a long 
time, and in some states28 parents have right to counsel, which can delay a hearing on a contempt 
motion (Dolittle & Lynn 1998). Even when custodial mothers are seeking child support 
enforcement, some complain that the state doesn’t act fast enough or do enough to try and collect 
support from fathers (Josephson 1997). Because it is a civil rather than a criminal matter, law 
enforcement officers may be slower to enforce contempt of court than criminal offenses. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter sought to investigate who, out of those with child support debt, goes to jail for 
this debt. Of child support debtors in the FFCW, about 14% go to jail for child support debt in 
the first 9 years of their children’s lives. To determine risk factors, I employed three logistic 
regressions within a state fixed effects discrete-time event history framework to determine how 
two pathways—public assistance involvement and relationship context—affect progression 
through the steps of becoming at risk of jail for child support debt. To be at risk, a parent must 
live away from his child, have a formal child support order, and owe debt. I find that public 
assistance involvement and relationship context predict movement into having a formal child 
support order and accruing child support debt, but only relationship context predicts jail for child 
                                                 
28 Some states, such as Maryland, provide a lawyer throughout the enforcement process. In others, such as Texas, 
qualifying low-income NCPs are not informed of their right to counsel until incarceration becomes a possible 
outcome. Still, other states never provide a court-appointed attorney because NCPs should not be held in contempt 
unless they have the ability to pay. If they have the ability to pay their child support debt, they also must have the 
ability to pay for their own counsel (HHS 2002) 
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support nonpayment. In addition, dads with $10,000 or more of child support debt have much 
higher odds of going to jail for this debt than dads owing less than $500. 
 This study contributes to the discussion on poverty governance by examining how a third, 
relatively understudied institution—the child support enforcement system—is connected to the 
welfare and criminal justice systems. Receiving public assistance requires families to interact 
with the formal child support system, and parents who owe child support can be sent to jail for 
this debt. Contempt of court for child support nonpayment is a civil, not a criminal, offense; 
therefore the child support enforcement system constitutes part of the shadow carceral state, 
extending the capacity of the state to deprive individuals of liberty, even if they haven’t 
committed criminal offenses (Beckett & Murakawa 2012). The child support enforcement 
system, therefore, is an institution of poverty governance to which more than 11 million child 
support debtors are subject (OCSE 2014a). This is one of the first studies to investigate what 
factors affect one’s likelihood of spending time in jail for child support debt. 
Finally, this study has implications for child wellbeing. There is a large literature on the 
collateral consequences of incarceration, showing negative consequences of incarceration on 
earnings, employment, relationships, and child health and well-being (Wakefield & Wildeman 
2014; Pager 2003; Turney & Wildeman 2013). Child support enforcement aims to increase child 
wellbeing by ensuring that noncustodial fathers contribute to children’s material wellbeing. Yet, 
owing child support debt puts nonresident dads at risk for going to jail, triggering potentially 
negative collateral consequences. Understanding more about jail for child support nonpayment, 
therefore, is important for child wellbeing.  
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Chapter Two. Judicial Discretion in Child Support Enforcement Court 
 Child support enforcement court lies at the intersection of family law, welfare, and the 
criminal justice system. In child support enforcement court, nonresident parents (usually dads) 
face being held in contempt of court and incarcerated if they owe child support debt. Contempt 
for child support nonpayment blurs the line between the civil and criminal justice systems, 
constituting part of the “shadow carceral state” (Beckett & Murakawa 2012), where civil entities 
acquire the capacity to detain. Most research on judicial discretion has focused on criminal 
courts, and most research on judicial discretion as it relates to child support has focused on the 
process of opening a child support order and setting order amounts. This chapter aims to bridge 
the gap between these two literatures by examining how judicial discretion operates in child 
support enforcement court.  
Drawing on field observation of 250 child support enforcement hearings in two 
jurisdictions, this chapter examines the role of judicial discretion at three decision points in the 
life of a child support enforcement case. The first is whether or not a judge finds a parent 
indigent, and eligible for a court-appointed attorney. The second is whether or not a judge is 
willing to lower the bond on which a parent is held while awaiting his child support enforcement 
hearing. The third is whether a judge gives a contemnor another chance to pay down his debt 
before ruling that he serve out his sentence.  
Each of these decision points have real world consequences for the nonresident parents 
who are involved in the child support enforcement system. Individuals with legal representation 
tend to fare better in civil court (Engler 2009). Being detained before trial has shown to have 
negative consequences for individuals in criminal court (Williams 2003). Finally, spending time 
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in custody, whether prison (Wakefield & Wildeman 2014) or jail (Comfort 2015) has a host of 
negative collateral consequences on individuals and their families. 
Literature Review 
Judicial discretion in the criminal justice system 
 The concept of judicial discretion is most often studied in the criminal context. Albonetti 
(1991) provides a summary of two major theories of discretion. The first comes from the 
organizational features of the courts. Experience leads judges to develop “patterned responses” 
for risk management based on cases they have already seen, to help them reach a decision. These 
judges engage in “satisficing” wherein they focus on reducing recidivism. Qualities that they 
associate with the likelihood of future criminal activity are marshalled in their sentencing 
determinations. The second theory focuses on causal attribution—the extent to which judges 
attribute personal and environmental causes to the commission of the crime. For instance, one 
can steal either as a result of greed (personal), or poverty (environmental). If judges attributes 
theft to greed, they are likely to sentence thieves more harshly than if they attribute theft to 
poverty. As with the patterned response theory, attributions are linked to social categories and 
stereotypes, which helps explain racial and socioeconomic disparities in criminal court. 
Compared to whites, people of color are more likely to be sentenced to jail or prison time 
(Steffensmeier & Demut 2001). Furthermore, research has shown that Latinos, followed by 
Blacks, have the least favorable pretrial release decisions, because they are held on higher bond 
and less likely than whites to be able to afford to pay this bond (Demuth 2003; Demuth & 
Steffensmeier 2004). Judicial discretion, whether through patterned responses, attribution, or 
unconscious racial/ethnic biases clearly shapes legal outcomes, with ramifications for inequality. 
 58 
 
These theories of discretion can help us understand how judicial discretion functions in the 
family court context. 
Judicial discretion in child support policy 
Establishment. The child support system was founded with the purposes of ensuring that 
nonresident parents contribute financially to their children, so that custodial parents and children 
would be lifted out of poverty and lose their welfare eligibility (Solomon-Fears 2013). Before 
1984, child support orders were determined on a case-by-case basis, in line with norms of family 
law that allowed judicial decision-making to be tailored to the individual needs and 
circumstances of families (Elrod 1990). This resulted in significant disparities in child support 
order amounts. In her 1979 investigation of child support establishment in Denver, Yee found 
child support order amounts ranging from 6% to 48% of the nonresident parent’s income, 
without readily discernable patterns. For instance, one father making $300/month was ordered to 
pay $125 in child support for one child (42% of his income), while another making 
$1,342/month was ordered to pay only $100 for his one child (7.5% of his income). About 60% 
of the custodial parents in Yee’s study received Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC), and, in 76% of cases, children remained on welfare even after their nonresident parents 
were ordered to pay child support (Yee 1979, p. 39). This finding suggested that child support 
orders didn’t pull the incomes of custodial families above the poverty line. 
Yee’s (1979) study helps provide context for the implementation of child support 
guidelines. According to Garfinkel and Melli (1990), there were three main reasons for 
implementing guidelines: first, order amounts were insufficient to raise children; second, orders 
ranged widely “for no apparent reason” (Elrod 1990, p. 111); and third, policymakers believed 
that making nonresident parents contribute substantially to their children’s upbringing would 
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reduce the welfare rolls. The 1984 Child Support Amendments (HR 4325) instructed states to 
come up with mathematical guidelines for determining child support orders, and the Family 
Support Act of 1988 (HR 1720) made these guidelines presumptory—if judges choose to set a 
child support order that does not follow these guidelines, they must provide reasoning for this 
departure in writing (Elrod 1990; Garfinkel & Melli 1990). These reforms significantly cut down 
on the amount of judicial discretion in child support establishment. In contrast to judicial 
discretion in setting a child support order amount, less research has focused on specific moments 
of judicial discretion in the child support enforcement process. 
Enforcement. In a child support enforcement action, a noncustodial parent who owes 
child support is brought to court to account for this debt. If he is found in contempt of court for 
his failure to obey the child support order, he can be jailed. In Texas, the site of this study, 
contempt of court for child support nonpayment carries a sentence of six months in jail. 
Importantly, contempt of court for child support nonpayment is a civil rather than criminal 
offense. Legal scholars have identified civil contempt as a judicial power that can be capriciously 
applied (Patterson 2008). Indeed, even the Supreme Court pointed to the potential for “most 
tyrannical licentiousness” in how judges exercise the contempt power (International Union, 
United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 831 [1994], cited in Patterson 2008, p. 122).  
In his foundational study of child support enforcement court, Chambers (1979) examined 
the court records of 28 Michigan counties between 1969 and 1974. Chambers found that judicial 
discretion mattered in deciding whether or not to bring an enforcement action against a parent 
who owed child support. After an action was brought, Chambers (1979) found that those who 
were jailed for nonpayment were less likely have legal representation, and more likely to have 
blue-collar jobs, irregular employment histories, problems with alcohol, other criminal justice 
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involvement, and ex-wives who received welfare.  Blacks who owed child support debt were 
also disproportionately likely to be jailed, compared to whites (see also May 2004; Cook 2015). 
More recently, Cook and Noyes (2011) find discretion among individual caseworkers and 
judges regarding when to pursue contempt of court for child support nonpayment. They find that 
some jurisdictions have written guidelines about when contempt should be used to enforce child 
support nonpayment, while other do not.  Some counties employ jail for child support 
nonpayment as a “last resort” while others implement it sooner, as a “wake up call” for parents 
(Cook & Noyes 2011). Furthermore, different judges require different “burdens of proof” and 
have different definitions of “willfulness” (Cook & Noyes 2011, p. 11). This work provides clear 
evidence that the contempt process leaves much room for judicial discretion. 
 Brito and colleagues (2015) conduct ethnographic observation in civil courts in two states 
to examine attorney representation among low-income litigants facing contempt of court for 
child support nonpayment. Many of the parents that they observe have trouble finding good jobs, 
but court officials fail to recognize racial discrimination as a barrier that these majority Black 
noncustodial parents face, instead painting them as willfully avoiding work. Judicial 
interpretations of these fathers as lazy, rather than systematically disadvantaged lead to a policy 
of “legal-colorblindness,” which negatively affects the legal outcomes of Black fathers. 
Building off this previous work, I investigate the role of judicial discretion at three 
particular decision points during the life of a child support enforcement case: first, whether or not 
a judge makes a determination of indigency and appoints counsel; second, whether or not a judge 
is willing to lower the bond of parents who testify that they cannot afford to bond out before 
trial; and third, how the judge chooses to enforce a sentence of contempt—by either deferring the 
sentence to give the parent another chance to pay, or committing to jail. 
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Data and Method 
 This chapter draws on qualitative research that I conducted in two central Texas counties as 
part of a larger project. In spring and fall 2016, I observed more than 250 child support hearings 
across two counties. I call the first jurisdiction Riley County,29 a politically-liberal, urban county 
in central Texas with a diverse population in terms of race and socioeconomic status. The second 
jurisdiction, that I call Masters County, is adjacent to Riley County, but whiter, more suburban, 
more affluent, and more conservative politically. Through designing this project as a county 
comparison, I intended to study how the demographics and political affiliations of the two sites 
affected the punitiveness of judicial child support enforcement. What I found, however, was that 
variation in punitive orientation towards nonresident parents mapped more closely on to 
individual judges than it did jurisdictions. This is also because the main judges that I observed in 
each county travelled to other counties weekly to preside over child support enforcement in other 
jurisdictions. Although I didn’t observe them presiding over these travelling courts, I did observe 
three different judges presiding in Riley County, who ruled very differently from one another on 
these major decision points.  
Site descriptions  
The Riley County child support court is held in a building on the south side of the city. 
The court building consists of one courtroom, with a waiting room outside. The waiting room 
has large windows into the courtroom so that litigants can watch the action at the bench, but 
generally cannot hear the proceedings. The waiting room has rows of chairs facing the 
courtroom, in which litigants slouch, browse the Internet on their cell phones, and try to entertain 
their children as they wait all day for their cases to be called. The waiting room gives this 
                                                 
29 Counties have been given pseudonyms to preserve anonymity. 
 62 
 
building the feel of a state office or low-rent health clinic. There is another door in the waiting 
room that leads to a mediation room, where prosecutors from the state’s Attorney General’s 
(AG) Office talk with both parents to try to come to an agreed order and avoid the necessity of 
going in front of the judge for a hearing. 
When you walk into the building, there is a bathroom and water fountain, and then 
double glass doors leading into a security line. When the doors first open at 8:15 each morning, 
there is a long queue to go through the metal detector, a line that sometimes sticks out the front 
door into the weather outside. Parents have to take off their belts and empty their pockets when 
they go through security. Since the bathroom and water fountain are outside of the metal 
detector, they have to go through security again every time they have to go to the bathroom or 
get a drink of water as they await their hearings. During the course of my time in Riley County, I 
became friendly with the deputies working the security line because of my many trips through it. 
Riley County is served by two different judges and organizes the dockets by type of case 
and day of the week. I observed in Riley County on Fridays, Judge Salinas’ enforcement docket. 
Judge Salinas is a diminutive, wrinkled Latina woman in her sixties whose small size belies the 
gravity of her presence. In addition, I spent two sessions observing other judges presiding in 
Riley County—one was a guest Judge on a day that Judge Salinas was absent, and the other is 
Judge Lopez, the other Riley County presiding Judge, who hears enforcement cases on 
Thursdays. Observing other presiding judges helped me put Judge Salinas’ judicial approach in 
context. 
Unlike Riley County court, Masters County child support enforcement court is part of the 
larger district court complex for Masters County. Child support court is on the second floor, at 
the end of a long hallway filled with other courtrooms. Each courtroom has an airport style sign 
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showing what cases are on the docket each day, and benches in the hallway that look like church 
pews. Here, parents go through the metal detector only once when they walk in. This court 
complex is equipped with vending machines, bathrooms, a breakroom - all without having to go 
back through the metal detector.  
Mediation in Masters County often takes place at tables positioned in the courtroom 
itself, even while the judge is on the bench. This means that the courtroom itself is often quite 
loud, and the litigants who sit on benches inside the courtroom often cannot hear what is going 
on at the bench.  
Unlike Riley County, which divides its docket into enforcement and establishment days, 
Masters County hears all types of cases on the same days. Early in my field work, I noticed that 
there were generally more establishment than enforcement cases. Because I was interested in 
observing child support enforcement cases, I befriended the court clerk, who would tell me ahead 
of times which days would be good ones for me to observe because there were more enforcement 
cases on the docket.  
Judge Warren is the presiding Judge in Masters County child support court. She is an 
older blond white woman with oval-shaped black plastic glasses whose reputation precedes her. 
Before I began observing in court, I had heard from many people that Judge Warren was very 
tough. Through my observations, I generally found her to be reasonable and empathetic. The AG 
staff who work in Masters County all admire Judge Warren—one told me that Judge Warren was 
who she wants to be when she grows up. 
With the consent of the judges in each county, I sat next to the bench and took field notes 
via computer about all of the cases that I observed. From February to May 2016, I spent one day 
a week observing Riley County child support court from docket call at 8:30 in the morning until 
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the last case was called, sometimes as late as 6:00 in the evening. During the course of my field 
work in Riley County, I observed 150 child support enforcement hearings for a total of 123 
unique noncustodial parents.30  From September through December 2016, I observed in Masters 
County using the same observation method. During this time, I observed 95 child support 
enforcement hearings for a total of 90 unique noncustodial parents. For an additional point of 
comparison, I spent one day in Judge Lopez’s Riley County Court, observing 23 hearings. As 
part of the larger dissertation project, I conducted interviews with two child support defense 
attorneys, with experience in both of the judges’ courts. I briefly draw from these interview 
transcripts to make my case that the differences I observed are based on judicial discretion more 
than jurisdictional differences. 
Key statistics about these cases and individuals were collected in spreadsheets to allow 
for ease of summarizing. Full narratives from field notes were analyzed using the qualitative data 
analysis software Max QDA. Analysis followed the coding procedure outlined by Emerson and 
colleagues (1995). I began with a round of open coding, creating codes on a line-by-line basis.  
After the major themes and codes were identified, I wrote integrated memos that became the 
basis for this chapter. 
Findings 
The process of jailing for child support nonpayment 
To understand the legal proceedings that I present, I first clarify the process of jailing a 
nonresident parent for child support. This process is mapped in Figure 7. In Texas, noncustodial 
parents facing a charge of contempt have the right to a lawyer. Prior to their contempt hearing, 
judges notify noncustodial parents of their right to legal representation. In regards to this right 
                                                 
30 In 27 cases, I observed repeated hearings for the same individuals. 
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parents have three choices: 1) to request that the hearing be delayed so they have time to hire a 
lawyer, 2) to request an indigency hearing to see if they qualify for a court-appointed counsel, or 
3) to waive their right to counsel and represent themselves.31 Therefore, the first decision point 
that I examine is the indigency hearing. 
                                                 
31 During my court observations, I found that most non-custodial parents represented themselves. In the hearings 
that I observed, only about one-fifth of non-custodial parents had legal representation. 
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Figure 7. Process of jailing for child support nonpayment. 
Note: Process begins with upper left corner “Motion for enforcement filed”. 
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After the question of legal representation has been settled, noncustodial parents are 
required to appear in court for their contempt hearings and if they do not appear, the state child 
support agency can ask for a capias—an arrest order—for failure to appear in court. The 
noncustodial parent who fails to appear can be arrested on this warrant. Once he32 is arrested, he 
either stays in jail until his hearing, or pays bond33  to be released, with the promise that he will 
appear in court for his contempt hearing. The second decision point that I examine is whether 
judges grant a pretrial release, or lower the bond on parents who testify that they cannot afford to 
bond out before their hearing. 
Following a finding of contempt, the AG state prosecutor typically requests a deferred 
commitment. This means that the noncustodial parent is sentenced to jail for child support 
nonpayment, but rather than going to jail today, will begin his sentence several months in the 
future. This begins a probationary period during which the parent must pay what is asked during 
the interim or else face his sentence. 
This next hearing is called a commitment review hearing. On the day of this hearing, the 
court will assess whether to jail the noncustodial parent or give him more time to pay. If the 
judge commits him, the noncustodial parent will be sent to jail and begin serving out his sentence 
of 180 days. The judge will generally set a conditional release amount, meaning that if the 
noncustodial parent is able to pay this amount of money, he can get out of jail.34 The final 
decision point that I examine is what happens during a commitment review hearing. The judge 
                                                 
32 About 80% of noncustodial parents are fathers (Census 2012), so I use “he/his” to refer to noncustodial parents 
and “she/hers” to refer to custodial parents for ease of reading. However, noncustodial mothers face the same legal 
process. 
33 If the parent was picked up on a warrant before the hearing, the money that this parent must pay to get out is 
called a bond. If the parent has been committed to jail following the hearing, the money that he must pay to get out 
is called a conditional release amount. Although these are different, they functioned in a similar way, with the 
payment of either amount resulting in a release from jail. 
34 Often, the judge in one of my jurisdictions would set the conditional release amount to be the same as the 
shortage that the noncustodial parent did not pay on the day of his commitment review hearing. 
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can decide whether the payments the parent has made are adequate and whether or not to give 
him another chance to pay before he serves out his sentence. 
Before getting into the findings from each of these decision points, I will start by sharing 
how two defense attorneys that I interviewed felt about each of the judges in question. 
Perceptions of judges 
Anne is a 44-year-old white attorney working for the public defender’s office. The clients 
that she defends in child support court have been found indigent, and she has been appointed to 
represent some of them. Here, she compares the two Judges in Riley County: 
Judge Lopez tends to be a little more willing to give ‘em a chance. She will say things in 
her hearings like—she’ll be lookin’ at the record, and she’ll be like, “You know, this is 
the fifth time that you’ve come to see me. Why should I give you a chance this time?” 
She’s very much the, “Hey, I really don’t wanna put you in jail, but you realize what 
position you’re putting me in?” mindset. Certainly, Salinas is very much matter of fact, 
and I have heard the argument of, “What are your children gonna eat?” Anytime 
somebody tries to use the argument of, “Well, I’ve gotta eat, Judge.” “What are your kids 
supposed to eat?” It’s an instantaneous. 
 
Compared to Judge Lopez, Anne finds that Judge Salinas is less willing to give parents another 
chance.  
Lydia, a 37-year-old private attorney who owns her own firm, has spent time defending 
noncustodial parents in the courts of Judge Lopez, Judge Salinas, and Judge Warren. She 
generally agrees with Anne’s assessment of the two Riley County judges: 
Lydia: Salinas, she’s not the nice one, I believe.... She’s really kind of evil. I’ve seen her 
do a lot of unfair things….That’s where the system becomes a little unbalanced because it 
really depends on the judge. It depends on how pissed she is that particular day or how 
tired she is or how hungry she is or whatever it is….There’s big discrepancies between 
the judges…. 
Q: Which judge do you think somebody has the best chance with? 
Lydia: Lopez. 
Q: Lopez? 
Lydia: Mm-hmm. Between the one you’re gonna see in Masters County, Salinas, and 
Lopez, Lopez. She’s almost too kind sometimes. 
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When I described to Lydia the design of my project, she shared her perceptions on the Judges: 
 
Q: [With] what I’ve learned about the process, I wonder if that will be different with a 
different judge. 
Lydia: It’s similar prosecutors. They all share the same office but the judges are entirely 
different.  [Judge Warren] is pretty tough. She’s the one who sent my [client who’d] just 
had a baby to jail for six months. She’s known as being one of the tougher ones. 
Q: Even tougher than [Salinas]? 
Lydia: About the same. 
 
I had heard, not only from Lydia, but from other child support court officials, to expect that 
Judge Warren would be tough. Yet, I found her to be much less punitive than Judge Salinas. It 
was clear from these interviews with child support defense attorneys that they saw judicial 
discretion as an important factor in whether parents went to jail for child support. Below, I share 
excerpts from hearings that I observed in each Judge’s court to demonstrate the way that their 
different approaches played out in the courtroom.  
Indigency 
 In indigency hearings, judges take testimony on a parent’s income to see if the parent 
qualifies for a court-appointed lawyer. In criminal cases, courts determine indigency based on 
simple mathematical determinations (Task Force on Indigent Defense 2007). For both Riley and 
Masters County, the criminal indigency cutoff is set at 125% of the federal poverty line.  
Unlike indigency hearings in criminal cases, I was surprised to learn that child support 
associate judges have no such guidelines (Lemkuil & Lemkuil 2010). In response to an email 
inquiry about what guidelines they use to determine indigency, Judge Warren explained it this 
way: 
There are no “set” guidelines.  I just take testimony on whether they are working or not, 
other people in their household and if they're working; any special or extraordinary 
circumstances (medical usually).  If someone is in jail, then they generally will qualify, 
unless it's a short time and they've kept their job.  If they are on disability they usually 
qualify.  If they're working full time, they generally won't qualify.  If they're not working, 
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but testimony shows they're not looking for work, they won't qualify.  It's a case by case 
basis. 
 
During the course of my fieldwork, I observed 36 indigency hearings.35 Observing these 
indigency hearings revealed that nonresident parents often face a great deal of instability, both in 
their earnings and in their household composition. Many were part time, seasonal, or contract 
workers, with incomes that varied widely each month. Many didn’t have their own home or 
apartment, but instead stayed with romantic partners or family members.  
A minority of nonresident parents had more stable lives and jobs. Most of these stable 
parents that I observed lived in Masters County. When such parents had an indigency hearing, 
Judge Warren generally found them not to be indigent. For example, Kelly is a white female 
nonresident parent seeking a court-appointed lawyer in Masters County, who testified that she 
made about $2600 each month. In finding her not indigent, Judge Warren explains:  
A court appointed attorney taxpayers have to pay for – the rules are very strict. Someone 
working full-time at minimum wage wouldn't qualify for court-appointed attorney. You 
make well above that, so you don't qualify. 
 
Here, Judge Warren pointed to “very strict” guidelines in a way that made it seem like there were 
written guidelines for indigency determinations that must be followed. Yet, she told me that there 
are no such written guidelines. When she talks about strict guidelines here, she is talking about 
guidelines that she holds and creates herself. It seemed as though she stuck to these guidelines. 
Of those who Judge Warren ruled not indigent, almost all had monthly incomes of $2000 or 
more and testified that they worked full time.  
 Unlike Kelly, the majority of nonresident parents requesting indigency hearings in both 
counties had unstable jobs and households. Judge Warren found almost all of these nonresident 
                                                 
35 21 of these were in Judge Salinas’ court, and 10 of these resulted in a positive determination of indigency. 10 of 
these hearings were in Judge Warren’s court, and 6 resulted in a positive determination of indigency. The final 3 
were with other judges in Riley County, and all resulted in a positive determination of indigency. 
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parents indigent. For instance, here she questions Michael, a Latino noncustodial dad, about his 
income, before finding him indigent:  
Q: Are you currently working?  
Michael: Not right now, but I help my dad.  
Q: How often, how many hours per week?  
Michael: I don’t work for hours, but per day, doing lawn service. 
Q: How much do you make per day? 
Michael: On a good day, I can make $100... If I work all day,  I can make $100. Half a 
day, $50.  
Q: Who do you live with?  
Michael: My friends. 
Q: Do you pay bills?  
Michael: Not at the moment.  
Q: Do you have a savings account, or other money saved anywhere?  
Michael: No.  
Q: Who’s paying your bills? Your parents?  
Michael: Yeah, they help me out right now.  
 
Because of his unstable living situation and uncertain income, Judge Warren ruled that Michael 
qualified for a court-appointed attorney. To Judge Salinas, however, unstable home and work 
lives were insufficient for one to be named indigent.  
If Judge Warren had her own indigency guidelines that she seemed to follow, Judge 
Salinas’ mental guidelines were much harder for me to discern as an observer. Judge Salinas 
often assumed that parents worked full time unless they specifically testified that they did not, 
and she sometimes—but not always—ruled that a nonresident parent who lived with a romantic 
partner or family member must borrow money from that person to pay for a lawyer. Finally, 
there was often a great deal of misunderstanding between Judge Salinas and the litigants about 
which income to count—before taxes, before child support, or after? A few cases illustrate these 
differences.  
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First is Alejandro, a Latino noncustodial father. Like Michael, he works intermittantly, 
but he works as a day laborer delivering sheet rock. Here Judge Salinas asks him how much he 
makes each month: 
Q: Your sheet says you earn $7.75/hr and 0 income. What do you do? 
Alejandro: Day labor... I’ve assisted in delivering sheet rock for one and a half years, off 
and on.  
Q: How many jobs did you work last month?  
Alejandro: Maybe 2... They would call throughout the month, maybe 3 days out of the 
week, next week 1 day, 2 days, 4 days - out of the week.  
Q: How many hours?  
Alejandro: I don’t remember, maybe 3 there, 4 there, daily. It was a part time job.  
 
Because of the inconsistency in his hours, it’s hard for Alejandro to estimate how much money 
he makes. This results in a lot of uncertainty on the part of the judge, who must determine 
whether he is indigent. In addition to being unable to estimate their income, parents often 
misunderstood what the judge was asking them, resulting in a great deal of confusion.  
Tomas’ case exemplifies this confusion. He is a very young Latino man who was dressed 
in a baggy polo and jeans for his hearing. Right at the outset, there was a good deal of fogginess 
about just how much money he makes. On his indigency affidavit, Tomas wrote his father’s 
workplace in the occupation slot. He says he’s not employed, but helps his dad out working at a 
car dealership, and gets money that way. He also does some construction and landscaping work, 
with earnings around $70-90 per day.   
Q: You have 3 jobs?  
Tomas: No, temporary jobs just to help out with money. I last worked 3 weeks ago. 
Q: Nothing else since then?  
Tomas: No. 
Q: The last time you worked, it was for two days?  
Tomas: Yeah.  
Q: Or two jobs?  
Tomas: Yeah. My last job doing landscaping was January or February 2015 [more than a 
year ago].  
Q: You worked only 8 times in the past year? 
Tomas: I might have told you that incorrectly.  
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Q: Do you work with your dad regularly?  
Tomas: Yes, 2-3 times a month for the past year.  
Q:  So 24-36 times in the past year. Any other jobs?  
Tomas: Yes, I recently got hired at McDonalds.  
Q: Why does your occupation say something else? 
Tomas: I haven’t started working yet. I will start this week, making $8.50 an hour, part 
time, 30-35 hours per week. 
Q: How have you been surviving in the mean time?  
Tomas: Working with my dad, working side jobs.  
 
Tomas is clearly confused by the questions that Judge Salinas asks him, and by the end of the 
hearing it still isn’t clear how much money Tomas has. Seeing how unstable his income is, Judge 
Salinas asks him if he is receiving help from anyone else: 
Q: Who helps you?  
Tomas: My brother, he pays rent and I stay there, I pay him $50 every 2 weeks.  
Q: You rent a room?  
Tomas: No, I’m living with him.  
Q: Have you asked him to help you hire a lawyer?  
Tomas: I already have a lawyer for other legal issues. I’ll be honest with you, I just got 
out of jail a few weeks ago and I’m trying to catch up.  
Q: You’ve hired a lawyer?  
Tomas: Not for child support but for criminal.  
Q: Why not in this case?  
Tomas: I can’t afford it.  
Q: You’re paying the other lawyer how much?  
Tomas: My brother is helping me out, I’m paying him back however I can, $50 a month. 
My brother and father helped me bond out.... 
Q: You have resources, you have people who can give you jobs and a place to live and 
pay your bond. You need to ask them for help paying a lawyer. Maybe you can use the 
lawyer you already have.   
 
Tomas is the clearest illustration of a misunderstanding, where some nonresident parents, 
especially those with low levels of education, may misunderstand the questions that the judge is 
asking them. Like Alejandro, Tomas cannot say definitively how much money he makes, 
because of its inconsistent nature. In addition, Tomas is already involved in the legal system 
through his criminal charges. He has already tapped into his family network for assistance hiring 
a lawyer, and testifies that they can’t afford to hire another. This was also the case for Alejandro. 
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Learning that his wife pays their rent and that Alejandro’s mother pays his cell phone bill, Judge 
Salinas inquires about their income: 
Q: What does your wife do? 
Alejandro: She works in corrections, she’s a teacher at the state jail.  
Q: Have you asked her to help you hire a lawyer?  
Alejandro: She’s helping me with a lawyer on my criminal case, she’s doing everything 
she can.  
Q: She won’t help you with this case?  
Alejandro: Not currently, she’s quite upset with me, your honor.  
Q: She refuses to help you? 
Alejandro: She wants me to get the court-appointed lawyer...  
Q: Your mom works too?  
Alejandro: Yes, she is a nurse. 
Q: Have you asked her to help?  
Alejandro: She’s too busy saving people to help... She is an RN....  
Q: Does she know you’re looking at an enforcement action? 
Alejandro: I don’t think so, she’s so busy. I’m busy taking care of this and my criminal 
situation, trying to make sure everything’s all right.  
Q:Do you want to make a phone call? 
Alejandro: I’m not sure if she’ll do that, she’s trying to take care of my sister.  
Q: So that’s a no. I’m not finding you indigent. 
 
Even though Alejandro’s wife was already helping him pay for a lawyer to fight criminal 
charges, and refuses to pay for another, Judge Salinas says that he doesn’t qualify for a court-
appointed lawyer, even though he doesn’t think anyone will lend him money to hire a lawyer for 
his child support case. She has the same finding for Tomas. In each case, her determination that 
he is not indigent isn’t based on his own income—which varies widely based on his inconsistent 
hours, and that he cannot predict—but rather on the income of someone else, even though he 
testifies that this other person won‘t pay for another lawyer.  
Here, Judge Salinas is effectively ordering parties who aren’t part of the legal motion to 
pay for the legal expenses, rather than being willing to provide a taxpayer funded lawyer. In 
contrast, Judge Warren and the other judges that I had seen presiding in Riley County are all 
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more generous with providing court-appointed attorneys. Judicial discretion, therefore, plays a 
large role in which parents are granted attorneys and which are not. 
As illustrated through the misunderstanding between Tomas and Judge Salinas, many 
nonresident parents may find the child support enforcement system complex, and not fully 
understand the ramifications of their testimony. In these cases, representation by a legal 
professional would greatly assist their ability to successfully navigate this system. However, she 
rules that they do not qualify for appointed counsel and must hire their own lawyer if they want 
representaiton. Most do not hire a lawyer and instead waive their right to representation, 
appearing pro se.  
Compared to Judge Salinas, Judge Warren and the other presiding judges in Riley County 
are each more willing to appoint counsel. It seems clear from this evidence that two litigants with 
similar cases will have disparate outcomes depending on which judge hears their case.  
Bond Lowering 
 Another area where judicial approaches greatly differed was in the question of whether or 
not a nonresident parent would have to spend time in jail awaiting his hearing. These differences 
presented themselves at two later points in the life of a child support enforcement case. First, if a 
parent was already in jail and testified that he could not afford to pay to be released, the judges 
differed on their propensity to lower the bond to an amount that the parent could afford to pay. 
Second, the judges differed in their willingness to commit parents to jail versus giving them 
another chance to pay the child support that they owed. Again, Judge Warren was more willing 
to lower bond and less willing to commit to jail than Judge Salinas.  
 Travis, a white incarcerated noncustodial father who lives in Masters County, testified 
that he was unable to afford the $1500 bond that had been set for him: 
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Q: Do you have any money to pay?  
Travis: I have nothing.  
Q: Is there anyone you can ask?  
Travis: I could ask my boss for about $500.… Now I have a job …I’ll be able to pay my 
wife whatever - she’s been ripping me off to see my kids anyway.  
Q: You’ve been ripping your kids off too. …You don’t steal from your kids because 
you’re mad at your ex-wife.  You have two kids who can’t take care of themselves by 
themselves. Your priority is your kids and then everybody else. Not everybody else then 
your kids.  
Travis: I’m learning that the hard way.  
Q: Yes you are. I’ll reduce the bond to $500. 
 
Even though Travis expressed hostility towards his ex-wife that Judge Masters clearly did not 
appreciate, she still agreed to lower his bond from the $1500 that he couldn’t afford to pay to the 
$500 that he said he would be able to come up with. This was a pattern that I saw repeatedly by 
Judge Warren: it was clear that she was annoyed by hostility and reluctance to pay on the part of 
nonresident dads, but instead of punishing them for this testimony by refusing to hear their 
requests, she would lecture them harshly but grant their requests.  
 Yet, Judge Warren was not a push over. Nick, an incarcerated white noncustodial father 
with a poor payment record testifies that he can’t afford to pay his $2100 bond: 
Q: Do you have any money to pay?  
Nick: My wife has some money available. I don't have that full amount, but I can 
definitely make a payment.  
Q: [Your payment history has not been good]. The order doesn’t say pay and then not pay 
for six months, you don’t get to pay your car payment, rent, every 6 months. [You’re 
saying you] had to pay everybody BUT your son. We’re done with that. You were down 
to $800 being behind, we are now back to $2300, there’s been no progress, you’re a 
hamster on a wheel. I’m reducing your bond to $1500. If you bond out, pay your child 
support for November and December in full and bring a money order for $500 in 
attorney’s fees on December 9. Failure to pay on 12/9, - do you want christmas at home 
with your five-year-old [his other child that lives with him]? It’s your priority.  
Nick: Can I request $1000 bond?  
Q: No, your bond should be $2200.  
 
Again, Judge Warren lectures Nick like she did Will because of his inconsistent payment record. 
She is clearly frustrated with the situation, but decides to lower his bond from $2100 to $1500, 
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stipulating that he must be fully compliant with his next two months of payment or else he will 
spent Christmas in jail. When he further requests that his bond be lowered to $1000, she refuses. 
 Most of the time that parents testified that they couldn’t afford to pay their bond, Judge 
Warren lowered the bond to an amount that they said they would be able to pay. This was not the 
case for Judge Salinas. Mateo, an incarcerated Latino nonresident dad, testified to Judge Salinas 
that he could not afford to pay his $2000 bond: 
Mateo: I’m trying to see if you could lower my bond. The reason that I didn’t show up 
last time is because the date was wrong on my paperwork... I recently got a new job.   
Q: Do you have a lawyer, do you want to represent yourself, request a court appointed 
lawyer, what do you want to do?  
Mateo: I don’t know, get appointed counsel? 
Judge, to the custodial parent [CP]: The question is whether I should lower his bond so he 
can get out and pay. Are you okay with that?  
CP: It’s up to you guys.  
Q: The alternative is he stays in jail and could get court-appointed lawyer.  
CP: That’s up to him ultimately if he’s gonna bond out or not (laughs). 
Mateo: Right now, the only thing is that I do have a legit job, if I stay in here any 
longer…  
Q: I don’t know about that, my biggest concern is getting you a lawyer. I can reset to let 
you bond out and hire a lawyer. Or if you’re not going anywhere, not bonding, out we 
can appoint you a lawyer.  
Mateo: I would like to bond out and get my own lawyer, if I sit here any longer, I’ll lose 
my job. I’ve never had a real job per se.  
Q: You want time to get money together, bond out, hire a lawyer?  
Mateo: Yes ma’am.  
Q: That will be the order.  
Mateo: My bond is still $2000?  
Q: $2000.  
Mateo: You can’t make it $1800?  
Q: $2000 is the bond. 
 
Judge Salinas was in the habit of doubling the bond whenever a parent failed to show up to court 
more than once in a row. Mateo testified that the reason he missed his second court appearance 
was because the date on his paperwork had been wrong, but Judge Salinas was not hearing it. 
She informed him of his right to counsel, he asked for a court-appointed attorney, and she gave 
him two options: a) to bond out of jail and hire his own attorney, or b) to stay in jail and be 
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appointed an attorney. Mateo was requesting that his bond be lowered because he could not 
afford to pay $2000, and clearly understood that choosing option a) would entail that Judge 
Salinas lower his bond so that he could get out of jail and hire his own attorney. This was not the 
case; she still refused to lower his bond. At the end of the hearing, Mateo still could not afford to 
bond out of jail, nor was he granted a court-appointed attorney. Whatever the cause of this 
misunderstanding, Mateo failed to get either of his requests met during the hearing. 
 The very next hearing that day was for Joaquin, another incarcerated Latino noncustodial 
father who also testified that he was unable to afford his $1000 bond. In this case, Judge Salinas 
did not give him the options that she gave Mateo, but rather decided for him: 
Joaquin: I have like $33.  
Q: Your bond is set at $1000, a motion [for commitment] is before the court, in the 
interest of one child. I find you indigent since you can’t afford to bond out. I will appoint 
you a lawyer for [your next appearance].  
Joaquin: There’s no way I can get out is there? Unless I come up with $1000?  
Q: Correct. [Your bond is] $1000, if you pay that money [and bond out] you still have to 
come to court [for your next appearance]. 
Joaquin: I have to stay in jail until then?  
Q: Yes. 
 
Perhaps because of Mateo’s misunderstanding of what the options that she provided entailed, 
Judge Salinas followed a different tact with Joaquin, whose case she heard immediately after 
Mateo’s. When Joaquin testified that he couldn’t afford to pay his $1000 bond and asked if there 
was any way he could get out of jail without paying this, Judge Salinas said no. However, she 
did appoint him an attorney for his next appearance. Unlike Judge Warren, Judge Salinas was 
generally not open to requests that bond be lowered.  
Inability to pay bond has been in the news lately, at least in the Texas Criminal Court 
system. As of this writing, the 5th Circuit Federal Appeals Court had recently found Harris 
County’s bail system discriminatory (AP 2017). In June 2017, this ruling resulted in the release 
 79 
 
of more than one hundred Houston jail inmates who were unable to afford bail. Clearly, 
considerations of ability to pay bond should be taken seriously by judges in all types of court.  
Commitment or Probation 
 A final key point on which the judges differed was with regards to whether or to commit 
a parent or give them one final chance to pay. Recall that deferred commitment hearings 
followed a probationary period of several months during which parents were ordered to pay their 
entire child support order each month. Again, Judge Warren acted with much more leniency than 
Judge Salinas, frequently giving parents who had not paid what they were supposed to pay by 
their court appearance one more chance to pay before they would be jailed. In contrast, even 
parents who testified that they could afford to pay the amount that they were ordered—but that 
they didn’t have the money in their pocket—were often committed to jail by Judge Salinas.  
 In the following case, Eric, a white noncustodial father, had served 107 of his 180-day 
sentence for child support nonpayment. Previously, he had been released so that he could work 
and make payments. He came back to court today to review whether he would remain on 
probation or be sent back to jail.  He managed to pay $600 towards his debt in the past month. 
Here, Eric describes his difficulty working while his license is suspended: 
Q: What do you have to do to get your license back? 
Eric: I [owe money on] 7 tickets, [to get it forgiven] I have to serve time in jail, but I 
wanted to make sure I made it to this court date before that.  
Q: Let’s just reset it for early January to give you time to go get those tickets taken care 
of. If you get your license back, keep doing odd jobs like this, keep making payments like 
this, continue to progress, then you won’t have to go back to jail. 
 
Despite having months since his release that he hadn’t paid anything, Judge Warren hears Eric’s 
difficulty making money without a valid license and decides to give him more time to resolve 
these issues and make money. Even though she could have sent him to jail on the day of the 
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hearing, she decides to wait until January (four months later) to see if his payment record 
improves. 
Judge Salinas not only divided her dockets into enforcement vs. establishment days, she 
also set one day a month as a "review docket", where she heard all of the deferred commitment 
review cases on the same day. In her court, the sum of money that these parents were supposed 
to pay by their review date was called a "shortage." Whether or not parents paid all or most of 
that shortage greatly determined whether or not Judge Salinas would incarcerate them.  
Samuel is a Latino noncustodial father facing commitment. Like Eric, Samuel had been 
previously jailed for contempt on this action. The AG prosecutor is requesting that Samuel be 
jailed because he hasn’t made any payments since he bonded out. His shortage is $452, and the 
bond he would have to pay if he went to jail today is $1000, bringing the total amount that he 
must pay today to $1452: 
AG: We’re asking for commitment, he hasn’t made any payments since [he bonded out 
last time], that’s the only time he makes his payments.... 
Samuel: I just got the notification that the money’s in my account, I do have the $1000, I 
can pay, there’s no ifs about that.  
Judge: $452?  
Samuel: I’m sure my first paycheck will cover all that and even more.  
Judge: Well, that’s the amount that is previously ordered and I’m going to impose the 
sentence. If you pay the $1452 I’ll order your conditional release once again. We’ll look 
at this case in June [three months from now]. You’re remanded to the sheriff’s office to 
serve out your sentence.  
(Samuel sighs as he is cuffed and led away). 
 
Even though Samuel testified that he had the $1000 that he was supposed to pay in his bank 
account, and that he had a new job that would make it possible for him to pay an additional $450, 
Judge Salinas rules that he be committed to jail today. She often did this as if she didn’t believe 
parents who said that they had the money to pay what they owed. If Samuel does have the 
money, he can bond out as soon as he is arrested. Judge Salinas sees no problem with putting 
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him through the process of being arrested and having to bond out, even though it would save him 
a lot of time and hassle if she gave him the opportunity to go and get the money out of his 
account and transfer it to a money order36 that can be put onto his child support record. 
 Similarly, Christopher is a Latino nonresident father in a deferred commitment review 
hearing. The AG prosecuting attorney asks Christopher if is able to make any last minute child 
support payments, and Christopher says that money is on the way but won’t be here until the late 
afternoon: 
AG: Any last minute child support payments?  
Christopher: A family member will give me money, but he’s out of town and won’t get 
here until 3 pm. Another family member is on the way from out of town [with money] as 
well. 
Judge: My concern is that he’s not paying the balance of that shortage, the $1226. 
Correct?  
Christopher: Yes ma’am.  
Judge, to custodial parent: Are you willing to wait?  
CP: I’m waiting to see if he’ll do what I said instead of lying to me all the time. How 
long will it take, Christopher?  
Christopher: Until 5 pm.  
CP: Can they wire it to you? Check it out, because we can’t be waiting that much 
longer.... I’m willing to wait until today but if he doesn’t get it by 3, 5 o’clock, he has to 
go. I’ve spent 5 years doing this.  
Judge: If you can get the $1226 you’ll get out of jail. You’re remanded to the sheriff’s 
office. If you pay that amount today you’ll get out today, if not we’ll review this case in 
May [two months from now].  
(The sheriff cuffs Christopher and leads him away.) 
 
Again, Judge Salinas does not give Christopher until the end of the day to get together his $1226 
shortage. She shares the custodial mother’s impatience, ruling that he must pay to get out of jail, 
instead of giving him the opportunity to pay to avoid going to jail. 
                                                 
36 Acceptable forms for paying child support in Judge Salinas’ court are money orders or cashier’s checks. Cash is 
unacceptable. 
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Discussion 
 Overall, Judge Warren’s approach to child support enforcement court was much more 
lenient than that of Judge Salinas. If parents could choose which court they wanted to hear their 
case, clearly Judge Warren’s court would give them better odds of a) being appointed an 
attorney, b) having their bond lowered to an amount they could afford, and c) being given 
another chance to pay before being sent to jai.  
How much of this is due to judicial discretion and how much is due to jurisdicational 
factors? When I first designed this project, I had assumed that jurisdictional factors would be 
strong determinants of how punitive a court was. I theorized that counties with poorer residents, 
more nonwhite residents, and more conservative politics would be more punitive in child support 
court. Riley County is poorer and more nonwhite, while Masters County is more conservative 
politicly. After doing the research, I found that the Riley County Judge that I observed the 
most—Judge Salinas—was the most punitive.  
Riley County is about half white, a third Latino/a, and 10% Black. Yet, the noncustodial 
parents whose cases I observed were 15% white, more than two-thirds Latino/a, and 16% Black. 
Riley County has a median income of $55,000 and many educated residents, but most of the 
parents whose cases that I observed were unemployed or worked in low-wage or intermittant 
jobs, such as resturants, construction, or landscaping. Masters County, in contrast, has a 
population that is more than 60% white, a quarter Latino/a, and 7% Black, and the parents whose 
cases that I observed were 47% white, 32% Latino/a, and 21% Black. Masters County has a 
higher median income, of more than $70,000. Of the parents whose cases that I observed, many 
had similar job opportunities as those whose cases I observed in Riley County, but a more 
sizable minority had steady work.  
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 Differences between the populations of these counties and the characteristics of the parents 
whose cases I observed reflect a number of stratifying factors. The samples I observe are 
disproportionately nonwhite and low-income. This is because low-income and nonwhite parents 
are more likely be single (Bogenschneider 2000; Harris 2011), owe child support (Census 
Bureau 2012; Sorenson et al. 2007), and be unable to afford their child support orders (Mincy & 
Sorenson 1998).  
  Readers may notice that most of the cases I have quoted in this chapter have been Latino 
in Riley County and white in Masters County. Given what we know about judicial discretion and 
race (e.g., Demuth 2003; Demuth & Steffensmeier 2004; Steffensmeier & Demuth 2001), it’s 
likely  no coincidence that the more lenient Judge also happened to hear more cases from whites. 
Yet, Judge Lopez who also presided over Riley County was described by attorneys as more 
lenient than either Judge Warren or Judge Salinas. I did not observe enough cases with the same 
characteristics across different judges to fully assess the impact of race/ethnicity on outcomes. 
Future research with larger samples should systematically compare the effects of judicial 
discretion across race/ethnicity and gender, in the civil contempt context. 
Another organizational feature of these two counties that I think matters is the way that 
they divide dockets. Judge Warren heard all types of cases each day that she presided, while 
Judge Salinas divided her dockets into establishment days, enforcement days, and even deferred 
commitment review days. Hearing the same types of cases repeatedly on the same day may have 
led Judge Salinas to become tired of hearing the same reasons for nonpayment, hastening her 
impatience and making it more likely that she would treat them harshly. 
 Despite these demographic and organizational differences, I argue that judicial discretion 
mattered for outcomes. My interviews with defense attorneys and my own limited observation in 
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Judge Lopez’s court suggests that Riley County residents would be better off having their cases 
heard by Judge Lopez than by Judge Salinas.  One of the days that I observed in Judge Salinas’ 
court, she was absent and a guest judge presided for the day. This guest judge was also more 
lenient than Judge Salinas. Further, Judge Warren, Judge Salinas, and Judge Lopez are presiding 
judges who travel to different counties and preside over other courts regularly. Although I did 
not observe these judges in these other jurisdictions, I would be surprised if demographic 
differences in these other jurisdictions drastically changed their approaches. 
 Several policy recommendations emerge from this research. First, perhaps judges should 
be discouraged from dividing their dockets in ways that cause them to hear the same types of 
cases on the same day, because this might diminsh their ability to empathize with parents and 
treat them fairly. Second, civil courts should develop indigency guidelines the same way that 
criminal courts currently do. States should consider adopting uniform indigency guidelines 
across counties, so that the resource of appointed counsel is not distributed as artbitrarily as it 
appears to be today (Murphy 1991). Third, all of the child support presiding judges in a given 
state should communicate with one another about their practices of incarcerating parents over 
child support nonpayment. Perhaps they can together come up with guidelines that would ensure 
more uniform treatment.  
 Judicial discretion can be problematic for procedural justice when similarly situated 
individuals having committed the same offense—failure to pay court-ordered child support—are 
treated differently depending on which judge hears their case. In this chapter, I have examined 
three decision points: whether to appoint a lawyer, whether to lower bond, and whether to give 
one more chance to pay. Each of these has ramifications for inequality. First, research has shown 
that representation improves legal outcomes (Engler 2009). Making sure that government-funded 
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legal counsel is allocated fairly should also be of public concern. Second, pretrial detention has 
been shown to negatively affect legal outcomes (Williams 2003). When parents testify that they 
can’t afford to pay their bond, failing to lower this bond to an affordable amount is an instance of 
punishing without conviction (Demuth & Steffensmeier 2004). Finally, spending time in custody 
has been shown to have negative consequences on earnings, employment, relationships, and 
child health and well-being (Wakefield & Wildeman 2014; Pager 2003; Turney & Wildeman 
2013). Because of the potentially great individual-level ramifications of  jailing for child support 
nonpayment, this sanction should not be applied arbitrarily. 
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Chapter Three. Flat Broke without Children: Policing Nonresident Parents 
in Child Support Court 
Introduction 
   Following the second demographic transition, there have been significant changes to the 
composition of American families, including declines in marriage, increases in divorce, and 
rising nonmarital childbearing. Today, about half of all U.S. children spend time living with only 
one biological parent (Lin & McLanahan 2007). These changes in the composition of U.S. 
families have been unequally distributed across the population, with poor and nonwhite children 
disproportionately likely to live in single-parent households (McLanahan 2004).    
  Child support is one policy lever intended to address these changes in family composition 
and assure that both parents provide support for their children, whether children live with them 
or not (Committee on Ways and Means 2008). Child support enforcement personnel have a 
number of different mechanisms for recovering this debt, including initiating a judicial action 
against a parent who owes child support debt, finding them in contempt of court for failure to 
comply with their court ordered child support payments, and incarcerating them in county jail for 
up to six months (HHS 2002).   
 This chapter examines the legal process of finding a parent in contempt of court for child 
support nonpayment and sentencing them to jail. Drawing on ethnographic observations of 150 
child support enforcement hearings, I investigate how child support policy is translated into 
practice and what it reveals about expectations of nonresident parents. I find that child support 
officials police nonresident parents’ earning, spending, and family decisions, in a way 
conceptually similar to how welfare policy polices the behavior of low income mothers, but 
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which puts freedom at stake. By threatening jail, the civil charge of contempt of court shades into 
the criminal justice system, putting families at risk of the collateral consequences of 
incarceration.  In this chapter, I use existing literature on how the welfare system constrains poor 
mothers’ choices to argue that child support enforcement similarly polices nonresident parents’ 
earning, spending, and family decisions.  
Few studies use observational data to assess what goes on during child support 
enforcement hearings. Chambers (1979) conducted a mixed methods study of child support 
enforcement in Michigan between 1969 and 1974. Using administrative data provided by the 
Friends of the Court and observation in one county, Chambers finds that those who are jailed are 
more likely to work in blue collar jobs and have irregular employment histories, problems with 
alcohol, other criminal justice involvement, and ex-wives who receive public assistance.  Blacks 
who owe child support arrears are also disproportionately likely to be jailed, compared to whites.  
 Brito and colleagues (2015) conducted ethnographic observation in civil courts in two 
states to examine attorney representation among low-income litigants facing contempt of court 
for child support nonpayment. Many of the parents that they observed had trouble finding good 
jobs, but court officials failed to recognize racial discrimination as a barrier that these majority 
Black noncustodial parents faced, instead painting them as willfully avoiding work. Court 
officials saw “indigent Black fathers as objects of social control, men who need to be 
encouraged, prodded, and even threatened with imprisonment to get them to seek work” (Brito 
et. al 2015, p. 3050). 
 Taking Brito et. al (2015) as a point of departure, I argue that court officials not only aim 
to make noncustodial parents find work, but that they also police these parents’ earning, 
spending, and family choices more broadly. I argue that this is theoretically similar to the ways 
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that the state polices custodial mothers’ earning, spending, and family choices through welfare 
policy. In both cases, the state’s provision of welfare to children justifies policing both parents’ 
choices in ways that middle class families would find unacceptable (Cahn 1999).  
Previous literature has demonstrated how U.S. welfare policy constrains and punishes 
poor women’s earnings, spending, and family choices (Collins & Mayer 2010; Hays 2004). In 
regards to earnings, TANF’s “work first” orientation requires that women be working or actively 
seeking employment in order to receive payment (Hays 2004; Collins & Mayer 2010). In many 
cases, the program gives women little choice over what type of employment they will have. 
TANF also promotes workfare—labor that is unpaid because it is deemed “training”—for 
women who cannot find regular employment (Collins & Mayer 2010). In regards to spending, 
the racialized controlling image of the welfare queen was a central motivation behind welfare 
reform (Brito 1999; Collins 1990; McCormack 2005; Thomas 1994). The welfare queen was 
thought to spend her taxpayer-funded welfare payments on luxuries that even most tax-payers 
couldn’t afford. This image devalues the care work of poor mothers, views black women as 
manipulating the welfare system, and blames black poverty on the pathology of black 
motherhood (McCormack 2005; Thomas 1994). Welfare queens are seen as both wasteful and 
undeserving because of their improper spending. Finally, TANF regulates women’s family lives 
through marriage promotion (Collins & Mayer 2010), compelling women to comply with child 
support enforcement (Josephson 1997), and punishing nonmarital fertility. Many states have 
enacted “family caps” under which a child who is conceived while a woman is receiving welfare 
will not increase the mother’s welfare payments (Hays 2004). There have also been documented 
cases of sterilization abuse of women receiving welfare. In some cases, women have been 
coerced into becoming sterilized out of fear of losing their welfare payments (Nelson 2003). 
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In this chapter, I argue that the legal process of finding a parent in contempt of court for 
child support nonpayment controls nonresident parents—usually fathers—in a similar way, but 
with a different penalty. Rather than facing loss of benefits for their work or family choices, 
noncustodial parents face the possibility of jail time. Most of the noncustodial parents that I 
observed who faced jail time for child support debt had former partners with public assistance 
involvement. Welfare involvement, therefore, subjects both parents to state sanction over their 
work and family decisions, with implications for the reproduction of inequality.  
Data and Method 
 This chapter draws on qualitative research that I conducted in two central Texas counties as 
part of a larger project. From February 2016 to January 2017, I observed more than 250 child 
support hearings across two counties. In this chapter, I focus on the time I spent in a jurisdiction I 
call Riley County,37 an urban county in central Texas. (For more on my research methods, see 
the Data and Methods section of Chapter Two). 
Findings 
 In line with previous research, I find that the population of parents facing jail for child 
support nonpayment is disproportionately non-white and poor. Despite Riley County having a 
population that is 50% white, only about 15% of the nonresident parents that I observed were 
white (See Table 8). The vast majority were Latino/a (69%), and 16% were Black. Parents’ 
average38 income was less than $30,000 a year and their average child support debt was almost 
two-thirds of this amount—parents owed an average of $19,000. 
 
                                                 
37 Counties have been given pseudonyms to preserve anonymity. 
38 Not all cases featured testimony on parents’ income and debt, but I use all reported testimony on these amounts to 
calculate the average. 
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Characteristics of Parents 
  N 
Percent 
of total 
Noncustodial parent is incarcerated during hearing 56 37.33% 
Noncustodial parent has previously been arrested for child 
support nonpayment 13 8.67% 
Noncustodial parent has other criminal history 22 14.67% 
Noncustodial parent has a lawyer 29 19.33% 
Hearing indicates incarceration before, during, and/or after 
hearing for nonpayment 89 59.33% 
Noncustodial parent is Latino/a  93 68.89% 
Noncustodial parent is Black   22 16.30% 
Noncustodial parent is White 20 14.81% 
Noncustodial parent is a woman 10 7.41% 
Total number of cases 123  
Average debt 
 $ 
19,284.33   
Average monthly total child support order 
 $     
394.87   
Average annual income 
 $ 
29,692.88   
Table 8. Characteristics of parents observed in Riley County. 
In total, 14% of the cases (21 out of 150) that I observed resulted in a commitment to 
county jail for a six month sentence. Yet, of the 123 different individuals whose cases I 
observed, almost 60% (89 out of 123) spent some time in jail for their child support nonpayment 
either before, during, or after the hearing. (See Table 9). 
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Characteristics of Hearings 
Type of hearing N Percent of total 
Indigency39 27 18.00% 
Found indigent 15 55.56% 
Default40 10 6.67% 
Review41 36 24.00% 
Enforcement 16 10.67% 
Other 19 12.67% 
Outcomes   
Committed42 21 14.00% 
Deferred commitment43 15 10.00% 
Probated sentence 5 3.33% 
Released44 10 6.67% 
Reset45 44 29.33% 
Recalled46 37 24.67% 
Total number of hearings 150   
Table 9. Characteristics of hearings observed in Riley County. 
The legal process of contempt of court for child support nonpayment often subjected 
noncustodial parents to harsh indictments of their behavior. Parents gave testimony under high 
stakes, as child support officials based their decisions about whether to give parents another 
chance on this testimony. When officials incarcerated noncustodial parents, they justified this 
decision by pointing to nonresident parents’ improper earning, spending, or family choices.  
                                                 
39 Indigency hearings are where a parent testifies about his income to see if he qualifies for a court-appointed 
defense attorney. 
40 Default hearings occur when only one party is present. 
41 Review hearings occur when a parent has reached the end of his deferred commitment timeline, and he must 
provide evidence of payment or else face jail. 
42 Committed parents are jailed. 
43 Deferred commitments and probated sentences are where parents are put on probation, where their child support 
is monitored for a set period of time. 
44 In these hearings, formerly incarcerated parents are released. 
45 Reset hearings are postponed for another day. 
46 Recalled hearings are postponed for a later time during the same day. 
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Earning 
 The Judge and prosecuting attorneys policed how noncustodial parents chose to earn their 
money by critiquing their career and educational decisions. They chastised parents for deciding 
to leave jobs because they were unhappy or hoped to do something else with their careers, or for 
quitting work to pursue higher education. In the below exchange, the AG prosecuting attorney 
questions Daniel,47 a Black noncustodial father giving his testimony through a Sign Language 
interpreter, about why he left his old job at HEB, a Texas grocery chain, for his current position: 
AG Prosecuting Attorney [AG]: Are you still working for HEB? 
Daniel: No, the last time I worked for HEB was March 2015, I quit that job because I got 
this new job, that’s the job I’m working currently. I was part time but hired full time in 
January. 
 AG: How much did you make at HEB? … 
Daniel: I’m trying to remember. It was like $13.25 per hour, something like that. 
AG: So why are you working for $10.62 an hour [now, at your new job] instead of $13? 
Daniel: I transferred to this job because I wouldn’t have to work during the day and I had 
flexibility to finish school and work at night. I didn’t have flexibility at HEB, [and] I was 
a full-time student. … 
AG: If school isn’t part of picture [anymore], why do you chose a job that pays $650 less 
[per month] than job you had before? That doesn’t make sense.  
Daniel: Well, as I said before, I was finishing school. Unfortunately I had to deal with 
some things with my family, I had to make a decision to stop going to school so I could 
get a full-time job and support my family. 
 
Here, the AG attorney questions why Daniel decided to leave one job for another that paid less 
but provided greater flexibility. Because Daniel owes child support, he is subject to state 
intervention to enforce this support, and the state feels entitled to tell Daniel which kinds of jobs 
he should work. 
Similarly, Beto, a Latino father who was later committed to jail for his child support 
nonpayment, had to defend why he stopped working a second job: 
Beto: I only have one job, the amount that’s been taken out [of my check for child 
support] hasn’t been changed from when I had two jobs. The second job got too 
overwhelming, being on my feet from 10 am to 1 am every night. It was too physically 
                                                 
47 All names are pseudonyms. 
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demanding, I was physically drained, I couldn’t spend time with my son, so I gave my 
two weeks’ notice to Walmart, from that point on I only had one job, but my child 
support order hasn’t been changed. 
 
Beto was requesting a downward modification on his child support, but the Judge wouldn’t hear 
this motion because he didn’t request it through the proper legal process. Instead, his hearing was 
about whether his probation should be revoked and he should serve his sentence for child support 
nonpayment. The Judge and prosecuting attorneys were critical of his choice to stop working a 
second job that he found physically overwhelming. Having been denied a court-appointed lawyer 
earlier that day, Beto was left to represent himself in his commitment hearing.  
 In hopes of leniency from the Judge, sometimes parents humbled themselves before her, 
promising to make better work decisions in the future. Miguel, a Latino father, was fired from 
his job at Taco Cabana because of a disagreement with his boss. After a lengthy lecture wherein 
the Judge criticized Miguel’s life choices, a humbled Miguel promises to be a more compliant 
employee in the future: 
Judge: If nothing changes then we’re going to be in this same situation where you’re 
looking at another 180 days in the county jail in the near future. So you need to figure it 
out, what is it? Are you feeling that you need to be punished?  
Miguel: No ma’am. 
Judge: Is life so bad that you’d rather just do your time?  
Miguel: No ma’am. 
Judge: Then what is it? … What are you going to do about it? 
Miguel: Get a good job, stick with it whether I’m disrespected or not.  
Judge: How are you going to do that?  
Miguel: Just realize that despite the job conditions, I’ll just take it.  
Judge: But how are you going to get a job?  
Miguel: I’ve done several applications, I’m waiting to get called for interviews. I’ve had 
two so far, one for Chick-Fil-A and one for Popeye’s. I’ll continue wherever they’re 
hiring and keep putting in applications. I’ll get another job and stick with it. 
 
Because Miguel has a court ordered child support order, the Judge thinks that Miguel was not 
entitled to disagree with his boss and risk getting fired. After the Judge’s earlier criticism of his 
relationship with his child, his attire choices, and his employment decisions, Miguel is humbled 
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and aims to convince her that he will not let his own pride get in the way of being a good 
employee again. This tactic works for Miguel, as he is not sent to jail after this hearing. 
In the next exchange, Antonio, a young Latino noncustodial father and student who drove 
more than eight hours to get to court, is trying to qualify for a court-appointed lawyer. Here, the 
Judge questions his decision to be pursuing a college degree rather than working: 
Judge: [The State] wants to go forward [with the enforcement case against you]. This 
matter is different in that you choose to not work and go to school. 
Antonio: I’m trying to do something with myself for my daughter.…  
Judge: I’m just trying to make sure that you understand that on a motion for enforcement, 
your liberty is in question…You can choose to go to school if you want to, but when you 
have a legal responsibility for a six year-old, and the state is supporting this child in some 
way, through public assistance like [welfare, food stamps] or Medicaid, the state gets 
involved because it’s taxpayer money they’re putting out to support your child. 
 
Here, the Judge explicitly states that it is Antonio’s child’s public assistance receipt that justifies 
the state’s intervention in his life, particularly her criticism of him for choosing to pursue a 
college degree rather than working for an immediate paycheck. The Judge is not interested in his 
long term career success; she only cares about whether he is able to pay the child support that he 
currently owes.  Paradoxically, Antonio would likely have a much easier time paying in the 
future if he is able to obtain his college degree.  
 In sum, because of their court-ordered child support orders, the state has to power to 
critique these parents’ employment choices—with jail used to punish them if they’ve made 
choices that officials deem unacceptable. 
Spending 
 In addition to critiquing how parents earn money, officials also police the way that they 
spend money—particularly, when they provide evidence of having spent money on something 
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other than their child support debts. Rent, food, and other expenses that these parents make are 
seen as selfish expenditures when they leave their child support unpaid.48 
 Here, the prosecuting AG attorney closes his argument by focusing on how Maria, a 
Latina noncustodial mother, spent her income tax refund: 
AG: She had $3400 in July 2015, [her child support debt] balance was $1300 at that time, 
but she didn’t use any of that money to comply with the court’s order….  She wants to be 
the good person, give money directly to her children because it feels good, they thank 
you for it, you look better in their eyes, but that’s not how child support works…. She 
used all that money to support herself, she used none of that $3400 on [her child support 
debt]. 
 
Rather than using almost 40% of her tax refund to pay off her child support debt, Maria gave 
some of this money directly to her children as gifts and used the rest on her living expenses. 
Despite the fact that Maria was not working at the time and had little other way to make ends 
meet, the AG attorney still argued that her first course of action with that money should have 
been to pay down her child support debt. 
 Similarly, in the following exchange, the Judge tells Luis, a formerly homeless Latino 
noncustodial father, that he should reconsider his living arrangements: 
Judge: If you used to be homeless, but [now] you have a nice apartment— 
Luis: It’s not nice— 
Judge: It should be nice for $900 a month! What else do you need so … you can pay for 
your son? ... Since you’re working now at a taco joint this may mean you have to get a 
roommate or a cheaper apartment. You have to make [your child support] a priority, are 
you willing to do that? Let’s find out. 
 
Even though Luis finally has a place to live after a spell of homelessness, the Judge disproves of 
how much money he is spending on housing. She suggests that he ought to spend less of his 
money on rent so that he has more left to pay down his child support debt. 
                                                 
48 See Cozzolino & Williams (2017) for more about the role of child support in family budgets. 
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Similarly, elsewhere in Miguel’s hearing (introduced in the previous section), the Judge 
makes explicit that, for these low-income parents, the tradeoff is often between paying the rent 
and paying their child support: 
Judge: You can choose what to do with your money. You can choose to pay your rent or 
your child support. You make that decision. Every penny, every dollar that you get, that’s 
your decision. You want to buy yourself a name brand hoodie to stay warm, that’s your 
decision. Think about your son, maybe he needs something to keep warm, maybe he 
needs a place to live, maybe he’s hungry. 
 
The Judge pits Miguel’s fulfillment of his material necessities directly against his son’s, in the 
form of child support debt. She frequently saw parents who asserted that they didn’t make 
enough money to both survive on their own and pay their child support; she painted this conflict 
as a zero-sum between the survival of the child and the survival of the parent.  
 Even dire poverty and homelessness were not sufficient to absolve parents from paying 
their court-ordered child support payment. In the following exchange, the Judge admonishes 
David, a Latino noncustodial father, for supporting himself at the expense of his child. David 
cries silently throughout: 
Judge: I can understand that you want to consider yourself first, have a place to lay your 
head, a home, a car, all of these good things that everybody has. I know that you feel 
humbled because you’re homeless - there’s a reason for all that. That reason…is all the 
little tiny decisions that got you here. …  Based on what the mom’s told me, [your 
daughter] loves you. They like to eat every day, children do. We’re talking basics here. I 
don’t know what got you to thinking of yourself first. You think you’re the most 
important person in the world even though you have a dependent child who likes to eat 
every day. Maybe you need to get over that. Maybe the humbling experience will make 
you a better father, a better daddy where you call the child, maybe, I don’t know. I don’t 
know what would make a difference. I know that last time putting you in jail made the 
difference in terms of $1500 but not monthly support payments, not even a dollar a day. 
 
The Judge argues that the only tactic that she thinks could get David to pay his child support is to 
jail him, because last time they put him in jail for child support, he paid $1500 to bail out of jail. 
Even though David has testified that he is homeless, the Judge still believes that putting him in 
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jail will help him come up with some money to pay down his child support debt. Because he has 
used whatever money he was able to come up with in the past to support himself, she is forcing 
him to change his spending behavior by making his freedom contingent on the payment of some 
of his child support debt. 
 The prosecuting attorneys and Judge are critical of the way that parents spend whatever 
(little) money that they have. Maria’s direct gifts to her children, Miguel’s rent, and the money 
that David spent on his own survival are all poor pecuniary choices according to the state. 
Because they owe child support debt, any money that they acquire should go to this debt first and 
foremost, rather than to any other necessary living expenses that these parents have. 
Family 
 Finally, the Judge and prosecuting attorneys are critical of the family choices that these 
noncustodial parents make—particularly their choices to engage in care work for family 
members and their decision to have more children. Like welfare officials, child support officials 
do not see care work as a valuable alternative to paid work. Like the family cap of welfare 
policy, child support officials believe that parents should not have additional children when they 
have state-involved child support orders.  
Beto, a Latino nonresident father introduced earlier, had left a job to take care of a sick 
aunt. Here, the prosecuting AG attorney is questioning why he was caring for his aunt instead of 
seeking paid work. The AG attorney questions him rapidly, sometimes giving him little time to 
respond: 
AG: How did you live while unemployed?  
Beto: I was living off my parents’ support.  
AG: Did you ask your parents for child support money? 
Beto: No. I don’t like to get handouts, I have never been on assistance, I’ve never been on 
food stamps.  
AG: But you found money for yourself during unemployment. 
 98 
 
Beto: No, I helped out by taking care of my aunt and they supported me in exchange.  
AG: You spent all that money on yourself and not your child.  
Beto: No, I bought instruments and school supplies for my child. … 
 
In this case, Beto’s child’s mother is represented by an attorney. Here, the mother’s attorney 
jumps in on the questioning: 
Attorney: How many other restaurant jobs did you apply to when you were laid off?  
Beto: None. I have had several different kinds of jobs and wanted to better my career…. 
Attorney: Why did you miss payments?  
Beto: I wasn’t working.  
Attorney: And you didn’t look for another job.  
Beto: I was caring for a family member. I filed for home health care benefits [where the 
state will pay family members to care for the sick or aged] but it didn’t work out…. 
Attorney: Your Honor, we want to commit him today for 180 days. If he would have 
gotten another job - I respect he was trying to help his family, but he could do that after 
work. 
 
Although Beto and his family had decided on an arrangement where he cared for his aunt in 
exchange for them supporting him, the state and the mother’s attorney don’t find this to be an 
acceptable arrangement. Even though Beto had tried to get paid for the care work that he was 
doing, this didn’t excuse him—in their minds—from pursuing other paid work, even if it meant 
that his sick aunt went without the care that she needed. Despite paying lip service to Beto’s care 
work contribution, this contribution pales in comparison to his child support debt. Having other 
care responsibilities is no excuse for unemployment. Following this hearing, Beto was 
committed to jail to serve out his sentence. 
Similarly, the Judge is critical of the care arrangement in Jaime’s family. Jaime is a 
young, remarried Latino father who is trying to qualify for a court-appointed lawyer. 
Judge: Have you talked to your wife about her helping you hire a lawyer?  
Jaime: We are barely making it now. It’s only her income, we are behind on child 
support. Hiring a lawyer would just get us in more debt…. I don’t know if the lawyer 
would help, if it would be good enough to keep me from getting locked up. 
 Judge: You would rather have the taxpayers pay a lawyer to represent you? The only 
difference we’re looking at is if the taxpayers or you paying for a lawyer.  
Jaime: I don’t have the money to spend on a lawyer… 
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 Judge: You’re wanting taxpayers to get you a lawyer. You make decisions about your 
income so you can stay home and care for your three and seven year old. You babysit.  
Jaime: I’m looking for work too.  
Judge: You’re deciding with your wife who’s going to be working. Maybe you need to 
call your wife again and see if she’s willing to help you hire a lawyer….You’ve made the 
financial decision to stay home with the kids. Not hire the lawyer. 
 
Despite her lecture, the Judge grants Jaime’s request for a court-appointed lawyer. But it is clear 
from the hard time that she is giving him that she disapproves of the way that Jaime and his wife 
have decided to arrange the division of labor in their family. The Judge paints Jaime as choosing 
not to work, even though Jaime has been unable to find anything other than temp work. Living 
off of his wife’s income is unacceptable, and staying at home to care for his children is 
“babysitting.” Like in Beto’s case, child support personnel disapprove of care work—particularly 
when it is done by men and goes against traditional gender roles. 
The state also polices noncustodial parents’ decisions about how many children to have. 
In the following passage, Jake, a Latino father who was later committed to jail, describes the new 
job he is about to start after months of unemployment. 
Jake: I’ve just been hired at nonprofit making $40,000 a year. I was supposed to start on 
Wednesday [but I’ve been in jail awaiting this hearing.] I’m able to come up with $1000 
right now. This is the best I can do due to my two felony convictions. It’s taken a lot of 
no’s [on job applications] to get this one yes finally.  
Judge: What were your felonies for?  
Jake: Two charges of first degree aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. I served 5 
years. I was incarcerated at age 17 and came home at 22… 
Judge: The mother and state say you only pay when you’re ready to go to jail.  
Jake: The only thing I can say about that is that I’ve had people help me out…The 
company I work for is loaning me the money to pay for this before I even start getting 
paid. It’s been hard for me to get a job… I also will say that this is a perfect opportunity 
that would put both of our lives on the path for something better, me and my children. I 
don't have a problem with paying child support, but before I’ve never had the opportunity 
to pay continuously because of lack of employment. When I did get employed, I lost it 
because I was arrested for child support.  
Judge J: Well, you had these children after your conviction correct? 
Jake: Yes ma’am. 
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Judge: You knew you had these children, this responsibility, and felony conviction. It’s 
not the children's fault that you went to prison. You’re the one who didn’t pay the support 
which caused your arrest, so that’s your responsibility right?  
Jake: Yes ma’am. 
 
According to the Judge, Jake should have known better than to have children if his felonies 
meant he was unable to make his court-ordered child support payments. Even though he testified 
that he had a good job lined up (after years of struggling to find full time employment), the Judge 
still sentenced him to serve out his six month sentence. Jake’s case provides a clear example of 
the very real ramifications of how parents’ behavior is seen by child support officials. 
 Similarly, the Judge is unhappy with the decisions that Sara has made about her fertility. 
Sara is a Latina nonresident mom who attends the hearing while under custody of the county jail. 
After Sara’s attorney requests leniency from the Judge, this is her response: 
Judge: I’m full of leniency and consideration for a person who takes responsibility for 
their actions, a person who has the intention or plan to obey the order, but I don’t see that, 
I don’t hear that in this case and it is a concern of mine. Mom having three families, 
that’s a personal decision that she made, to have the responsibility for these three 
children. The state is the one that brought the child support action to court, yet there’s 
some kind of an effort to blame dad for having her in jail, where payment record is way 
outside the bounds of acceptable standards. Leniency why? Because she has three 
families? Every time that you have an additional family, the existing family is a part of 
that equation. You don’t ignore the existing family just because you have a new family, 
the existing family continues to need help from both parents. I’m looking for a basis so I 
can show judicial discretion, leniency. My biggest concern is that she’s not taking 
responsibility for her actions, I’m not sure why… Blaming dad, second father, third 
father, second, third, or first family, they aren’t the ones ordered to pay support. 
 
Sara has three children with three different fathers and doesn’t live with any of them. Her 
attorney had asked for leniency on the basis of her poverty, which the Judge did not grant. The 
Judge sees “no basis for leniency” since Sara continued to have children, even though she could 
not afford the child support orders on the children she already had. The Judge’s decision to 
sentence Sara to six months in jail could be interpreted as  punishment for continuing to have 
children she could not afford to support. 
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Alvaro, a Latino nonresident father who is under custody of the county jail during his 
hearing, tried to convince the judge to release him by referencing his other children: 
Alvaro’s attorney: But putting him in jail will put him behind on his other child support 
cases.  
Alvaro: I have a four year old, I’m not trying to be in and out of jail for the rest of my 
life.  
Judge: You also have a fifteen year old. I’m sure you’re doing right by your other 
children but I cannot forget one of your children just because you have others. I’m here 
for all children. 
 
Frequently, parents facing contempt mentioned that they had other children living in their 
household—even though they were noncustodial parents to one of their children, they were 
custodial parents to other children. As above, this strategy tended to backfire, because the Judge 
thought it was irresponsible of them to have responsibility for additional children when they 
could not afford to pay child support for the children they already had. 
In sum, child support officials scrutinized noncustodial parents’ earning, spending, and 
family choices. This scrutiny had serious ramifications, because child support officials cited 
nonresident parents’ bad decisions as a justification for incarcerating them.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
Like welfare recipients, noncustodial parents face similar government scrutiny of their 
spending, earning, and family choices. Choices deemed improper by state officials carry the 
sanction not of losing benefits, but of being incarcerated. Jailing for child support nonpayment 
has serious ramifications for the reproduction of inequality. 
The risk of ending up in child support court to begin with is unequally distributed across 
race and class. Although the population of Riley County is about 50% white, only 15% of the 
noncustodial parents whose cases I observed were white. Most of the parents I saw in court were 
low-income, and many testified to prolonged spells of unemployment. Despite these economic 
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difficulties, they faced a scrutiny about their economic and family choices that is unheard of for 
middle class families (Cahn 1999). Changing jobs, pursuing education, paying rent, or choosing 
to stay home to take care of a young or sick family member are decisions that anyone might 
make. But in the context of child support enforcement, these decisions are policed by 
government officials—with serious consequences. Child support officials used earning, 
spending, and family choices as justification for putting parents in jail. By criminalizing 
nonresident parents’ work and family choices, child support officials may be bringing 
individuals in contact with the criminal justice system who never would have encountered it 
otherwise. 
Child support enforcement court is a civil entity, but the sanction of jail for child support 
nonpayment blurs the line between the civil and criminal justice systems. Incarceration and 
associated legal processes lead to substantial and long-lasting debts that grow over time (Harris 
2016; Harris, Evans & Beckett 2010). Child support orders don’t stop while a nonresident parent 
is serving time, whether he is incarcerated for child support nonpayment or for any other reason 
(HHS 2002; Reynolds et al. 2009). On the first day of each month that he spends in jail, his 
monthly child support comes due and adds to his total amount of child support debt. Upon 
release from jail or prison, child support debt is typically the largest debt that a former inmate 
owes (Reynolds et al. 2009). Jailing parents for child support nonpayment increases their child 
support debt, through the continued accrual of unpaid payments while a parent is incarcerated 
and unable to work, calling into question its effectiveness as a child support enforcement 
mechanism. Indeed, we saw the example of Jake being sent to jail for his unpaid child support, 
losing out on the first opportunity at a full time job that he has had in years.  
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These conclusion are necessarily tentative, because data for this chapter come from 
observations of one Judge in one county in Texas. In the previous chapter, we have seen that 
judicial discretion plays a very large part in child support enforcement, particularly the decision 
of whether to incarcerate today or give parents another chance to pay down their child support 
debt. We have seen that other Judges in different jurisdictions can be more lenient on parents, 
particularly when parents are low-income. Furthermore, Texas is exceptional in terms of its high 
criminal justice population (Perkinson 2010) and large child support collections (OCSE 2014). 
We can thus expect that Texas will be in the upper part of the distribution for jailing 
noncompliant parents. Yet, because we lack national data on the frequency of jail for child 
support nonpayment (McCann 2016), and child support nonpayment is meant to be one of the 
more rarely utilized enforcement mechanisms (Solomon-Fears, Smith & Berry 2013), a highly 
punitive Judge in a highly punitive state is a valuable site for studying this particular mode of 
enforcement. 
 In this court, child support officials policed parents’ earning, spending, and family 
decisions. Daniel’s decision to value job flexibility over pay and Antonio’s pursuit of higher 
education, for instance, are choices that anyone might make. Yet, their court-ordered child 
support debt enables child support officials to scrutinize these decisions, jailing parents who 
make decisions that officials disagree with.  
 The consumption decisions of poor people are often scrutinized and distrusted (Brito 
1999; Collins 1990; Cozzolino & Williams 2017; McCormack 2005; Thomas 1994). Indeed, the 
controlling image of the welfare queen was part of the justification for cutting welfare funding 
(Collins 1990). Similarly, child support officials distrusted the budgeting choices of nonresident 
parents. In Miguel’s hearing, the Judge admitted that the tradeoff these parents made was often 
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between paying their child support and paying their rent. Under such dire economic 
circumstances, parents must choose whether to pay child support and risk homelessness, or pay 
the rent and risk jail.  
 Child support officials also policed parents’ family decisions—in particular, their unpaid 
care work and multi-partner fertility. Child support officials were especially critical of unpaid 
care work when fathers were the ones doing it, like how the Judge called Jaime a “babysitter” for 
staying home with his children. It is likely that these men suffered a gender penalty for staying 
home and doing “women’s work” instead of performing the traditional fatherhood role of 
breadwinning (Bernard 1981; Hays 1996; Marks & Palkovitz 2004). Future research should 
investigate how gendered parenting expectations play out in child support enforcement court. 
Likewise, child support personnel criticized parents for having children by more than one 
partner. Multi-partner fertility is extremely common among unmarried parents—Carlson and 
Furstenberg (2006) estimate that more than half of all unmarried couples in their data had multi-
partner fertility. Family complexity complicates child support enforcement efforts (Meyer, 
Cancian & Cook 2005), making these child support officials’ jobs more difficult. However, 
jailing parents as a result of their family choices is not going to reverse the trend of increasing 
family complexity (Guzzo & Furstenberg 2007). When nonresident parents live with new 
children, incarcerating them for the child support debt that they owe to their other children hurts 
both their resident and nonresident children. 
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Chapter Four. Litigating Relationships: Gendered Conflicts in Child 
Support Court 
Introduction 
 When parents terminate their romantic relationship with one another, continued 
interaction can be conflict-ridden, especially when relationship wounds are still fresh. Because a 
child creates a continued link between them, parents often must continue to communicate with 
one another, bargaining and hashing out accommodations with respect to financial and care 
responsibilities for children. Child support represents an interesting case in the post-separation 
family, as it is a legal set of obligations that bind nonresident parents to their children, and—by 
extension—to their ex-partners. 
 Because most custodial parents are women and most noncustodial parents are men (Grall 
2016), gendered opinions and discourses are central to understanding relationships between 
parents who have broken up. This chapter investigates how legal motions for child support 
enforcement become tools for inter-household bargaining in situations of conflict. Seeking a 
child support enforcement action is a tool that (mostly) women use against (mostly) men in order 
to compel child support payments. Yet, mothers and fathers have very different understandings 
of a) why these tools are used, and b) how these tools are used.  
 This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I provide background on the child support 
enforcement process and review existing literature on parental conflict and its connection to the 
child support enforcement system. Next, I describe my methods for sample recruitment, and data 
analysis. After, I present the findings in three parts: 1) noncustodial father’s views on why and 
how women seek child support enforcement, 2) custodial mother’s views on why child support 
enforcement is necessary and how well they are able to use it , and 3) how gender and custody 
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interact to shape these belief systems. I conclude with policy suggestions and directions for 
future research. 
Background 
 There are two parties with the power to establish and enforce a child support order: the 
child’s custodial parent and the state. The state has the power to establish and enforce child 
support orders in cases where the custodial parent is receiving public assistance (e.g., TANF, or 
Medicaid in some states). In public assistance cases, some portion of the child support paid by 
the nonresident parent is kept by the state to reimburse the cost of welfare provision. When this 
child support is unpaid, child support debt accrues to the state, which has the power to collect on 
this debt even if the custodial parent does not agree (HHS 2002). About half of the child support 
caseload consists of families with a history of current (10%) or prior (40%) welfare receipt 
(OCSE 2014a).   
 The custodial parent also has the power to establish and enforce a child support order. 
Any child support that is not owed to the state belongs to the child’s other parent. In 2014, three 
quarters of all child support debt was owed to the custodial parent, with the remaining 25% owed 
to the state (OCSE 2014b). The custodial parent has the legal power to seek child support 
enforcement over any of the debt that she is owed.  
The child support enforcement system can make nonresident parents pay by garnishing 
their wages, intercepting their tax returns, putting a lien on their property, or even incarcerating 
them. Filing a motion for enforcement through the state Attorney General (AG)’s Office is a 
legal motion that seeks that nonpaying parents be found in contempt of court for their failure to 
obey court-orders mandating their child support payments. In Texas, this contempt of court is 
punishable by six months in jail and/or ten years of probation.  
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Post-separation conflict 
This state intervention into the private sphere of the family (Josephson 1997) provides an 
interesting case for examining family conflict. Because women usually have custody of children, 
disputes over legal matters in family court tend to fall along gendered lines (Kaganas & Slacter 
2004). Fathers’ rights activists aim to increase fathers’ access to their children within a system 
they see as biased against men (Coltrane & Hickman 1992; Natalier 2012), while feminist 
scholars tend to focus on how many legal principles in family law reproduce men’s domination 
over women, particularly in families with domestic violence (Elizabeth, Gavie, & Tolmie 2012). 
Like divorce court, child support enforcement court becomes a venue in which parents pursue 
their gendered relational interests (Elmore 2010). 
 Prior research suggests that custodial parents seek establishment and enforcement of 
child support when there is conflict between parents (Edin 2000; Waller 2002; Waller & Plotnick 
2001). This conflict can stem from a range of causes, from one parent re-partnering or having 
children with someone new (Edin & Nelson 2013), to disagreement over how child support 
payments are spent (Cozzolino & Williams 2017; Natalier & Hewitt 2010; 2014). In contrast, 
mothers with good relationships are less likely to instigate their own enforcement actions, or 
cooperate with the state’s efforts (Rich, Garfinkel & Gao 2007; Waller 2002; Hamer 2001). 
The fact that these child support enforcement efforts carry a possible sanction of jail adds 
gravity to the situation for parents considering using these tools, and for parents who fear that 
their ex-partners might use these tools against them. This makes legal child support enforcement 
an extreme case for examining parental conflict after a break up. Previous research about men on 
the run from the law has shown that romantic partners are sometimes willing to use the threat of 
jail in their relationship negotiations (Goffman 2014). Other research has found that women with 
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criminally-involved partners are hesitant to call the police on them, even though they may be 
ambivalent about, or even frightened of, their partners (Comfort 2008).  
Building on prior research, this chapter looks at parents’ perceptions of how legal child 
support enforcement processes are enlisted in gendered conflicts post break-up. For nonresident 
fathers and resident mothers, attitudes fall along gendered lines. Nonresident dads see custodial 
moms’ pursuit of child support enforcement as stemming from personal animosity and revenge, 
while custodial moms say they pursue child support actions because of men’s irresponsibility. 
Fathers see mothers succeed with these efforts because of what they identify as systemic bias 
against men in child support court. Mothers find the child support enforcement system hard to 
use, particularly because of men’s tactics of avoidance. Yet, the attitudes of mothers and fathers 
whose gender and custody status do not align—mothers without custody of their children and 
fathers with custody—complicate these gendered discussion, raising questions about how 
custody and gender (both independently and in combination) affect child support outcomes.  
Data & Method 
 Data for this chapter come from 31 semi-structured in-depth interviews I conducted as 
part of a larger project about parents who go to jail for child support nonpayment. As a part of 
this project, I conducted fieldwork in child support enforcement court in two counties in central 
Texas. The respondents whose stories I share in this chapter were recruited from child support 
court in one site, a place I call Riley County. With the permission of the child support Associate 
Judge, I made a recruitment announcement inside the courtroom before docket call. I introduced 
myself as a university researcher seeking to hear parents’ experiences of child support court, 
offering participants a small gift card incentive. Across six recruitment sessions in summer 2016, 
I was able to recruit 31 participants: 15 custodial parents, 14 noncustodial parents, and two 
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defense attorneys who have represented noncustodial parents in enforcement court. For this 
chapter, I focus on the interviews I conducted with parents.  
 The sample is diverse both racially and socio-economically (See Table 10). About a 
quarter of respondents were white, 45% were Latino/a, and 30% were Black. About 60% of 
respondents had a high school diploma or less, and average annual income was about $25,000. 
Respondents’ ages ranged from 23 to 51, with an average age of 40. All but two (87%) of the 
custodial parents were women, and all but two (86%) of the noncustodial parents were men. 
Gender didn’t track perfectly with custodial status, allowing me to explore variation through the 
experiences of noncustodial mothers and custodial fathers. Compared to the group of custodial 
parents, the noncustodial parents were somewhat less educated and less affluent. Overall, half of 
respondents reported that the nonresident parent had been found in contempt for nonpayment. 
Half of the noncustodial parents had served jail time for their child support debt, while only two 
of the custodial parents reported that their former partner had been jailed for this reason. 
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All Parents % 
Custodial 
Parents % 
Noncustodial 
Parents % 
Male 14 48.28% 2 13.33% 12 85.71% 
Custodial Parent 15 51.72% 15 100.00% 0 0.00% 
Age 38.97 
 
40.07 
 
37.79 
 
Black 9 31.03% 5 33.33% 4 28.57% 
White 7 24.14% 4 26.67% 3 21.43% 
Latino 13 44.83% 6 40.00% 7 50.00% 
Less than high school 8 27.59% 2 13.33% 6 42.86% 
HS only 10 34.48% 6 40.00% 4 28.57% 
More than high school 11 37.93% 7 46.67% 4 28.57% 
Average income  $24,051.72  
 
 $27,333.33  
 
 $20,535.71  
 
Had to miss work for court 21 72.41% 9 60.00% 12 85.71% 
Had to find child care for court 12 41.38% 7 46.67% 5 35.71% 
NCP found in contempt 15 51.72% 8 53.33% 7 50.00% 
More than once? 9 31.03% 4 26.67% 5 35.71% 
NCP gone to jail for CSNP 9 31.03% 2 13.33% 7 50.00% 
More than once? 7 24.14% 1 6.67% 6 42.86% 
N 29 
 
15 
 
14 
 
Table 10. Demographic summary of interviewees.
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In this sample, I have four dyads: cases where I’ve interviewed more than one 
parent from the same family. Melody and Joey, Gavin and Reba, Sean and Riley, and 
Gerardo and Diana each have children and a child support order together. In addition, 
four respondents were interviewed in group interviews, cases where I recruited two 
members of the same family at once and they preferred to have a group discussion as 
opposed to separate interviews. Gerardo and Diana were interviewed together, as were 
Reba and her new partner, Jackson.   
As we saw in Chapter One, the sample of parents who end up in child support 
court are less affluent and more racially diverse than any average custodial and 
noncustodial parent. Nevertheless, these are the families who are in court and subject to 
incarceration as an enforcement mechanism.  
Interviews focused on three themes: parents’ child support orders and payment 
histories, parents’ experiences with child support enforcement and its consequences, and 
parents’ feelings about enforcement policy. They were audio-recorded and transcribed, 
lasting about an hour on average. Transcripts were coded using the qualitative data 
analysis software Max QDA. Coding followed the process outlined by Emerson and 
colleagues (1995). I developed initial codes covering such topics as parents’ relationship 
history, court experiences, and opinions about using jail to enforce child support, and 
wrote memos about emerging themes. Using the code retrieval tool from Max QDA, I 
was able to pull all of the codes covering each particular theme, printed out the 
quotations, and synthesized the codes by hand.  
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Results 
Dads 
 Dads saw moms’ pursuit of child support as spiteful. They said that moms most 
often went to the AG’s office when they were angry, or trying to get back together with 
the dads. They saw the child support enforcement system as a set of tools that only 
women had access to, enabling women to seek revenge against men, but that didn’t 
provide any legal tools for men to use against women. The dads identified child support 
enforcement as a venue in which interpersonal conflicts could be fought, but saw 
themselves as disadvantaged in this arena. 
Women are spiteful 
 Although either the custodial parent or the state has the authority to bring a child 
support enforcement action against a noncustodial parent, most of the nonresident dads 
that I interviewed focused on the role of their former partner in bringing a child support 
action. When moms filed an enforcement action against dads, dads attributed it to 
mothers’ feelings of personal antagonism against them. 
David, a 39-year-old Latino father who owns his own drywall installation 
business, explains how and when his ex chose to enforce child support against him: 
She put me on child support. It’s been a tough battle because throughout the 
whole thing, I’ve always had my sons or I’ve provided for them without having to 
give money to child support, through her directly or whatever. Then for whatever 
reasons that she would get mad or whatever, she would just say I didn’t do that or 
I wouldn’t do that. Or she would call child support and they would enforce the 
rules on me ‘cause I wasn’t giving the court, directly, the money. I was giving it 
directly to her at times.  
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David told me that he had been to jail for his child support arrears about eight times. Each 
time, he said it was because his ex was mad at him. Because David had chosen to pay his 
children’s mother informal support, he didn’t have a good record of formal payment for 
his AG case. This lack of “receipts” over his payments meant, in his view, that he was at 
the mercy of his children’s mother’s whims. Whenever she was mad at him, he said, she 
would call the AG and make a complaint about his nonpayment, which would trigger an 
enforcement action.  
George, a 40-year-old Latino father who works as a driver for an airport shuttle 
service, had a similar experience. After a period where he paid informal support to his 
child’s mother, he said that she opened a child support order against him when she found 
out that he was in a new relationship: 
Before I was put on child support, I told my ex, “I will pay half of the expenses. 
All you gotta do is tell me. That’s it.” We were cool that way for six months. She 
finds out I have a girlfriend [who] is now my wife, boom. Child support. 
Q: That’s when she put you on? 
George: Mm-hmm. I mean, that was 17 years ago. We’re cool now, but I wish 
they wouldn’t let it go so easy. “Oh, he’s dating somebody? Oh, I’ll get him.” 
That’s basically what it was…. 
 
George feels that his ex put him on child support out of jealousy, because he was in a 
new relationship six months after they had broken up.  
 I asked David what kinds of things he thought made his children’s mother mad 
enough to call the AG. He said it was because she wanted to get back together with him: 
It seemed to me she wanted to be back together. That’s what it seemed like to me 
because the way I worked for a living and she just, still to this day, doesn’t have a 
job and doesn’t work for a living. I had a vehicle. She didn’t have a vehicle. I 
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didn’t live with my mother. I lived on my own. I guess she just wanted to have a 
better life… 
 
Because she wanted to get back together with David and share the income that his 
business made, David says that his children’s mother would get angry with him when he 
didn’t want to get back together. To get back at him, she would complain to the AG and 
trigger an action that sent David to jail.  
 Mark, a 38-year-old Black father who works as a dishwasher, had a similar story 
about ending up in jail over child support: 
I guess that’s why she did this, ‘cause she’s kinda upset that I’m not like one of 
her old ex-boyfriends and still trying to come back around and sleep with her…. 
So I guess this is how she getting back at me, by sending me to jail.… 
Q: Why does she want you to go to jail? 
Mark: Probably ‘cause I’m not—all I can come up with is, I’m not talking to her. 
I’m [not] doing the date your boyfriend thing, like coming over late at night, 
trying to—“let’s work things out.” … [There’s] a lot of anger and hate, I think. 
On the mom’s part. ‘Cause they could—they have the whole control of everything 
‘cause they’re signing the papers.  
 
Like David, Mark identifies the “anger and hate” that his ex is feeling about his 
unwillingness to get back together with her as the reason that she is pursuing child 
support against him. Even though his ex has received public assistance and the state has 
the authority to enforce child support against him without her approval, at the end of the 
day, he thinks that it is her personal animosity that explains why he has been sent to jail. 
Juan, a 34-year-old Latino father who worked on air duct maintenance, owes 
about $30,000 in total child support debt. Custodial parents can forgive debt that is owed 
to them, although this wouldn’t zero out the debt for most dads, who owe child support 
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debt to the state as well. Juan sees animosity and a desire for control as the reason why 
his ex has not chosen to forgive his debt: 
It sucks, ‘cause my ex can—she can forgive the arrearages. She can forgive them, 
but it’s almost as if she likes me being stuck in this situation where she can play 
with my life and determine whether or not I go to jail. You know what I mean? … 
There’s evil women out there. There are evil women out there. There are women 
like my ex who is just scorned and doesn’t want to let things go and have the 
ability to make your life hell and do so.  
 
According to Juan, his ex should forgive the debt that he owes her, but she’s unwilling to 
do so because she wants to be able to control him. The child support enforcement system 
gives her the power to do so. Juan continues, “Women feel entitled sometimes. They 
know how the laws are … written and how they work and who they work for.” 
These men identified the reason that women were able to use child support as a 
tool in their battle against men as resulting from systemic bias. Men saw this bias existing 
throughout all stages of their legal involvement: they saw custody determinations as 
favoring women, felt that the AG didn’t listen to them, and were upset that child support 
was so much easier to enforce than visitation.  
The system is biased 
 Fathers identified this systemic bias as starting as early as the custody 
determination. Gavin, a 40-year-old white father who worked as a contractor, shares the 
following experience that he had talking with a family court judge: 
Let’s flash back ten years ago. District judge, I think he just left this last year. 
Head district judge, Riley County precinct five. You can go back and look up his 
name. Good old boy. I’m before him. I have evidence beyond evidence beyond 
evidence that my ex-wife is not capable, is not fit, is not the type of person you 
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want raising a child. Illicit things online, and I’m not talking just foolin’ around a 
little bit. I’m talking a career of doing in the porn industry behind closed doors. I 
go to that judge, and he hears my case, and he hears what’s going on, and he 
knows what we’re angling for. He stops proceedings, and he pulls me back in his 
office, and he says, “Son—,” big old heavy set good old boy from west Texas, but 
one of those—wears the cowboy hat, pants up—good old boy. He said, “Son—,’ 
he looks over his glasses at me. He goes, “Son, I know what you’re goin’ for. 
You’re not gonna get it here.” I said, “What do you mean I’m not gonna get it 
here? It’s the right thing.” He said, “Son, I don’t care what the right thing is, and I 
don’t care what the wrong thing is. The law states that if your child is under the 
age of six years old, not matter what, he goes to the mother.” 
 
Although Gavin believed that he was more “fit” to be a parent than his ex-wife, Gavin 
reports that the district judge who handled his divorce didn’t give him a chance, because 
the law made custody determinations on the basis of gender. Gavin’s memory of this talk 
with a district Judge highlights something that many of the fathers believed to be true: 
that family law was systematically biased against men, particularly in regards to the key 
issues of custody and visitation.  
 Enrique, a 49-year-old Latino father who works as a landscaper, had a similar 
belief about his custody situation: 
I think the State of Texas is not fair about [custody] ‘cause it’s not always the 
mom that’s better for the child. If I wanted to fight—if I had the money to fight 
for my little boy, I would most definitely have my little boy because I know that 
my baby’s mother, several years back, was doing things that were not legal … but 
I didn’t have the money to do it…. I didn’t have the proof to do it, but I could’ve 
[proven it] and then I would’ve had [custody of my son], and then she would be 
the one paying me, but instead the moms get the rights right away. Right off the 
bat, it’s the moms. Well, wait a minute. How come you don’t look through her 
past and you’re looking through mine? How come you’re not seeing how stable 
she is and how stable he is? I could say, “She got four kids, four baby daddies. I 
have one child. Did y’all even look at that?” No. Look at her criminal record and 
look at my criminal record. Yeah, I have a DWI years ago, way before my son 
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was born. Look at her criminal records. Domestic violence. Public intoxication. 
And that’s while my son was born, and right away, she gets the right of way for 
him. That’s why I think the State of Texas does wrong because they automatically 
assume the mom’s the best for the child and that’s not true in all cases. There’s 
always an exception.  
 
Like Gavin, Enrique believed that he would make a more stable parent49 than his child’s 
mother and wished that he could have gotten custody of their son. He sees himself as a 
more stable parent figure than his ex, who has “four baby daddies” and a longer criminal 
record than he has. If the court had put the same amount of scrutiny on her as he felt they 
put on him, he thinks that he would have won custody. But, he didn’t have the money for 
a legal fight.  
Most of these men saw the state’s attorney (AG) as representing the mom in 
court, providing her with de facto free legal representation, while they had to hire their 
own attorneys.50 The AG maintains that they are a neutral party, representing the state of 
Texas rather than either parent (Texas Attorney General’s Office 2015), but their interests 
often overlap with the interests of the mother, particularly in cases where the father owes 
child support debt to both the mother and the state. There can be disagreement between 
the state and the custodial parent in child support court, and in these cases, who the Judge 
ultimately sides with depends on judicial discretion. However, it’s clear to see why these 
fathers see the AG as representing the mother, even though it technically doesn’t. 
                                                 
49 See Kaganas & Slacter (2004) for more about parental fitness in gendered custody disputes.  
50 They could also request an indigency hearing to see if they qualified for a court-appointed lawyer. For more on this, 
see Chapter Two. 
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Sometimes in enforcement cases brought by the state, the Judge would ask 
custodial mothers how they felt about whether a father should go to jail. Here, Mark 
describes how his child’s mother responded to that question: 
That [situation has happened] a couple of times. [The Judge] was like, “What do 
you want to happen?” [My ex would] say, “I want him to go to jail.” Why are 
they giving [her] that right? ‘Cause every time I go to jail, every time anyone go 
to jail, they start all the way over…. But I can’t trust [my ex] no more ‘cause she 
went in court and lied. It wasn’t fair. The judge—I think he didn’t listen. She told 
me before. She like, “Who you think they gonna believe, you or me? I’m white 
and you’re Black.” That’s what she talk about. I’m like, I hope they’ll believe the 
truth.  
 
Mark felt that the Judge didn’t listen to him, and instead took his ex’s word at face value, 
even though he says she lied. While Mark hoped that the Judge would believe “the truth,” 
his fears that the Judge won’t believe him, because he’s Black and his ex is white. 
Racism, combined with what these men see as systemic bias against them in the court 
system, make Mark wary that he won’t be treated fairly in the enforcement system. 
 Darren, a 32-year-old Latino father who works as a welder, believes that the 
enforcement system is also biased because men’s failure to pay child support is punished 
more harshly than women’s violations of visitation orders. Feeling that his children’s 
mother is withholding the children from him, Darren feels that he has no legal recourse to 
take care of this, because he can’t afford a lawyer: 
What gets me is how I could be on child support and not be able to see my kid. 
The state won’t do anything about that. I gotta get a lawyer and fight that, but the 
state would be easy to—they’ll be in a hurry to take someone’s money, though. 
You know what I’m saying? 
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When Darren tried to ask for help enforcing his visitation order in court, Judge Salinas 
told him that visitation was a separate matter and he would have to hire a lawyer to get it 
enforced. Generally, Judge Salinas was not willing to entertain complaints about 
visitation and access while she was hearing a case about child support compliance.51 This 
frustrated these noncustodial parents, making them feel discouraged about their ability to 
compel their exes to let them see their children. 
 Gavin, too, felt this way about visitation: 
There’s no database that our civil protectors can pull up and go, “Oh, Gavin is 
saying the right thing. Here’s his documentation. Here it is. She’s in violation. Oh, 
we need to tell her that she either lets the child go, or she goes to jail.” They won’t 
do it. … Even if you have a divorce decree, they’re not—[the] woman’s not 
required to follow it.   
 
Like Darren, Gavin was frustrated about what he saw as a systemic disadvantage that 
men had in family court. If child support enforcement court was a venue in which 
gendered conflicts played out, men saw themselves as handicapped. 
Moms 
 Moms, too, saw gendered conflicts playing out around the topic of child support.  
Moms were frustrated with what they saw as an unequal burden between themselves and 
their children’s fathers, whom they found unreliable and untrustworthy. Moms saw child 
support as one of the only avenues in which they could try to make dads take some 
                                                 
51 All of the parents I recruited came from Judge Salinas’ court. Therefore, it is possible that perceived bias over the 
enforcement of visitation might be lower among fathers in jurisdictions with Judges who were more willing to hear 
these cases. For instance, Judge Warren, who proceeds over the same court in a neighboring county, often let parents 
air their grievances around visitation and access. She would chastise custodial parents for withholding children, telling 
them that they too could be found in contempt of court if they did not follow visitation orders.  
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responsibility for supporting their children. They saw child support as a tool to be used to 
make dads contribute, but found the process of seeking enforcement to be time- and 
labor-intensive—particularly because of dads’ efforts to avoid the system.  
Dads are irresponsible & untrustworthy 
 The custodial mothers that I interviewed generally had very low expectations of 
their child’s fathers. They tended to see men as irresponsible, shirking their 
responsibilities for children, and leaving the burden of providing for children on women’s 
shoulders.  
 Mae is a 43-year-old Black mother and grandmother, who had custody of all three 
of her children when they were young, and who now has custody of one of her 
grandchildren. Reporting on one of her children’s fathers, Mae saw him as an unrepentant 
baby-maker: 
He got over 13 kids and steady havin’ them. I’m like, “Why you steady having 
kids if you don’t wanna take care of them? You don’t wanna pay no support and 
nothing for them, you don’t never be there to help raise them, so what is you 
steady making babies for and don’t wanna pay for them?” … My child, he’s like 
the second oldest of them. After that, it’s like [my ex] just went baby crazy, just 
making them.  
 
Mae doesn’t understand why her child’s father had so many children if he didn’t have 
any intention of caring or providing for them. She saw child support enforcement as a 
potential tool for forcing responsibility on men like her child’s father.   
 Like Mae, the sentiment that men were unreliable was particularly pronounced 
among many of the other Black custodial mothers that I interviewed. Taryn, a 36-year-
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old Black mother who works as a certified nurse’s assistant, felt that her son was entirely 
her responsibility: 
He don’t help me with my kid. I realize now that don’t do it again, and that’s my 
son. 
Q: What do you mean? 
Taryn: That’s my baby. That’s my kid. Mama’s baby. Daddy’s maybe. You know 
what I mean? He don’t have to be around. That’s my child. 
 
Taryn saw fathers as optional, but mothers as essential. She says that she learned her 
lesson about trusting men, out of her own experience with her child’s father and the 
behavior she saw in men around her. She continues: 
I really believe in my heart that he thinks that we had the baby, but you get to 
keep the kid. That’s how they all believe, I believe. I have four brothers. I mean, 
they just drop a baby off and keep moving. …I don’t care how much you in love 
and how much you talk about it and how much y’all make plans to be together 
forever. After you had a baby, that’s your baby, and I’m going to the next. That’s 
how they think. I have four brothers and a deadbeat baby daddy. 
Q: They all do that? 
Taryn: Yeah. … I think the kids suffer the most. The mama get the short end of 
the stick, and we have to still come home and take care of the kid. 
 
Taryn’s ex isn’t the only man she knew that failed to take care of his kids. She says that 
her brothers acted the same way with their children. Although she calls her ex a 
“deadbeat baby daddy,” she doesn’t see him as exceptional. At the end of the day, Taryn 
finds that women, not men, are responsible for children.  
 Zoey, a 23-year-old Black mother who works nights at a post office, identified 
social pressures and peer groups as reinforcing the unequal burden of care between men 
and women: 
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It’s common for a man to take off. … None of his friends judge him. They’ll still 
all party with him every weekend. If I was to right now give up my daughter and 
not take care of her, all my friends would judge me. It’d be like, “You’re 
supposed to be a mom.” As a dad, it’s like, “Eh, you don’t [have to] be in [your 
child’s] life. That’s common. I’m not gonna judge you for it. That’s your life.” [In 
this] society, it’s just women have to step it up no matter what. [Men] don’t have 
to be responsible. 
 
If she had given up custody of her daughter, Zoey expects that she would have faced 
reprisals in her social circle. Her ex’s decision to be uninvolved with their daughter 
carried no similar consequences, something that Zoey believes contributed to the gender 
inequality that she sees in her community.  
The white and Latina mothers that I interviewed also found their children’s 
fathers to be irresponsible, but didn’t elaborate on this to the same extent that the Black 
mothers did. Black mothers’ had extremely low expectations on their children’s fathers.  
 Against this backdrop of unreliable men, child support enforcement emerged as 
one of the only possible ways for holding fathers accountable. Tammy, a 52-year-old 
white mother who recently lost her H.R. job, sees the child support enforcement system 
as potentially teaching responsibility to both her former partner and to her teenaged son: 
It’s not just for satisfaction of the other spouse who’s having to support 
everything and everyone. Not only that, and unfortunately, children learn by that, 
as well. It teaches them not to live up to your responsibilities. It’s so important. I 
live up to mine. If I didn’t, my son wouldn’t have food in his mouth, or a senior 
ring on his hand, or his school fees paid. He’d be in a mess. It’s hard to force 
responsibility, but it doesn’t hurt to try.  
 
Tammy sees the child support enforcement system as a potential device that she can use 
for making her son’s father contribute to him economically. Mae, the mother and 
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grandmother introduced above, sees potential in the child support enforcement system to 
change the behavior of noncustodial parents: 
You know what? I feel like if they enforce it, these men would stop running 
around making babies and these women who make babies that run off and leave 
them… either you gonna fix it and don’t have no more [children] or you gonna 
know that you gotta stay there and take care of them. Make their life miserable. 
[Got to] make them pay. 
 
Mae has custody of her special-needs grandchild, since her son is in prison and her 
grandchild’s mother was unable to care for a child with disabilities. Mae’s frustration 
with nonresident parents focused on her children’s fathers, and her grandson’s mother—
she does not blame her incarcerated son for his inability to pay support. Against the 
others who she sees as unwilling non-payers, Mae wants to use the tools of the child 
support enforcement system to make them contribute.  
 The fathers identified spite and anger as reasons that their exes sought to enforce 
child support against them. According to mothers, these reasons aren’t right. Mothers see 
fathers as unreliable, irresponsible baby-makers, and identify child support enforcement 
as one of the few tools that they have to try and make dads contribute. However, to these 
moms, bringing a child support enforcement action isn’t as easy as the fathers make it out 
to be. It requires a great deal of time and effort—particularly due to fathers’ attempts to 
play the system. 
Challenges of using the child support system 
 Melody, a 42-year-old white unemployed mother, explains the labor that she puts 
into trying to make the AG enforce her ex-husband’s child support order: 
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[I would be put on hold when I called the AG’s office] every day, almost three to 
four days a week saying, okay, this is [my ex-husband’s] new phone number. I 
got at least the name and the city of his friend he's staying with…. He’s a 
deadbeat dad. It’s like even the caseworker that was working with me, at court on 
Monday he said, “I really don't like this guy. He is just irresponsible.” … I am 
kind of frustrated. It just seems to be going on and on and on. It's all been based 
on his slyness to avoid responsibility in the legal system. Me and my family have 
put so much money into getting this taken care of.  
 
Melody reports the difficulty that she has had trying to enforce her ex-husband’s child 
support order. These efforts include calling the office repeatedly, doing detective work to 
track down where her ex was staying, and putting a lot of money into this effort.  
Lara, a 35-year-old Latina homemaker, identifies her tenacity at seeking child 
support enforcement as crucial for seeing any kinds of results: 
Every year. I stay on top of it. I call a lot. I know that I have friends that also have 
cases and they don’t get money. They don’t call. They don’t make an issue of it at 
all and nothin’ gets done. I think the only way things do get done is if you are 
[regularly calling]. Even if you are getting [public] assistance. Even if you are 
getting assistance, I think you have to do your part. I wish there was a way I can 
call the IRS the same way I call child support and try to get them  [to garnish his 
wages]. It’s his friends business. The friend [says], “I can’t garnish. He doesn’t 
work here.” I know one of the [child support] officers was familiar with excuses 
and schemes [nonresident parents] try to run. 
 
Unlike her friends, who Lara says aren’t thorough enough in their pursuit of child 
support, Lara “stays on top of it,” calling the AG’s office regularly whenever her ex 
hasn’t paid. Having received Medicaid herself, Lara is aware that the state has the right to 
enforce child support for public assistance cases. But she says this doesn’t mean that they 
will do it. Even for public assistance cases, Lara says that the custodial parent’s role in 
pursuing child support is necessary for seeing results. Like Melody, she tries to track 
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down information about her ex’s current whereabouts and work place, in hopes that the 
AG will track him down. 
 In addition to the time and money costs of enforcing child support, Taryn 
identifies a relational cost. Her ex is currently in prison on unrelated charges, but Taryn 
has a bad relationship with his family. One reason that her son’s paternal grandparents 
aren’t involved in his life, says Taryn, is because she sought child support against her 
son’s father: 
For Black men, bringing the law into any kind of situation is like betrayal. The 
worst thing you could ever do. “You put the people [the system] in my life.” You 
know what I mean? “Yeah, but you ain’t dropped off a sucker [lollipop] in four 
years. What do you want me to do?” … That’s almost like snitching. Calling the 
police. 
 
Her pursuit of formal child support for her son exacted a relational and a moral cost for 
Taryn. Cognizant of how the criminal justice system disproportionately imprisons men of 
color, yet at the same time feeling that she had no other options for getting what her son 
needed than to file for child support, Taryn suffers the consequences of this action 
through her son’s paternal grandparents’ refusal to be involved in his life. Taryn’s ex has 
a number of criminal justice entanglements, yet it is this civil entanglement that his 
family identifies as problematic. 
 Like Lara and Melody, Taryn says that her ex played the system to get out of 
paying what he should have paid in child support when he worked at IHOP before he 
went to prison: 
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His sister is a general manager [at IHOP], so I think she worked some stuff out for 
him not to be able to pay. [She reported to the AG that he made] something like 
three bucks an hour.  
Q: She made it so that it looked like he wasn’t making money? 
Taryn: Right. That’s just what I believe. ‘Cause I don’t know any way they 
[would have ordered him to pay only] $75.00 a month. 
 
While Melody’s ex-husband avoided child support by trying to keep his current address 
hidden from her so he wouldn’t be served with court papers, and while Lara’s ex worked 
for a friend who denied that he worked there so that his wages couldn’t be garnished, 
Taryn’s ex’s sister reported that he made lower wages than he really did make, so his 
support order would be lower. In response to their efforts at pursuing child support, these 
women believed that their exes did everything they could do avoid paying.  
 Men believed that women sought child support out of spite and animosity, and 
that they had a gender advantage in child support court. Women saw child support as one 
of few possible tools that they could use to force irresponsible dads to contribute, 
although using this tool had costs. So far, this discussion has focused primarily on 
noncustodial dads and custodial moms—the most common custody arrangement in the 
U.S. (Grall 2016). Yet, I interviewed four parents who had a custody arrangement where 
the mother was the nonresident parent. Below, I examine how their experiences 
complicate the narrative. 
Custodial dads and noncustodial moms 
 Jackson is a 51-year-old white carpenter. He had custody of his (now-adult) 
children all throughout their childhood, where an AG record-keeping error made it so that 
he was ordered to pay child support despite having custody of the children. He described 
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his repeated attempts to remedy the situation that continue to the present, and mentioned 
his desire to bring a lawsuit against the AG to get back the money that he erroneously 
was made to pay into the system. Given this experience, you might think that Jackson 
would side against the AG whenever possible. However, this wasn’t the case. Talking 
about his experience as a construction foreman, Jackson describes his response to men on 
his team who were trying to avoid their child support orders: 
I’m working construction—back when I used to work commercial. There might 
be a hundred people on the job site. Half of them would disappear because all of a 
sudden, the child support found out where they work and was gonna garnish their 
wages. They walk in the office and quit their job. “Hey, child support people 
found me. Gotta go.” They’d leave and I’m like, “What’s wrong with you?” “I’m 
not paying her.” “Why? Is that your kid?” “Yeah.” “Pay.” I said, “I’m paying and 
I’ve got custody. That’s the least you can do is pay. You don’t help, hell.” 
 
While the ordeal that Jackson went through with the AG might have made him into a 
men’s rights activist who helps other men avoid involvement with the AG, instead, 
Jackson recognized the importance of child support and called those who do not pay 
“deadbeats.” His experience as a father who both cared for and provided for his children 
on his own made his situation similar to many of the women that I interviewed whose ex-
partners hardly paid. In addition, Jackson is engaged to Reba, a 51-year-old white 
clinician and custodial mother whose ex-husband is Gavin (introduced above). Through 
his relationship with Reba, Jackson became frustrated with Gavin’s nonpayment. In their 
interview, Reba and Jackson paint a very different picture of the situation than Gavin 
described in his interview. In particular, they are frustrated with the leniency that they 
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perceive the Judge as providing Gavin when she did not go through with a threat to arrest 
him in court: 
Jackson: That’s happened the last five times she’s been down there, though. [The 
Judge says] “[Gavin] will not leave here unless he pays her.” First, it was 
$3,000— 
Reba: “X” amount of money. 
Jackson: —then it’s $5,000. He walks out every time. They let him. 
Reba: Yeah. The last time, they said he owed me $5,000, he put $500 in and they 
let him walk. 
 
Perhaps because of his relationship with Reba, and his experience of Gavin’s 
nonpayment, along with the child support avoidance of people in his construction crew, 
Jackson believes in the importance of paying child support, despite his bad experience 
with the AG. 
 Alice is a 35-year-old Black noncustodial mother who works in a warehouse. Like 
Jackson, she, too, says she is the victim of AG system dysfunction, though hers is even 
more egregious. After becoming pregnant at age 13 by an older man, Alice was too 
young to be granted legal custody of her daughter, who was instead raised by the man 
who impregnated her. Years later, when her daughter became pregnant too, Alice learned 
that her daughter had been raped by her own father, who was subsequently convicted and 
sentenced to 30 years in prison. Despite this grave offense that he committed, Alice owes 
him $13,000 in child support debt. She has gone to jail for this debt more than ten times. 
Her experience with the AG is similar to the fathers’ experiences that I described above. 
Despite her efforts to make the AG understand the situation that she is in, she finds them 
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completely unresponsive and attributes this to her status as a noncustodial parent. Like 
Mark, Alice says that the AG only listens to custodial parents: 
It’s every time the custodial parent calls, whether they’re angry with you or they 
want more money, they get a court date. They get whatever they ask for. When it 
comes to the non-custodial parent, [child support officials] feel like you’re 
complaining and you’re not trying to take responsibility. 
 
Alice had to go to court and bring check stubs to prove that she had been paying her child 
support, to thwart the AG’s latest effort to incarcerate her. Like the noncustodial fathers, 
Alice finds that the AG sides with the custodial parent—even though, in her case, he is a 
rapist.  
 The noncustodial fathers describe mothers as using child support as revenge when 
nonresident parents rebuff their romantic advances. Alice had a similar experience. 
Describing a conversation with her daughter, Alice says: 
“Basically, if I was not willing to do what he—whatever he wanted me to do, then 
I was not able to see you.” That’s not what you do to people. He’s like, “You 
don’t sleep with me or you don’t marry me, then I’ll continue to lock you up and I 
will continue to make your life miserable,” and he did. 
 
Because he wanted to be in a relationship with her, Alice’s ex punished her by enforcing 
child support and sending her to jail for the debt that she owed him. These threats seem 
especially sinister when they are coming from a rapist. It might be easy for some readers 
to dismiss men’s allegations that women enforce child support out of revenge as 
gendered tropes about “women scorned,” but hearing the same story from the point of 
view of a sexual abuse survivor complicates this interpretation of the men’s stories. 
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Discussion 
There are complex power dynamics at work in child support enforcement court. 
First, the legal child support enforcement system exists, in part, because of the failure of 
nonresident fathers to voluntarily contribute sufficient support to their children. Less than 
half of all parents due child support receive all of the payments that they are owed, and 
75% of all child support cases owe some debt on this support (Grall 2016; OCSE 2014a). 
This nonpayment leaves women to shoulder most of the responsibility for caring for and 
supporting their children (Cozzolino & Williams 2017, Hamer 2001, Waller 2002, Edin 
& Nelson 2013). In this context of unequal responsibility, the child support enforcement 
system emerges as one potential remedy for making dads do their part. This is a case of 
the law coming to the aid of a disempowered group (custodial mothers) and allowing 
them an accessible process to partially remedy the situation (by making noncustodial 
fathers contribute) (Josephson 1997). Indeed, this is the way the custodial mothers that I 
interviewed see the situation. 
Non-custodial fathers see the situation quite differently. While moms identify 
paternal irresponsibility as their motivation for seeking child support, dads believe that 
moms are seeking child support out of spite, revenge, or to try and make reluctant fathers 
get back together with them. Fathers see mothers acting out extremes of spite and 
revenge, on par with the saying that “hell hath no fury like a woman scorned” (Kaganas 
& Slacter 2004; Adams 2006; Elizabeth, Gavie, & Tolmie 2012). The child support 
system is an interesting case for studying parental conflict after separation. In few other 
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cases is one ex-partner compelled by law to pay money to his ex’s household, against 
whom he might still harbor resentment. In few other cases, too, does one ex-partner have 
a legal process she can instigate that can land her ex in jail. Hence, fathers understand 
mothers’ actions through the lens of interpersonal conflict. To add insult to injury, these 
fathers see the system as biased in favor of mothers (Coltrane & Hickman 1992), because 
she can seek a child support enforcement action against him without having to hire a 
lawyer, while he has no comparable free recourse for enforcing visitation against her. If 
dads see child support enforcement as punishment of relationship slights, he cannot have 
“revenge” through enforcing visitation against her unless he has the resources to hire a 
lawyer. Because they cannot respond legally, men may try to avoid the child support 
system as a tactic of resistance. Women say that this avoidance inhibits their ability to 
effectively use the tool of child support enforcement to make men pay. 
I found some variation in parents’ experiences by race. The Black custodial 
mothers were those most vocal and expressive about fathers’ irresponsibility. In 2015, 
two-thirds of Black children lived in single parent households, compared with a quarter 
of white children and 42% of Latino children (Kids Count, 2017). Given how single-
parent families are distributed, it makes sense that these gendered conflicts might be most 
extreme for Black families. There are other vulnerabilities that affect the experiences of 
the Black parents that I interviewed. Mass incarceration is a major contemporary driver 
of racial inequality, with Black men making up a disproportionate share of prisoners 
(Alexander 2010). Thus, like Taryn, other Black women might be especially conflicted 
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about seeking enforcement through means that can lead fathers to jail. Mark, too, pointed 
to racial discrimination in the legal system, when he reported that his ex had lied in court 
and gotten away with it, because the  Judges believed her testimony as a white woman 
over his, as a Black man.  
The experiences of custodial fathers, like Jackson, and noncustodial mothers, like 
Alice, complicate the story. In their interviews, Jackson and Alice shared some of the 
same frustrations and interpretations of their situation as others with the same custody 
status, but different genders. These findings add complexity to the picture of gender 
inequality, but they are necessarily limited. Because the majority of the parents that I 
interviewed fit conventional gender/custody categories, I can only provide limited 
evidence on how the experiences of parents whose gender and expected custody status do 
not align. Future research should look at the experiences of greater numbers of custodial 
fathers and nonresident mothers to see what their experiences can add to our 
understanding of gendered conflicts in family court. 
 There are other limitations to these findings as well. Interviewees were all 
recruited from the same Judge’s court. Judicial discretion plays a large role in legal 
methods of child support enforcement. As part of the larger dissertation, I discovered that 
the Judge in my other field site was more amenable to adjudicating visitation conflict in 
her court. Custodial father interviewees from this other court may not believe so firmly in 
systemic bias. Future research should compare experiences of gendered conflict in child 
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support court across jurisdictions, to examine the longer range consequences of judicial 
discretion. 
This chapter argued that child support enforcement court becomes a venue for 
parents’ gendered conflicts, post-break up. Men believe that women seek enforcement 
out of spite and that systemic bias against men gives women the upper hand. Women 
believe that child support becomes one of the only tools that they have to force 
irresponsible men to support their children. Yet, they have trouble using child support 
enforcement tactics because of men’s efforts to evade the system. Rather than providing 
neat solutions to the messy problems of inequality and relationship conflict, this chapter 
dives into the experience of child support enforcement, exposing what it can reveal about 
gendered conflicts among parents.  
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Conclusion 
You lose your life. You lose everything. It’s harder to open up bank accounts, 
because you’re in the negative, or automatic payments and stuff. You gotta get a new 
car. You basically have to start all over again. You go away for six months, you get 
out and you have to start all over again…. Your life is impacted in every way by 
getting locked up. 
- Juan, 34-year-old Latino father 
In this dissertation, I have explored the understudied phenomenon of jailing for 
child support nonpayment through assessing its fiscal basis, distribution, process, and 
meaning. In addition to what I have presented, going to jail for child support nonpayment 
also has negative consequences on the lives of nonresident parents—and their children. 
Recall the story of Jake in Chapter Three who lost his first ever salaried job because he 
went to jail. Jake is not alone. Many of the respondents that I interviewed shared similar 
stories of loss and instability stemming from the time they spent in jail. Juan, quoted 
above, lost his apartment, car, and job when he went to jail. I heard similar stories from 
Mark, George, and Alice (all introduced in Chapter Four). In addition to having negative 
consequences for himself, Juan’s incarceration also impacted his new partner and 
residential child: 
Q: When you’re not there, how do they make rent and everything if you can’t— 
Juan: They [don’t]. They jump around, friend to friend’s house, and stuff like that. 
My mom would take them in for a little while. My sister would take them in for a 
little while.  
 
Juan’s incarceration for child support led to residential instability and economic hardship 
for his current partner and youngest child.  
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 The experience of having one’s parent locked up was also traumatic for the 
children of other interviewees. Gavin, introduced in Chapter Four, told me how 
frightened his 12-year-old son was to hear that Gavin might go to jail: 
[He] cried his little heart out…. He’s like, “Mom said you were goin’ to prison, 
and I talked to mom this morning before getting on the bus. She said you were 
going to prison.”  
 
When Gavin came to pick up his son for visitation, his son cried because he was afraid 
Gavin would not be able to get him because he would be incarcerated. George, too, 
shares a story of emotional tumult when his son witnessed his arrest: 
George [Jr.] answered the door. The guy scared the shit out of him. He’s like, 
“Dad, some officer is here for you.” Why are you gonna traumatize a kid like that, 
you know? 
 
In addition to its economic irrationality and unequal distribution, going to jail for unpaid 
child support leads to negative consequences both for the nonresident parent and for 
children.  
There is a large literature on the collateral consequences of incarceration in prison 
and jail on children and families (Comfort 2015; Pager 2003; Turney & Wildeman 2013; 
Wakefield & Wildeman 2014).  In line with this research, I find negative collateral 
consequences of incarceration for child support nonpayment. Child support enforcement 
aims to increase child wellbeing by ensuring that noncustodial fathers contribute to 
children’s material wellbeing. The negative collateral consequences of jailing are 
working in direct opposition to this aim. 
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Review of findings 
Chapter One posited jail for child support nonpayment as an emerging, 
understudied form of poverty governance. In this Chapter, I found that about 14% of 
nonresident fathers owing child support spent time in jail for this debt by their child’s 
ninth birthday. I found that relationship factors and public assistance involvement 
affected an individual’s progression through the process of becoming at risk of jail for 
child support nonpayment. Of nonresident fathers who owe child support debt, dads with 
multi-partner fertility and dads who owed more than $10,000 in debt were more likely to 
spend time in jail. 
 Chapter Two looked at the role of judicial discretion at three crucial points in the 
life of a child support enforcement case: whether or not a parent is found indigent and 
provided with a court-appointed attorney, whether or not a parent is granted lower bond 
so he can be released while he awaits trial, and whether or not a parent is given another 
chance to pay his debt before being ordered to serve out his sentence. I find that Judge 
Warren from Masters County more often appoints counsel, lowers bond so parents can be 
released before trial, and gives parents another chance to pay before ordering that they 
serve their sentence. Despite the similarity in the cases presided by Judge Warren and 
Judge Salinas, they had very different approaches. Overall, parents who ended up in 
Judge Warren’s court fared much better than those in Judge Salinas’ court. 
 Chapter Three concentrated on Judge Salinas’ court to show how the court 
process can be used to police nonresident parents’ earning, spending, and family 
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decisions in ways conceptually similar to how welfare policy polices the decisions of 
poor mothers. The judge and prosecuting attorneys were critical of parents’ job choices, 
budgets, and decisions to have more children or stay at home to care for family members. 
Unlike those outside the child support system—who make the same personal decisions 
every day—the parents who end up in child support court are subject to state sanction 
about these choices. 
 Chapter Four turned to my conversations with custodial and noncustodial parents 
who I met in child support enforcement court. I found that former partners saw child 
support as a tool for adjudicating gendered relationship conflict. Men saw women’s use 
of the system as stemming from spite, jealousy, or a desire for revenge, while women saw 
the system as their only hope for making reluctant men contribute to their children. Men 
saw the system as biased against them and perceived that their exes could easily use it 
against them, while women found the system slow, cumbersome, and easy for men to 
evade. The stories of noncustodial mothers and custodial fathers complicate this gendered 
picture, showing complex power dynamics across gender, custody status, class, race, and 
ethnicity.  
Problems with the system 
Most child support policy is based on the idea of the deadbeat dad: one who is 
able to pay his support, but unwilling. Indeed, this is the justification for using jail as an 
enforcement mechanism. Yet, one overwhelming finding of this dissertation is that most 
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of the parents who go to jail for child support nonpayment don’t pay because they’re 
unable to.  
 Many of these child support orders may have never accurately reflected a parent’s 
income. In my observation in Masters County, I saw a good number of child support 
establishment cases. Many times, the orders were established in default, meaning that the 
noncustodial parent was not present. When the AG lacked wage information for the 
noncustodial parent, attorneys would impute income, assuming that the nonresident 
parent worked full time at minimum wage, even though 2/3 of minimum wage workers 
work less than 35 hours a week (Acs 1999). This presumed a monthly income of about 
$1160 and a monthly payment of $232. Even parents who testified that they were 
currently unemployed were given this imputed order. 
 This monthly sum of $232 doesn’t include the cost of medical support—a sum 
additional to child support for those parents who do not provide health insurance for their 
children. When children receive Medicaid, medical support is kept by the state rather 
than passed on to the custodial parent. Medical support orders that I saw were relatively 
small each month, ranging from about $25-100. Yet, they add to the monthly obligation. 
 Texas also allows for retroactive orders dating back up to four years (Texas 
Family Code §154.131c). This, too, was a practice that I observed in establishment cases 
in Masters County. Here is an example. In this quote, the state Assistant Attorney 
General is negotiating with two older white parents about their child support order. They 
  
 
139 
have conducted a paternity test and conclude that the man is indeed the biological father 
of the child. After determining that he is the father, the AG sets a child support order.  
AG: The results are positive - you are the biological father. We are here to set 
child support and retroactive child support. ...  
Dad: I haven’t known [that this was my child] this whole time ... I’ve never 
known this child, I’ve seen him seven times [in his whole life], and now you’re 
telling me to pay back child support [child support debt].  
AG: Back child support is based on what you should have paid versus what you 
did pay... Minimum wage is $1250/month. Child support is set at 20% of net 
income, meaning $240/mo. in current child support. Back child support is 
$10,752. Do you agree to a judgement of $10,752? 
[Dad laughs incredulously.]  
AG: You don’t have to agree...On top of the $240, we want $66/month for the 
medical... This [debt] is back child support for 48 months x $240/month, [we are 
asking you to repay this at] $100/month. 
 
This man was found to be the biological father of his child and in the course of about ten 
minutes acquired more than $10,000 in debt. In the course of my field work, I saw this 
happen a lot. Often these debts were decided in court by the AG, the judge, and the mom, 
without the dad even being present. Like this man, they very quickly accumulated huge 
debt. In Chapter One, I found that owing more than $10,000 in debt significantly 
increased the risk of going to jail for child support nonpayment. Here we can see how 
easy it is for a nonresident parent to pass the $10,000 debt threshold.  
 Another finding of this dissertation is the prevalence of family complexity, 
specifically multi-partner fertility, among parents who go to jail for child support debt. In 
the FFCW sample, 72% of fathers owing child support—and 82% of fathers who end up 
in jail for child support—have children by more than one mother. This prevalence was 
similar among the parents I observed in court. For some parents, not only did they have 
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multiple children, but they also had multiple child support orders. This, too, has a serious 
impact on their ability to pay child support. A parent owing child support to three 
children in three different households will owe a much larger sum than if the three 
children were only in one household (Meyer, Cancian & Cook 2005).  
Most of the noncustodial parents in this dissertation are in very dire economic 
straits. Many have inconsistent work in seasonal, temporary, or low-wage jobs that do not 
provide benefits or stability. These parents also faced considerable insecurity in the 
romantic and residential parts of their lives. Many didn’t have homes of their own and 
instead stayed with parents, siblings, or romantic partners. Some experienced bouts of 
homelessness. Despite the insecurity that categorized their work and home lives, their 
monthly child support obligations were stable, consistent, and rarely modified. For 
parents who couldn’t predict how much they would make next week—let alone next 
month—these stable obligations become very difficult to meet. 
For parents unable to meet their obligation, debt grows quickly. In Texas, interest 
on unpaid child support is assessed at the rate of 6% simple interest per month (Texas 
Family Code §157.265b). The average debt load of parents that I observed in court was 
about $18,000, but I regularly saw cases of individuals owing $30,000, $45,000, or even 
$100,000 in combined child support and medical debt.  
Wage withholding in Texas is capped at 50% of income. In a few of the cases that 
I observed, nonresident parents were ordered to make payments in addition to their wage 
garnishment, because their monthly orders (including payment on debt) amounted to 
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more than 50% of their monthly income. In the following case, Eric, a Black 
noncustodial father, is incarcerated by Judge Salinas, because he is unable to pay more 
than the 50% of income currently deducted from his wages: 
Eric: I’m paying [my child support] every week. It comes out of my check every 
week….The fact that not enough is being deducted from my paycheck should not 
land me in jail. I have another family I’m paying for too. I don’t make enough to 
meet my court obligation…. 
Judge: I want you to have clarity that you are the only person responsible to pay 
[your child support debt] according to the prior order ….It’s important for 
everyone to take responsibility for their own actions. It’s not the state’s fault that 
they’re not deducting enough. The state will follow the law, they know they have 
a maximum under law regarding how much they can take.  
Eric: Even if it’s more than my paycheck?  
Judge: … Regardless of the number of families and child support orders, you still 
owe money pursuant to the court order, you have to pay on your own from 
whatever money is left in the paycheck even after garnishment. It may require a 
2nd or 3rd job to meet the requirements. When you have more than one family, 
you have that personal obligation. 
 
Even though Eric’s child support was deducted from his wages, he was still incarcerated 
because this garnishment was less than the monthly child support he was ordered to pay. 
By incarcerating him, Eric will likely lose the job that he has and be unable to pay any of 
his child support. 
 Overall, the problems with the child support system can be classified into three 
broad categories: problems with establishment and order size, dysfunction in 
enforcement, and finally how to balance the needs and contributions of noncustodial 
fathers, custodial mothers, and the children they share. For many of the parents that I 
encountered throughout this project, their child support orders did not reflect their ability 
to pay, whether because their earnings were inconsistent, because their earnings were 
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imputed, because they had multiple families, or because debt service and interest 
payments added to their monthly orders. These orders are unrealistic and do not reflect a 
parent’s ability to pay. 
 The second class of problems concerns the enforcement process. As noted in 
Chapter Two, there is a great deal of judicial discretion in the enforcement process, 
leading to like cases being treated differently. There are no set indigency guidelines for 
child support enforcement court, so decisions about who should be appointed counsel are 
not made systematically. At the very least, child support judges should use the pre-
existing criminal indigency guidelines to determine who qualifies for legal aid. Some 
recent legal scholarship has focused on the ability of parents in child support hearings to 
be treated justly if they are appearing pro se, without a lawyer (Curry 2012; Engler 
2009). Many of the respondents that I observed and spoke with were hopelessly confused 
about the enforcement process. Interviewees told me that they found the paperwork hard 
to read, had trouble with some of the words the judges and prosecutors used, and even 
signed documents that they didn’t understand. Legal counsel would go a long way 
towards helping parents navigate the system. Providing some benchmarks—e.g., nobody 
goes to jail the first time they appear in court on an enforcement order—would also help 
even out the enforcement process. Finally, it seems from the comparison between 
Masters and Riley County that separating out cases into enforcement and establishment 
dockets might be making it harder for judges to empathize with the parents in their 
courts. 
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 The final problem is more complicated. Many of the noncustodial fathers that I 
observed and interviewed were extremely poor and unable to afford to pay their child 
support orders. At the same time, the custodial mothers that I observed were poor and 
struggling to make ends meet as well. When both parents are low-income and the only 
existing policy lever involves a transfer of income from one low-income parent to 
another low-income parent, the capacity of this policy to improve child wellbeing is 
constrained by definition. Truly reducing child poverty and ensuring the economic 
wellbeing of parents and children will require a significant public investment and cannot 
be accomplished through existing child support enforcement law when nonresident 
parents are poor.  
Conclusion 
 In the introduction, I pointed to two categories of goals that the child support 
system aims to meet. The first category is fiscal and economic goals. In the introduction, 
I demonstrated that the system doesn’t meet its fiscal goal of welfare cost recovery. I also 
estimated the substantial cost that jail as a child support enforcement tactic adds. Rather 
than being an economically rational method for recovering child support debt, jailing 
low-income parents instead seems to be an ineffective method for collecting child 
support. What of the goal of parental responsibility? 
In other work, Christine Williams and I (2017) have found that child support 
reproduces gender inequality through holding custodial mothers overwhelmingly 
responsible for the economic support and care of children. Aside from a small monthly 
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support payment of a few hundred dollars, custodial mothers are responsible for meeting 
all of the economic needs that child support funds don’t cover. Unlike child support 
payments, which can be left unpaid, retaining custody of children requires that custodial 
parents meet the needs of children by any means necessary. Indeed, the resident mothers 
that I interviewed in Chapter Four understood that children are their responsibilities. As 
Taryn said, “that’s my baby. That’s my child. Mama’s baby, daddy’s maybe.”  
Indeed, the social goal of having nonresident fathers contribute to their children is 
crucial for reducing the burden on custodial mothers. I hope it is clear from this 
dissertation that I do not disagree with this goal, I only disagree with enforcing this goal 
via incarceration. Other methods of child support enforcement can be quite effective. 
Indeed, routine child support enforcement tactics such as wage withholding and tax 
refund intercept have been enormously effective in collecting child support, together 
accounting for almost 2/3 of collections (see Figure 8). It’s true, however, that these 
tactics are less effective for low-income fathers. What kind of changes can we make to 
child support policy so that it can more justly and effectively ensure that children are 
supported by their nonresident parents? 
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Figure 8. Sources of child support collections. 
Source: Solomon-Fears, Smith, & Berry 2012. 
Changes to debt policies. Child support debt outpaces collections by more than 
400% (see Figure 9). On an individual level, debt loads are often higher than annual 
income. It’s likely that most of this debt will never be collected. Using incarceration as a 
debt collection strategy adds to this cost without much financial return. Indeed, holding 
onto uncollectible debts makes the child support system look ineffective. Therefore, child 
support policymakers should consider debt forgiveness policies. Linking this debt 
forgiveness to job search programs, co-parenting classes, or time with children could 
incentivize nonresident fathers into socially productive activities. These programs can 
help fathers better contribute time, care, and money for their children and lessen the 
unequal burden on custodial mothers. 
57.95%
6.05%
9.46%
3.46%
2.70%
1.68%
18.70%
Income withholding Tax intercept
Banks/credit unions Interstate collection
Driver's license suspension Threat of incarceration
Other sources
  
 
146 
 
Figure 9. Child support arrears and collections over time. 
 Source: OCSE. 
Right size orders. In this dissertation, I have demonstrated that many of the child 
support obligations that nonresident parents have do not in any way reflect their actual 
ability to pay. Several policy changes could help lawmakers ensure that child support 
obligations are feasible. First, retroactive support should be eliminated. Starting a 
nonresident parent’s child support order in the red is an unfair and unsustainable policy. 
Second, default orders should not employ the full time minimum wage presumption. 
Very few minimum wage workers work full time (Acs 1999). Orders for minimum wage 
workers should reflect minimum wage hours. For unemployed parents, Texas should 
follow states like Wisconsin (35.93 Wisconsin Stats., Chapter DCF 150, Appendix C) in 
adopting different child support guidelines for unemployed and low-income individuals. 
Because of the high levels of instability in work and home lives among the child support 
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court population, reviews of child support orders should occur regularly. Every time a 
parent begins a new job, their child support order should carry over as a flat percentage of 
their paycheck, rather than a dollar amount. Finally, lawmakers should reconsider how 
child support orders across multiple households are allocated. Multi-partner fertility is 
extremely prevalent and likely not going to decline anytime soon. Pilot programs should 
experiment with different ways to deal with child support obligations across multiple 
households to try and determine the optimal solution. 
Deemphasize incarceration. In this dissertation, I have demonstrated that 
incarcerating nonresident parents for child support debt is fiscally irrational, unevenly 
enforced, counterproductive, and even harmful. Given the multiple problems with 
ensuring due process in judicial child support enforcement actions, lawmakers should 
reconsider their use of this tactic, particularly for low-income parents. I support recent 
calls to decrease reliance on this enforcement mechanism (Solomon-Fears, Smith, & 
Berry 2012). At the very least, protections should be put into place to ensure fair and 
equal treatment in access to court-appointed attorneys, pre-trial release, and sentencing.  
In this dissertation, I have explored the understudied phenomenon of jailing for 
child support nonpayment through assessing its fiscal basis, distribution, process, and 
meaning. It is my sincere hope that these policy suggestions reach their intended 
audience. The judicial child support enforcement system as it stands today is deeply 
dysfunctional and has negative consequences for both parents and children. The policy 
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suggestions that I have outlined above will go a long way towards making the system 
more rational, effective, and just.  
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Appendices 
  
National weight 
is missing 
National 
weight is not 
missing   Weighted mean (SD) 
Nonresident dad 0.6173437 0.4500681 *** 0.3091891 0.4621855 
Formal child support order 0.292374 0.2403338 *** 0.1519806 0.3590232 
Child support debt 0.1682193 0.1322943 *** 0.0763119 0.2655125 
Jail for child support nonpayment 0.0200538 0.0189533 ** 0.0109646 0.1041426 
Amount of child support debt 
(Categorical) 4.669632 4.443712 *** 4.96224 2.407374 
      
Public Assistance History      
Mom has ever received TANF 0.5484179 0.4147239 *** 0.2599809 0.4386504 
Mom has received Medicaid by wave 3 0.6362576 0.5361378 *** 0.4410851 0.4965543 
      
Relational Variables      
Relationship quality  2.735861 3.288218 *** 3.580688 1.377883 
Either parent is in a new relationship 0.3070164 0.2290059 *** 0.1561115 0.3629816 
Mom has MPF 0.4674507 0.3824751 *** 0.2732879 0.4456736 
Dad has MPF 0.555784 0.4660775 *** 0.3972198 0.4893568 
      
Controls      
Dad worked last week 0.6313842 0.8075666 *** 0.8612604 0.3456943 
Relationship at Baseline (Categorical) 0.8249904 1.094654 *** 1.043068 0.6155907 
Dad in jail at baseline 0.0442795 0.0344168 *** 0.0187763 0.135742 
Any domestic violence 0.105599 0.0843517 *** 0.0579 0.2335737 
Dad's education (Categorical) 2.244365 2.326714 *** 2.543217 1.075187 
Dad age at baseline 31.9573 32.24379 *** 34.47847 7.612583 
Dad's household income 36901.86 49233.59 *** 59135.83 67458.02 
Dad is White 0.1179167 0.2501135 *** 0.3855571 0.4867543 
Dad is Black 0.5754489 0.4394008 *** 0.2604303 0.4388943 
Dad is Hispanic 0.2610467 0.2664548 *** 0.2980685 0.4574357 
Dad is other race 0.0368012 0.0426691 *** 0.055198 0.2283793 
State of residence (Categorical) 32.08798 33.61619 *** 36.47641 14.50208 
N (person-waves) 9,708 6,957   6,957 
Appendix 1. Differences between FFCW respondents with and without national 
probability weights 
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 Formal Order Debt Jail Jail with Amount Debt 
Wave 1.109*** 1.082*** 1.108*** 1.071** 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.027) (0.026) 
Public Assistance History     
Mom has ever received TANF 1.112+ 1.497*** 0.908  0.902  
 (0.070) (0.127) (0.147) (0.145) 
Mom has received Medicaid by wave 3 1.037  1.127  1.142  1.158  
 (0.061) (0.092) (0.180) (0.182) 
Relationship Factors     
Relationship quality  0.956* 0.771*** 1.027  1.052  
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.057) (0.059) 
Either parent has ever been in a new 
relationship 1.199*** 1.289*** 0.874  0.869  
 (0.062) (0.094) (0.112) (0.112) 
Mom has MPF 1.030  1.013  1.001  1.004  
 (0.065) (0.084) (0.154) (0.156) 
Dad has MPF 2.205*** 1.139  1.890*** 1.861*** 
 (0.142) (0.100) (0.353) (0.351) 
Arrears Amount (Ref: Between $1 and $499)     
$500 to $1,000    1.215  
    (0.424) 
$1,001 to $2,000    1.139  
    (0.395) 
$2,001 to $3,000    1.081  
    (0.381) 
$3,001 to $4,000    1.093  
    (0.455) 
$4,001 to $5,000    1.331  
    (0.520) 
$5,001 to $10,000    1.415  
    (0.475) 
More than $10,000    2.363** 
    (0.779) 
Constant 0.320*** 2.727*** 0.108*** 0.086*** 
 (0.059) (0.695) (0.045) (0.043) 
     
Observations 8,309  8,309  8,309  8,309  
Appendix 2. Selected Results from Seemingly Unrelated Regressions. 
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 Formal Order Debt Jail Jail with Amount Debt 
Wave 1.115*** 1.011  1.074  1.024  
 (0.009) (0.049) (0.051) (0.050) 
Public Assistance History     
Mom has ever received TANF 1.163* 1.370** 0.776  0.751  
 (0.077) (0.153) (0.220) (0.211) 
Mom has received Medicaid by wave 3 1.030  1.164  1.394  1.384  
 (0.069) (0.110) (0.306) (0.307) 
Relationship Factors     
Relationship quality  0.950* 0.791*** 1.196  1.271  
 (0.021) (0.030) (0.197) (0.211) 
Either parent has ever been in a new 
relationship 1.181** 1.154  0.794  0.772  
 (0.063) (0.120) (0.141) (0.138) 
Mom has MPF 0.983  1.003  1.043  1.047  
 (0.064) (0.085) (0.162) (0.166) 
Dad has MPF 2.188*** 0.644  1.659** 1.620* 
 (0.147) (0.229) (0.321) (0.318) 
Arrears Amount (Ref: Between $1 and $499)     
$500 to $1,000    1.513  
    (0.740) 
$1,001 to $2,000    1.479  
    (0.702) 
$2,001 to $3,000    1.507  
    (0.761) 
$3,001 to $4,000    1.587  
    (0.888) 
$4,001 to $5,000    1.593  
    (0.846) 
$5,001 to $10,000    2.158  
    (1.019) 
More than $10,000    3.683** 
    (1.738) 
Constant 0.129*** 1.196  0.004** 0.002** 
 (0.032) (0.412) (0.007) (0.004) 
     
Observations 8,309  3,905  2,114  2,114  
Appendix 3. Selected Results from City Fixed Effects Models. 
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State City 
Debtors 
without 
jail Jail Total 
Percent 
jailed 
CA Oakland 77 4 81 4.94% 
CA San Jose 97 5 102 4.90% 
CA Total 174 9 183 4.92% 
FL Jacksonville 56 11 67 16.42% 
IL Chicago 32 1 33 3.03% 
IN Indianapolis 114 31 145 21.38% 
MA Boston 32 4 36 11.11% 
MD Baltimore 183 17 200 8.50% 
MI Detroit 192 25 217 11.52% 
NJ Newark 129 24 153 15.69% 
NY 
New York 
City 70 0 70 0.00% 
OH Toledo 71 18 89 20.22% 
PA Philadelphia 129 16 145 11.03% 
PA Pittsburgh 57 25 82 30.49% 
PA Total 186 41 227 18.06% 
TN Nashville 62 16 78 20.51% 
TX Austin 97 26 123 21.14% 
TX Corpus Christi 172 26 198 13.13% 
TX San Antonio 51 6 57 10.53% 
TX Total 320 58 378 15.34% 
VA Norfolk 55 14 69 20.29% 
VA Richmond 216 50 266 18.80% 
VA total 271 64 335 19.10% 
WI Milwaukee 248 40 288 13.89% 
Total 1,626 268 1,894 14.15% 
 
Appendix 4. Percent incarcerated for child support by city at baseline (aggregated by 
state). 
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  Formal Informal   Debt No Debt   Jail Sample No Jail   
Public Assistance History          
Mom has ever received TANF 64.11% 41.40% *** 69.27% 43.30% *** 69.93% 46.48% *** 
Mom has received Medicaid by wave 3 73.04% 53.35% *** 76.84% 54.82% *** 85.53% 56.97% *** 
          
Relational Variables          
Relationship quality  2.05 3.44 *** 1.75 3.32 *** 1.70 3.11 *** 
Either parent is in a new relationship 55.09% 16.22% *** 59.81% 20.17% *** 59.21% 25.21% *** 
Mom has MPF 57.97% 36.02% *** 59.71% 38.19% *** 63.61% 40.75% *** 
Dad has MPF 71.88% 44.79% *** 72.60% 48.14% *** 81.88% 51.42% *** 
          
Controls          
Dad worked last week 62.82% 75.51% *** 53.69% 75.10% *** 50.83% 72.37% *** 
Relationship at Baseline (Categorical) 70.59% 105.88% *** 68.50% 101.66% *** 61.84% 97.73% *** 
Dad in jail at baseline 5.76% 3.08% *** 6.46% 3.25% *** 4.44% 3.68%  
Any domestic violence 16.26% 6.55% *** 19.85% 7.14% *** 18.71% 8.54% *** 
Dad's education (Categorical) 1.93 2.17 *** 1.87 2.15 *** 1.78 2.12 *** 
Dad age at baseline 26.43 28.31 *** 25.88 28.17 *** 27.92 25.50 *** 
Dad's household income 
 $         
35,842.95  
 $     
51,814.65  
 
***  
 $     
32,321.37  
 $     
50,634.89  
 
***  
 $    
28,443.12  
 $ 
48,827.08  
 
***  
Dad is White 10.99% 21.75% *** 6.55% 20.46% *** 12.17% 19.32% ** 
Dad is Black 65.41% 44.64% *** 66.13% 46.98% *** 67.76% 49.23% *** 
Dad is Hispanic 28.97% 19.86% *** 19.12% 28.02% *** 15.46% 27.04% *** 
Dad is other race 3.24% 4.14% + 3.22% 4.04% + 4.61% 3.90%  
N 
                   
4,284  
             
11,883    
               
2,359  
             
13,432    
                 
304  
         
15,304    
Appendix 5. Results from two-tailed t-tests comparing subsamples to full FFCW.  
  
 
154 
  Odds Ratio (Standard Error) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Wave 0.912  1.080  1.027  
 (0.069) (0.059) (0.053) 
Public Assistance History    
Mom has ever received TANF 1.167   1.384** 
 (0.142)  (0.147) 
Mom has received Medicaid by wave 3 1.103   1.172+ 
 (0.111)  (0.113) 
Relational Variables    
Relationship quality   0.766*** 0.786*** 
  (0.024) (0.031) 
Either parent has ever been in a new relationship  1.260+ 1.163  
  (0.175) (0.128) 
Mom has MPF  1.094  1.021  
  (0.094) (0.088) 
Dad has MPF  1.096  0.731  
  (0.475) (0.273) 
Controls    
Dad worked last week 0.190*** 0.598*** 0.425* 
 (0.079) (0.050) (0.155) 
Relationship at Baseline (Ref: Not Romantic)    
Married 1.376  0.724+ 0.866  
 (0.400) (0.135) (0.170) 
Cohabiting 1.165  0.984  1.039  
 (0.147) (0.092) (0.105) 
Any domestic violence (Kick, slap, serious injury) 1.375+ 1.451* 1.326+ 
 (0.245) (0.221) (0.193) 
Dad in jail at baseline 0.981  1.207  1.130  
 (0.186) (0.238) (0.207) 
Dad's household income 1.000  1.000  1.000  
 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Dad's education at baseline (Ref: LTHS)    
High school degree 0.645*** 0.766+ 0.739* 
 (0.084) (0.110) (0.089) 
Some college/ Trade school 0.564* 0.864  0.793  
 (0.131) (0.220) (0.153) 
College degree 0.945  0.653* 0.746+ 
 (0.163) (0.118) (0.123) 
Dad age at baseline 0.981* 0.991  0.994  
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Dad's race (Ref: White)    
Dad is Black 0.845  0.942  0.896  
 (0.121) (0.148) (0.140) 
Dad is Hispanic 1.021  0.899  0.941  
 (0.183) (0.171) (0.182) 
Dad is other race 0.862  0.988  0.948  
 (0.230) (0.264) (0.252) 
Constant 0.294+ 3.052  1.292  
 (0) (2.470) (0.738) 
    
Observations 3,849  3,849  3,849  
Appendix 7. Full regression table predicting debt 
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  Odds Ratio (Standard Error) 
  Model 1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Wave 1.087+ 1.038  1.051  1.003  
 (0.055) (0.057) (0.050) (0.050) 
Public Assistance History     
Mom has ever received TANF 0.932   0.758  0.733  
 (0.232)  (0.206) (0.198) 
Mom has received Medicaid by wave 
3 1.406   1.312  1.305  
 (0.300)  (0.282) (0.285) 
Amount of CS Debt (Ref: Between $1 
and $499)     
$500 to $1,000    1.462  
    (0.734) 
$1,001 to $2,000    1.677  
    (0.808) 
$2,001 to $3,000    1.536  
    (0.787) 
$3,001 to $4,000    1.600  
    (0.906) 
$4,001 to $5,000    1.728  
    (0.931) 
$5,001 to $10,000    2.256+ 
    (1.084) 
More than $10,000    3.849** 
    (1.838) 
Relationship Factors     
Relationship quality   1.329  1.278  1.356+ 
  (0.267) (0.211) (0.226) 
Either parent has ever been in a new 
relationship  0.758  0.759  0.741+ 
  (0.131) (0.132) (0.129) 
Mom has MPF  0.991  1.035  1.045  
  (0.166) (0.165) (0.169) 
Dad has MPF  1.650* 1.658** 1.619* 
    (0.325) (0.319) (0.315) 
Appendix 8. Full regression table predicting jail 
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  Odds Ratio (Standard Error) 
  Model 1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Controls     
Dad worked last week 1.249  1.073  1.539  1.733+ 
 (0.399) (0.158) (0.482) (0.549) 
Relationship at Baseline (Ref: Not 
Romantic)     
Married 0.703  0.898  0.858  0.806  
 (0.274) (0.386) (0.338) (0.321) 
Cohabiting 0.918  0.929  0.906  0.871  
 (0.145) (0.147) (0.142) (0.139) 
Any domestic violence (Kick, slap, 
serious injury) 0.898  0.877  0.875  0.888  
 (0.295) (0.243) (0.233) (0.240) 
Dad in jail at baseline 0.581  0.475+ 0.523+ 0.499+ 
 (0.211) (0.197) (0.193) (0.185) 
Dad's household income 1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Dad's education at baseline (Ref: LTHS)     
High school degree 0.641* 0.758  0.722  0.745  
 (0.129) (0.196) (0.159) (0.166) 
Some college/ Trade school 0.857  0.940  0.897  0.862  
 (0.187) (0.239) (0.202) (0.194) 
College degree 1.493  1.887+ 1.805+ 1.920* 
 (0.416) (0.684) (0.579) (0.629) 
Dad age at baseline 0.999  0.994  0.994  0.994  
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
Dad's race (Ref: White)     
Dad is Black 1.142  1.078  1.135  1.168  
 (0.293) (0.257) (0.289) (0.304) 
Dad is Hispanic 0.860  0.902  0.897  0.903  
 (0.270) (0.291) (0.292) (0.291) 
Dad is other race 1.878  1.806  1.860  1.980+ 
 (0.758) (0.729) (0.767) (0.816) 
Constant 0.054* 0.010* 0.008* 0.004** 
 (0.076) (0.021) (0.016) (0.008) 
     
Observations 2,046  2,046  2,046  2,046  
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Appendix Figure 1. Results of Selected (Two-Tailed) T-test Differences between Formal Subsample and Informal Population 
in Full FFCW. 
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Appendix Figure 2. Results of Selected (Two-Tailed) T-test Differences between Debt Subsample and Non-Debt Population in 
Full FFCW. 
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Appendix Figure 5. Results of Selected (Two-Tailed) T-test Differences between Jail Subsample and Non-Jail Population in 
Full FFCW. 
 
 
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
**
***
***
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Mom has
ever
received
TANF
Mom has
received
Medicaid by
wave 3
Either
parent is in a
new
relationship
Mom has
MPF
Dad has
MPF
Dad worked
last week
Dad in jail
at baseline
Any
domestic
violence
Dad is
White
Dad is
Black
Dad is
Hispanic
Dad is other
race
M
ea
n
Variable
Full FFCW: No jail Jail Sample
  
 
160 
 
Bibliography 
Acs, Gregory. 1999. “A Profile of Low-Wage Workers.” United States Department of 
Labor.  
Adams, Michelle A. 2006. “Framing Contests in Child Custody Disputes: Parental 
Alienation Syndrome, Child Abuse, Gender, and Fathers’ Rights.” Family Law 
Quarterly 40(2):315-338. 
Albonetti, Celesta A. 1991. “An integration of theories to explain judicial discretion.” 
Social Problems 38(2): 247-266. 
Alexander, M. Jacqui. 2005. Pedagogies of Crossing: Mediations on feminism, sexual 
politics, memory, and the sacred. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Alexander, Michelle. 2010. The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of 
Colorblindness. New York: The New Press. 
Allison, Paul. 2009. “Missing data.” In R. E. Millsap & A. Maydeu-Olivares (Eds.), The 
SAGE handbook of quantitative methods in psychology (pp. 72–89). Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Associated Press [AP]. 2017. “Houston inmates who couldn’t afford bail to be released 
after court rules system unfair.” Washington Times, June 7. Available at: 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jun/7/houston-inmates-released-
after-court-rules-bail-sy/ 
  
 
161 
Bartfeld, Judi and Daniel R. Meyer. 2003. “Child Support Compliance among 
Discretionary and Nondiscretionary Obligors.” Social Service Review 77(3): 347-
372. 
Bartfeld, Judi. 2003. “Forgiveness of state-owed child support arrears.” Institute for 
Research on Policy Special Report no. 84. Available at: 
https://www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/sr/pdfs/sr84.pdf   
Beckett, Katherine and Bruce Western. 2001. “Governing social marginality: Welfare, 
incarceration, and the transformation of state policy.” Punishment & Society 3(1): 
43-59. 
Beckett, Katherine and Naomi Murakawa. 2012. “Mapping the Shadow Carceral State: 
Toward an Institutionally Capacious Approach to Punishment.” Theoretical 
Criminology 16, 2: 221-44. 
Bernard, Jessie. 1981. “The good provider role: Its rise and fall.” American Psychologist 
36(1): 1-12. 
Bogenschneider Karen. 2000. “Has Family Policy Come of Age? A Decade Review of 
the State of US Family Policy in the 1990s.”  Journal of Marriage and the Family 
62:1136-1159.  
Boynton-Jarrett, Renee, Jessica Fargnoli, Shakira Franco Suglia, Barry Zuckerman, and 
Rosalind J. Wright. 2010. “Association between maternal intimate partner 
violence and incident obesity in preschool-aged children.” Archives of Pediatrics 
and Adolescent Medicine 164(6): 540-546. 
  
 
162 
Brito, Tonya L. 1999. “From Madonna to the Proletariat: Constructing a New Ideology of 
Motherhood in Welfare Discourse.” Villanova Law Review 44(3):415-444. 
Brito, Tonya L., David J. Pate, Jr., and Jia-Hui Stefanie Wong. 2015. “‘I do for my kids:’ 
Negotiating race and racial identity in family court.” Fordham Law Review 83: 
3027-3052. 
Bzostek, Sharon H., Sara S. McLanahan, and Marcia J. Carlson. 2012. “Mothers’ 
Repartnering after a Nonmarital Birth.” Social Forces 90(3): 817-841. 
Cahn, Naomi R. 1999. “Models of Family Privacy.” George Washington Law Review 
67(5/6): 1225-1246. 
Carlson, Marcia J. and Frank F. Furstenberg Jr. 2006. “The prevalence and correlates of 
multipartnered fertility among urban U.S. Parents.” Journal of Marriage and 
Family 68(3): 718-732. 
Case, A., Lin I., &. McLanahan, S. 2003. “Explaining trends in child support: Economic, 
demographic, and policy effects.” Demography 40(1): 171-189. 
Chambers, David L. 1979. Making fathers pay: The enforcement of child support. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Clark, K., Esch, C., & Delvac, G. 2016. The Uncertain Hour: Welfare Reform, 20 Years 
Later. Marketplace, Minnesota Public Radio. Available at: 
https://www.marketplace.org/topics/uncertain-hour 
Collins, Jane L., & Victoria Mayer. 2010. Both hands tied: Welfare reform and the race 
to the bottom in the low-wage labor market. University of Chicago Press. 
  
 
163 
Collins, Patricia Hill. 1990. Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the 
Politics of Empowerment. New York: Routledge. 
Coltrane, Scott and Neal Hickman. 1992. “The Rhetoric of Rights and Needs: Moral 
Discourse in the Reform of Child Custody and Child Support Laws.” Social 
Problems 39 (4):400-420. 
Comfort, Megan. 2008. Doing Time Together. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.  
Comfort, Megan. 2015. “‘A twenty-hour-a-day job’: The impact of frequent low-level 
criminal justice involvement on family life.” The ANNALS of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 665: 63-79. 
Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives. 2008. 2008 green book: 
Section 8 – Child Support Enforcement Program. Washington, DC.  
Cook, Steven & Jennifer L. Noyes .2011. “The Use of Civil Contempt and Criminal 
Nonsupport as Child Support Enforcement Tools: A Report on Local Perspectives 
and the Availability of Data,” Institute for Research on Poverty. 
Cook, Steven. 2015. “Child support enforcement use of contempt and criminal 
nonsupport charges in Wisconsin.” Institute for Research on Poverty 
Coven, Mark S. 1997. “Welfare reform, contempt and child support enforcement.” 
Suffolk University Law Review 30: 1067-1095. 
Cozzolino, Elizabeth and Christine L. Williams. 2017. “Child Support Queens and 
Disappointing Dads: Gender and Child Support Compliance.” Social Currents 
4(3): 228-245. 
  
 
164 
Cozzolino, Elizabeth. 2018. “Public Assistance, Relationship Context, and Jail for Child 
Support Debt.” Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World 4: 1-25. 
Craigie, Terry-Ann L. 2015. “Multipartner Fertility and Child Support.” Eastern 
Economic Journal 41: 571-591. 
Curry, Daniel. 2012. “The march towards justice: Assessing the impact of Turner v. 
Rogers on civil access-to-justice reforms.” Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 
25: 487-501. 
Demuth, Stephen and Darrell Steffensmeier. 2004. “The impact of gender and race-
ethnicity in the pretrial release process.” Social Problems 51(2): 222-242. 
Demuth, Stephen. 2003. “Racial and ethnic differences in pretrial release decisions and 
outcomes: A comparison of Hispanic, Black, and White felony arrestees.” 
Criminology 41(3): 873-908. 
Edin, Kathryn and Timothy J. Nelson. 2013. Doing the Best I Can: Fatherhood in the 
Inner City. Berkeley, University of California Press. 
Edin, Kathryn. 2000. “What do low-income single mothers say about marriage?” Social 
Problems 47(1): 112-133. 
Elizabeth, Vivienne, Nicola Gavey, and Julia Tolmie. 2012. “‘…He’s Just Swapped His 
Fists For the System’ The Governance of Gender through Custody Law.” Gender 
& Society 26 (2):239-260. 
Elmore, Cindy. 2010. “On and On, Over and Over: The Gender War in Child Support 
Enforcement Court.” Feminist Studies 36(2): 397-403. 
  
 
165 
Elrod, Linda Henry. 1990. “The federalization of child support guidelines.” Journal of 
the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 6: 103-130. 
Emerson, Robert M. Rachel I. Fretz and Linda L. Shaw. 1995. “Processing Fieldnotes: 
Coding and Memoing.” Pp. 142- 168 in Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Engler, Russel. 2009. “Connecting self-representation to civil Gideon: What existing data 
reveal about when counsel is most needed.” Fordham Urban Law Journal 37(1): 
36-92. 
Farrel, M., Glosser, A., & Gardiner, K. 2003. “Child Support and TANF Interaction: 
Literature Review.” Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation. Available 
at: https://aspe.hhs.gov/basic-report/child-support-and-tanf-interaction-literature-
review-april-2003. 
Garfinkel, Irwin and Marygold S. Melli. 1990. “The use of normative standards in family 
law decisions: Developing mathematical standards for child support.” Family Law 
Quarterly. 24(2): 157-178. 
Goffman, Alice. 2014. On the run: Fugitive life in an American city. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Goldstein, Joshua R. and Kristin Harknett. 2006. “Parenting across racial and class lines: 
Assortative mating patterns of new parents who are married, cohabiting, dating, or 
no longer romantically involved.” Social Forces 85(1): 121-143. 
  
 
166 
Government Accounting Office [GAO]. 2011. “Child support enforcement: Departures 
from long-term trends in sources of collections and caseloads reflect recent 
economic conditions.” Washington, DC. Available at: 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/314589.pdf 
Grall, Timothy. 2016. “Custodial mothers and fathers and their child support: 2013.” 
Current Population Reports, Series P60 – 255, Washington, DC:  
U.S. Government Printing Office.  
Guzzo, Karen Benjamin and Frank F. Furstenberg Jr. 2007. “Multipartnered fertility 
among American men.” Demography 44(3): 583-601. 
Hamer, Jennifer. 2001. What it Means to be Daddy: Fatherhood for Black Men Living 
Away From Their Children. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Harris, Alexes, Heather Evans and Katherine Beckett. 2010. “Drawing Blood from 
Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary United States.” 
American Journal of Sociology 115(6): 1753-1799. 
Harris, Alexis. 2016. A Pound of Flesh: Monetary Sanctions as Punishment for the Poor. 
New York: Russel Sage Foundation. 
Harris, Leslie Joan. 2011. "Questioning child support enforcement policy for poor 
families." Family Law Quarterly, 157-172. 
Haskins, Anna R. 2016. “Beyond boys’ bad behavior: Paternal incarceration and 
cognitive development in middle childhood.” Social Forces 95(2): 861-892. 
  
 
167 
Hays, Sharon.2004. Flat Broke with Children: Women in the Age of Welfare Reform. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Hays, Sharon. 1996.  The Cultural Contradictions of Motherhood. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 
Huang, C., Mincy, R. B. & Garfinkel, I. (2005). Child support obligations and low-
income fathers. Journal of Marriage and Family 67(5), 1213-1225. 
Hutson, Ron A. 2007. “Child support and parental conflict in low-income families.” 
Children and Youth Services Review, 29, 1142-1157. DOI: 
10.1016/j.childyouth.2007.04.004 
Josephson, Jyl J. 1997. Gender, Families and State: Child Support Policy in the United 
States. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.  
Kaganas, Felicity and Shelley Day Sclater. 2004. “Contact disputes: Narrative 
constructions of ‘good’ parents.” Feminist Legal Studies 12: 1-27. 
Kane, Jennifer B., Timothy J. Nelson and Kathryn Edin. 2015. “How Much In-kind 
Support do Low-Income Non-Resident Fathers Provide? A Mixed-Method 
Analysis.” Journal of Marriage and Family 77: 591-611. 
Kids Count Data Center. 2017. “Children in single-parent families by race.” Annie E. 
Casey Foundation. Available at: http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/bar/107-
children-in-single-parent-families-by-
race?loc=1&loct=1#1/any/false/573/10,11,9,12,1,185,13/431 
  
 
168 
Laasko, Janice Hassebrock. 2002. “Key determinants of a mother’s decision to file for 
child support.” Families in Society: The Journal of Contemporary Human 
Services 83(2): 153-162. 
Lemkuil, Daniel J. and Alyssa P. Lemkuil. 2010. “Confused about contempt? Prosecuting 
and defending enforcement cases.” University of Texas School of Law – 2010 
Parent Child Relationships.  
Lens, Vicki. 2009. “Confronting government after welfare reform: Moralists, reformers, 
and narratives of (ir)responsibility at administrative fair hearings.” Law & Society 
Rev. 43(3): 563-592. 
Lin, I. Fen and Sara S. McLanahan. 2007. "Parental Beliefs About Nonresident Fathers’ 
Obligations and Rights." Journal of Marriage and Family 69(2):382-98. 
Lin, I-Fen. 2000. “Perceived Fairness and Compliance With Child Support Obligations.” 
Journal of Marriage and Family 62(2): 388-398. 
Lopoo, Lonard M. and Kerri M. Raissian. 2012. “Natalist Policies in the United States.” 
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 31: 905–946.  
Loprest, Pamela J. 2012. “How has the TANF caseload changed over time?” Urban 
Institute Research Brief #08, March 2012. Office of Planning, Research, and 
Evaluation. 
Marks, Loren, and Rob Palkovitz. 2004. “American fatherhood types: The good, the bad, 
and the uninterested.” Fathering 2(2): 113-129. 
  
 
169 
Massoglia, Michael.2008. “Incarceration, health, and racial disparities,” Law & Society 
Rev.42(2): 275-306. 
May, Rebecca and Marguerite Roulet. 2005. “A look at arrests of low-income fathers for 
child support nonpayment: enforcement, court and program practices.” Center for 
Family Policy and Practice. 
May, Rebecca. 2004. “The effect of child support and criminal justice systems on low-
income non-custodial parents.” Center for Family Policy and Practice. Available 
at: http://www.cffpp.org/publications/CFFPP_MayChildSup0406b.pdf 
McCann, Meghan. 2016. “Child support and incarceration.” National Conference of State 
Legislatures. Available at: http://www.ncsl.org/blog/2016/02/22/child-support-
and-incarceration.aspx  
McCormack, Karen. 2005. “Stratified Reproduction and Poor Women’s Resistance.” 
Gender & Society 19(5): 660-679. 
McLanahan, Sara. 2004. “Diverging destinies: How children are faring under the second 
demographic transition.” Demography 41(4): 607-627. 
Meyer, Daniel R., Maria Cancian, and Kisun Nam. 2007. “Welfare and child support 
program knowledge gaps reduce program effectiveness.” Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management 26: 575–598. 
Meyer, Daniel R. and Maria Cancian. 2012. “‘I’m Not Supporting his Kids’: Nonresident 
Fathers’ Contributions Given Mothers’ New Fertility.” Journal of Marriage and 
Family 74: 132-151. 
  
 
170 
Meyer, Daniel R., Maria Cancian, and Steven T. Cook. 2005. “Multi-partner fertility: 
Incidence and implications for child support policy.” Social Service Review 79(4): 
577-601. 
Mincy, Ronald B. & Elaine J. Sorenson. 1998 “Deadbeats and Turnips in Child Support 
Reform,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 17(1): 44-51. 
Mnookin, Robert H. 1981. “Review: Using Jail for Child Support Enforcement,” The 
University of Chicago Law Rev. 48(2): 338-370. 
Murphy, Jane C. 1991. “Eroding the myth of discretionary justice in family law: The 
child support experiment.” North Carolina Law Review 70: 209-242. 
Natalier, Kristin and Belinda Hewitt. 2010. "'It's Not Just About the Money': Non-Resident 
Fathers' Perspectives on Paying Child Support." Sociology 44(3):489-505. 
Natalier, Kristin and Belinda Hewitt. 2014. “Separated parents reproducing and undoing 
gender through defining legitimate uses of child support.” Gender & Society 
28(6), 904-925. 
Natalier, Kristin. 2012. “Descriptions of loss and resilience among fathers paying child 
support.” Journal of Family Studies 18(2-3), 246-255.  
Nelson, Jennifer. 2003. Women of Color and the Reproductive Rights Movement. NYU 
Press. 
Nepomnyaschy, Lenna and Irwin Garfinkel. 2010. "Child Support Enforcement and 
Father's Contributions to Their Nonmarital Children." Social Service Review 
84(3):341-80. 
  
 
171 
Office of Child Support Enforcement [OCSE]. 2014a. “FY 2014 Preliminary Report.” 
U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, Administration for Children and Families. Available at: 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/programs/css/fy2014_preliminary.pdf. 
OCSE. 2014b. “The Story Behind the Numbers: Major Change in who is Owed Child 
Support Arrears.” U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, Administration for Children and Families. Available at: 
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/programs/css/changes_in_who_is_owe
d_arrears.pdf  
OCSE. 2004. “Understanding Child Support Debt: A Guide to Exploring Child Support 
Debt in Your State.” Department of Health and Human Services, Administration 
for Children and Families. Available at: 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocse/dcl_04_28a.pdf 
Office of the Inspector General [OIG]. 2000. “The Establishment of Child Support 
Orders for Low Income Non-Custodial Parents.” U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services. Available at: https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-05-99-
00390.pdf 
Orloff, Ann. (1993). Gender and the social rights of citizenship. American Sociological 
Review 58(3): 303-328.  
Pager, Devah. 2003. "The Mark of a Criminal Record." American Journal of Sociology 
108(5): 937-975. 
  
 
172 
Patterson, Elizabeth G. 2008. “Civil Contempt and the Indigent Child Support Obligor: 
The Silent Return of Debtor’s Prison.” Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 
18: 95-141. 
Perkinson, Robert. 2010. Texas Tough: The Rise of America’s Prison Empire. New York: 
Picador. 
Pew Research Center. 2013. “Asian-Americans lead all others in household income.” 
Available at: http://www.pewresearch.org/daily-number/asian-americans-lead-all-
others-in-household-income/ 
Pirog, Maureen A. & Kathleen M. Ziol-Guest. 2006 “Policy Retrospectives - Child 
Support Enforcement: Programs and Policies, Impacts and Questions,” Journal of 
Policy Analysis and Management 25(4): 943-990. 
Reichman, Nancy, Julien O. Teitler, Irwin Garfinkel, and Sara S. McLanahan. 2001. 
“Fragile Families: Sample and Design.” Children and Youth Services Review 
23(4/5): 303-316. 
Reynolds, Carl, Mary Cowherd, Andy Barbee, Tony Fabelo, Ted Wood, and Jamie Yoon. 
2009. “A Framework to Improve How Fines, Fees, Resitution and Child Support 
are Assessed and Collected from People Convicted of Crimes: Interim Report.” 
Justice Center: The Council of State Governments.  
Rich, Lauren M., Irwin Garfinkel, and Qin Gao. 2007. “Child support enforcement policy 
and unmarried fathers’ employment in the underground and regular economies.” 
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 26(4): 791-810. 
  
 
173 
Roberts, Paula. 2001. “An ounce of prevention and a pound of cure: Developing state 
police on the payment of child support arrears by low-income parents.” Center for 
Law and Social Policy. 
Schott, Liz, Ladonna Pavetti, and Ife Floyd. 2015. “How states use federal and state 
funds under the TANF block grant.” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. 
Available at: http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/4-8-15tanf_0.pdf  
Sinkewicz, Marilyn and Irvin Garfinkel. 2009. “Unwed fathers’ ability to pay child 
support: New estimates accounting for multiple-partner fertility.” Demography 
46(2): 247-263. 
Solomon-Fears, Carmen. 2012. “Analysis of federal-state financing of the child support 
enforcement program.” Congressional Research Service RL334422. 
Solomon-Fears, Carmen. 2013a. “Child support: An overview of Census Bureau data on 
recipients.” Congressional Research Service RS22499.  
Solomon-Fears, C. 2013b. “Medical child support: Background and current policy.” 
Congressional Research Service 7-5700, R43020. 
Solomon-Fears, Carmen, Alison M. Smith, and Carla Berry. 2012. "Child support 
enforcement: Incarceration as the last resort penalty for nonpayment of support." 
The Green Book. Congressional Research Service 7-5700, R42389. 
Sorenson, Elaine & Chava Zibman. 2001 “Getting to Know Poor Fathers Who Do Not 
Pay Child Support,” Social Service Rev. 75(3): 420-435. 
  
 
174 
Sorenson, Elaine, Liliana Sousa & Simon Schaner. 2007. “Assessing child support 
arrears in nine large states and the nation.” The Urban Institute. Available at: 
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/1001242-
Assessing-Child-Support-Arrears-in-Nine-Large-States-and-the-Nation.PDF 
Steffensmeier, Darrell, and Stephen Demuth. 2001. “Ethnicity and judges’ sentencing 
decisions: Hispanic-Black-White Comparisons.” Criminology 39(1): 145-178. 
Sugie, Naomi F. 2012. “Punishment and Welfare: Paternal Incarceration and Families’ 
Receipt of Public Assistance.” Social Forces 90(4): 1403-1427. 
Task Force on Indigent Defense. 2007. “Supplemental publication re: The costs and 
benefits of an indigent defense verification study.” Texas Indigent Defense 
Commission. Available at: http://tidc.texas.gov/media/27395/supplement-to-
verification-study-final.pdf  
Texas Attorney General’s Office. 2015. “Frequently asked questions about child 
support.” Available at: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/files/faq/cs_faq.pdf  
Texas Family Code §154.131c. Available at: 
http://www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us/Docs/FA/htm/FA.154.htm  
Texas Family Code §157.265b. Available at: 
http://www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us/Docs/FA/htm/FA.157.htm#157.103 
Texas Family Code § 157.266. Available at: 
http://www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us/Docs/FA/htm/FA.157.htm 
  
 
175 
Thomas, Susan L. 1994. "From the culture of poverty to the culture of single 
motherhood: the new poverty paradigm." Women & Politics 14(2): 65-97. 
Turetsky, Vicki. 1998. “You get what you pay for: How federal and state investment 
decisions affect child support performance.” Center for Law and Social Policy. 
Turetsky, Vicki. 2005. “What if all the money came home? Welfare cost recovery in the 
child support program,” Family Court Review 43(3): 402-414. 
Turner, Kimberly J. and Maureen R. Waller. 2017. “Indebted Relationships: Child 
Support Arrears and Nonresident Fathers’ Involvement with Children.” Journal of 
Marriage and Family 79: 24-43. 
Turney, Kristin, and Christopher Wildeman. 2013. "Redefining Relationships: Explaining 
the Countervailing Consequences of Paternal Incarceration for Parenting." 
American Sociological Review 78(6): 949-979.  
Turney, Kristin. 2011. “Labored love: Examining the link between maternal depression 
and parenting behaviors.” Social Science Research 40: 399-415. 
Turney, Kristin. 2014a. “The consequences of paternal incarceration for maternal neglect 
and harsh parenting.” Social Forces 92(4): 1607-1636. 
Turney, Kristin. 2014b. “The intergenerational consequences of mass incarceration: 
Implications for children’s co-residence and contact with grandparents.” Social 
Forces 93(1): 299-327. 
  
 
176 
U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2012a. “Custodial mothers and fathers and their child 
support: 2011.” Current Population Reports, Series P60 – 240, Washington, DC:  
U.S. Government Printing Office.  
U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2012b. “Custodial mothers and fathers and their child 
support: 2011 detailed tables.” Series P60-246. Available at: 
http://www.census.gov/people/childsupport/data/files/chldsu11.pdf 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Administration for Children and 
Families [HHS]. 2002. “Chapter Ten: Enforcement of Support Obligations.” Pp. 
207-310 in Essentials for Attorneys in Child Support Enforcement, 3rd ed.  
U.S. Department of Justice. 2012. “Citizen’s Guide to U.S. Federal Law on Child 
Support Enforcement: 18 U.S.C. §228.” Available at: 
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/citizens-guide-us-federal-law-child-
support-enforcement  
Wacquant, Loic. J. 2009. Prisons of poverty.  Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
Wakefield, Sara, and Christopher James Wildeman. 2014. Children of the prison boom: 
Mass incarceration and the future of American inequality. Oxford University 
Press. 
Waller, Maureen R. 2002. My Baby’s Father: Unmarried Parents and Paternal 
Responsibility. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
  
 
177 
Waller, Maureen R. and Robert Plotnick. 2001. “Effective child support policy for low-
income families: Evidence from street level research.” Journal of Policy Analysis 
and Management 20(1): 89-110. 
Waquant, Loic. 2009. Punishing the poor: The neoliberal government of social 
insecurity. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Western, Bruce and Christopher Wildeman. 2009. “The Black family and mass 
incarceration.” The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social 
Science. 221-242. 
Wildeman, Christopher. 2010. “Paternal incarceration and children’s physically 
aggressive behaviors: Evidence from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing 
Study.” Social Forces 89(1): 285-309. 
Williams, Marian R. 2003. “The effect of pretrial detention on imprisonment decisions.” 
Criminal Justice Review 28(2): 299-316. 
Wisconsin Statute § 35.93, Chapter DCF 150, Appendix C. Available at: 
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/code/admin_code/dcf/101_199/150_c.pdf 
Yee, Lucy Marsh. 1979. “What really happens in child support cases: An empirical study 
of establishment and enforcement of child support orders in the Denver District 
Court.” Denver Law Journal 57(1): 21-68. 
 
